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INTRODUCTION

"In many respects this topic gives law its ultimate test. ''l.
In Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Services,
Inc., 2 a dodgy internet provider lost a major money judgment. 3 The
judgment creditor served a restraining notice on a customer of the
debtor. 4 The restraining notice prohibited the customer from paying
any debt to the internet provider or from assigning, transferring, or
interfering with property in which the internet provider had an

1 DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE§ 476, at 830 (5th ed. 2011). The present Article
is the sequel to a pair of prior installments. See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money
Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1291 (2008)
(hereinafter Carlson, Critique l]; David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment (Part Two:
Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 43 (2009) [hereinafter Carlson,
Critique 11].
2 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121 (N.Y.
2013).
3 See Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2010)
(involving a judgment for charges to access the Verizon system, as ordered by the
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy).
4 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 122.
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interest. 5 Anticipating such a court order and anxious to receive
services from the debtor, the customer had simply arranged to pay
in advance. 6 According to the New York Court of Appeals, this had
the effect of completely negating the restraining notice served on
the customer. 7
Dissenting from the appellate division opinion in the case, Justice
Angela M. Mazzarelli warned, "[t]he majority's narrow view of what
constitutes property for purposes of CPLR article 52 ... places in
[the customer's] hands a virtual road map for frustrating the efforts
of judgment creditors."8
In this Article, I will assess whether Justice Mazzarelli's remark
is justified.
My conclusion is that Verizon exposes serious
weaknesses in the New York law of money judgment collection.
Nevertheless, the decision in Verizon seems eminently correct on
the existing statutory scheme in New York. The fault is not with
the stars who populate the Court of Appeals but in ourselves, whose
elective representatives enacted the CPLR and, in particular, an
overzealous extension of the common law right of setoff in New York
Debtor & Creditor Law section 151.
Verizon reveals many flaws in the CPLR's governance of the
restraining notice and in the surrounding environment of money
judgment enforcement.
First, the CPLR defines "debt" in a
distinctly old fashioned way. According to CPLR section 5201(a),
"[a] money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is
past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of
the judgment debtor." In New York, contingent debts are not debts
at all. 9
As is well known, in ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films,
Inc., 10 the Court of Appeals attempted to palliate this defect by
ruling that contingent debts are also contingent property interests
of the judgment debtor. 11 According to CPLR section 5201(b), "[a]
money judgment may be enforced against any property which could
be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future

Id.; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 123.
1 Id. at 124.
8 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 245, 255-56
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012) (Mazzarelli, J.P., dissenting), aff'd, 990 N.E.2d 121 (2013).
9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
10 ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, (N.Y. 1976).
11 Carlson Critique II, supra note 1, at 99-100.
5
6
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right or interest and whether or not it is vested." 12 ,rVested" means
not subject to a condition precedent. 13 So, unvested property is
contingent property. ABKCO implies that all debts are property, so
all contingent debts are property. As such, contingent debts can be
levied. 14
In Supreme Merchandise Co. v. Chemical Bank, 15 the Court of
Appeals discovered that some contingent debts are so contingent
that they can't be considered property at all. 16 As such, supercontingent debts can never be levied. And that is what the Court of
Appeals also found before it in Verizon. 17 The advance payment
scheme was merely a unilateral offer by the customer to enter into a
contract for the provision of services, the mode of acceptance being
actually providing the desired services. 18 This arrangement did not
rise to the dignity of property. 19 Therefore the restraining notice
was incapable of restraining prepayment for services not yet
rendered. 20 According to the Verizon court, "the expectation of any
continued or future business is too contingent in nature and
speculative to create a present or future property interest."21
Although Verizon arose in the context of restraining notices, it
certainly implies that a levy of the customer would be equally
ineffective. The prepayment scheme was neither debt nor property.
Verizon simply makes express what Supreme Merchandise implied:
not all contingent debts are property. 22
Verizon also entails the second defect in the CPLR-the failure to
associate the restraining notice with liens. Prior to the enactment
of the CPLR, service of a restraining notice did create a lien. 23 In

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
See Christian v. Cnty. of Ontario, 399 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1977).
14 See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A., 190 F.3d 16, 23 (2d
Cir. 1999) ("ABKCO virtually erases the distinction in§ 5201 between 'debt' and 'property' by
re-characterizing-as 'property against which a money judgment may be enforced'-debts
that otherwise are placed out of reach by§ 5201(a)'s requirement that the debt being pursued
be either past due or certain to become due upon demand.").
15 Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 514 N.E.2d 1358 (N.Y. 1987).
16 Carlson Critique II, supra note 1, at 104.
17 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 122
(N.Y. 2013).
18 Id. at 124.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 514 N.E.2d 1358, 1361-63 (N.Y. 1987); Carlson,
Critique II, supra note 1, at 104.
23 See Wickwire Spencer Steel Co. v. Kemkit Sci. Corp., 54 N.E.2d 336, 337 (N.Y. 1944).
12

13
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its first opinion on the CPLR version of the restraining notice, the
Court of Appeals associated the restraining notice with a lien; 24
But, inexplicably, the Court of Appeals overruled itself by dictum. 25
Since then lower courts, with some exceptions, have insisted that
restraining notices do not create liens. 26
This defect should be corrected, but it would not actually have
changed the result in Verizon. Even if the creditor in Verizon had
obtained a valid lien against the customer of the debtor-because
the customer-debtor relation was ABKCO-style property-the result
would have been the same. The deeper problem exposed by Verizon
is that New York law allows for what most states prohibit-the
triangular setoff. 27 This is accomplished in New York Debtor &
Creditor Law section 151, which is the unacknowledged culprit in
Verizon. 28
Verizon brings a third defect to light: the restraining notice
contains an after-acquired provision. 29 Not only is the garnishee
restrained as to property she presently possesses or debts (narrowly
defined) she currently owes, but also she is restrained as to debtor
property obtained after the restraining notice is served, or debts
that become due after service of the restraining notice. 30 But this
rule applies only if, on the day of service, the garnishee possessed
debtor property or owed a debt to the judgment debtor. 31 If the
restraining notice was not effective at the time of service, it is never
effective. 32 In the context of Verizon, the restraining notice simply
did not cover the payment of a super-contingent debt. 33 When the
contingent debt became vested a few days later (as the parties knew
Int'! Ribbon Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 137, 138-39 (N.Y. 1975).
Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (N.Y. 1981) ("In contrast
with prior law ... service of a CPLR 5222 restraining notice confers no priority upon the
judgment creditor in the form of a lien on the judgment debtor's property." (citations
omitted)).
26 See Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 202-07.
27 Turner v. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Turner), 59 F.3d 1041, 1045 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The
general rule, however, holds that triangular setoffs among related parties do not meet the
mutuality requirement."). The triangle would be that the garnishee owes a debt to the sheriff
(thanks to the levy). The judgment debtor owes a debt to the garnishee (on a claim that did
not exist at the time of the levy). Though these are not mutual, New York Debtor & Creditor
Law section 151 permits these non-mutual debts to be set off.
28 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (IV[cKinney 2014).
29 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., 990 N.E.2d 121, 123 (N.Y.
2013).
30 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (IV[cKinney 2014).
24
25

31
32

33

Id.
See id.
Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 124.
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it would), the after-acquired debt principle in section 5222(b)'s third
sentence did not apply because, at the time the restraining notice
was served, the customer owed no debt to the judgment debtor and
possessed no property belonging to the debtor. 34
This article explores the weaknesses of the restraining notice, but
also emphasizes its strength. The restraining notice is especially
powerful when it is served on a third-party who actually owes a
debt (narrowly defined) or who possesses debtor property. Serving a
solvent third-party permits the judgment creditor to recover
damages if the third-party violates the terms of the restraining
notice. 35 Of course, the restraining notice must restrain, which is
precisely what it did not do in Verizon.
This article constitutes the first full exploration of the New York
institution of the restraining notice. 36 With most of the devices of
debt collection, the intercession of a court or a sheriff is necessary.
For example, only a sheriff may levy personal property. 37 Only a
court may order the judgment debtor or third party to turn property
over to the sheriff for sale or to pay a debt to the judgment
creditor. 38 The restraining notice constitutes a quasi-exception to
this judicial monopoly of debt collection procedure. 39
The
Id.; C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
In Mazzuka v. Bank of North America, a creditor was permitted to sue a bank for
negligently allowing the debtor to withdraw funds in violation of a restraining notice:
A judgment creditor's specification of debt or property in a restraining notice is binding
on the person served to the extent of forbidding payment or transfer except pursuant to
an order of the court. If such person does make payment or transfer in disregard of the
restraining notice, he takes the risk of liability for damages and contempt if the
judgment creditor can establish that the debt was owed to the judgment debtor or that
he had an interest in such property.
Mazzuka v. Bank of N. Am., 280 N.Y.S.2d 495, 500 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1967) (quoting
Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1965)); see Accounts Receivable Solutions, Inc. v. Tompkins Trustco, Inc.,
846 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007) (permitting an action for damages based on
negligent violation of restraining notice); Doubet, LLC v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No.
401544/2007, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235, at *49 (Sup. Ct. New York County July 6, 2011)
aff'd, 952 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (quoting Sec. Trust Co. v. Magar Homes, Div. of
R. John Magar & Son Dev. Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1983) ("When a
money judgment is sought for the violation, 'there is no willfulness requirement for imposition
of money damages, [but] there must at least be a showing of negligence in failing to comply
with the restraining notice."'). In such actions, the judgment debtor is not a necessary party
who must be joined. Conde v. Anton Adjustment Co., 508 N.Y.S.2d 884, 884-85 (Civ. Ct. New
York County 1986).
36 The restraining notice was largely omitted from the analysis in Critique II, supra note 1,
because the restraining notice gives rise to no lien.
3 7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a), 6214(a), (c) (McKinney 2014).
38 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(a)-(b), C.P.L.R. 5227 (McKinney 2014).
39 Doubet, LLC v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 401544/2007, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235,
34

35
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restraining notice, to be sure, is a court order, 40 but the CPLR
appoints the attorney for the judgment creditor as an officer of the
court for the purpose of issuing such a notice. 41 As a result, a
creditor's attorney can "costless[ly]" launch this important collection
tactic without making a motion to any court. 42
In exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the restraining
notice after Verizon, this Article is divided into three parts. Part I
deals with all aspects of the restraining notice, except for those
restraining notices served on third party banks whose customers
receive exempt income stream.
Part I analyzes New York's
unfortunately narrow definition of "debt" and how it plays havoc
with restraining notices. 43
Restraints on banks are governed by the Exempt Income
Protection Act ("EIPA"), 44 enacted in 2008, which is considered in
Part II. This legislation is designed to force banks to protect its
customers who receive exempt income streams, such as social
security payments. 45 Already class actions abound, claiming that
banks are failing to conform to the EIPA. 46 So far these class
actions have been barred or at least inhibited, on the theory that
the legislature did not intend to authorize private rights of action
under the EIPA. 47 This very question has been certified by the
federal court to the New York Court of Appeals. 48
In Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 49 the New York Court of Appeals ruled
that banks who deliberately flout the law and refuse to cooperate
with the EIPA cannot be sued for tort damages. 50 A senior citizen
who has been wronged by her bank can only obtain relief in a
special proceeding under CPLR sections 5239 or 5240, 51 where

at *29---30 (Sup. Ct. New York County July 6, 2011).
40 Id. at *29 ("Although CPLR 5222(a) permits an attorney for the judgment creditor to
issue a restraining notice without the court's involvement, it is legal process nonetheless ....
Like any legal process, it is an assertion of the court's, and the state's, power.").
41 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014).
42 John Infrap.ca, Safer Than the Mattress? Protecting Social Security Benefits from Bank
Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1127, 1184 (2009).
4a See infra Part LG.
44 Exempt Income Property Act, ch. 575, 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4086 (codified as amended
at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222, 5222-a, 5230, 5231, and 5232).
45 See infra Part II.A.
46 See, e.g., Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 711 F.3d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 2013).
41 Id. at 263-64.
48 Id. at 271.
49 Cruz v. TD Bank, N. Am., 2 N.E.3d 221 (N.Y. 2013).
50 See id. at 232.
s1 See id.
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damages may well be unavailable. I will argue that the Court of
Appeals has, in effect, used the EIPA to change the tort law of New
York. Prior to 2008, anyone victimized by an intentional refusal by
a third party to obey the CPLR was indeed able to bring a tort
action. Whether this can still happen after Cruz is in severe doubt.
For example, garnishees in pre-judgment attachment cases have a
duty to report whether they owe· the defendant a debt or whether
they control debtor property. 52 Deliberate falsehoods in such
garnishee statements gave rise to an action in tort for damages. 53 It
is no longer clear that false statements that harm plaintiffs are
tortious, under the law of New York.
Very closely joined with the restraining notice is the information
subpoena. 54 Like the restraining notice, a subpoena may be issued
without judicial intervention. 55 Indeed, before the CPLR, there was
no distinction between the restraining notice and the information
subpoena. 56 The subpoena implied the restraining notice. The
CPLR has divided these collection tools in two, though universally
they will be found together, like a divorced couple still maintaining
a household. 57 Accordingly, Part III considers the scope of the
information subpoena.

I. RESTRAINING NOTICES
A. .What Are They?

For historic and perhaps also for good reason, most enforcement
procedures in New York are delegated to judicial officers, such as
judges, sheriffs, marshals or receivers. 58 Creditor self-help has long
been discouraged. 59 Thus, a levy of property capable of delivery
under a post-judgment writ of execution requires a sheriff to take
the property into her possession. 60 This is no doubt justified by the

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6219 (McKinney 2014).
See Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 898, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1985).
54 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3) (McKinney 2014).
·
66 See C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3)(i).
66 See SENATE FIN. COMM., SIXTH REPORT OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE TO THE
LEGISLATURE, N.Y. Legis. Doc. 8, at 47 (1962).
67 For instance, the garnishee in Verizon was served both with a restraining notice and
with a subpoena. Verizon New England, Inc. v Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990. N.E.2d
121, 122 (N.Y. 2013).
58 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
59 Osborne v. Moss, 7 Johns. Cas. 161, 164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (per curiam).
60 See C.P.L.R. 5232(b).
62
63
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notion that dispossession inherently threatens the peace, and we
therefore want a judicial officer doing the dispossessing. A levy of
property not capable of delivery pursuant to a postjudgment
execution involves no dispossession. 61 It requires only the service of
the execution on the garnishee. 62 Any levy under a prejudgment
order of attachment is likewise accomplished by serving the
execution or the order of attachment63 on a debtor or a garnishee. 64
These we may call "paper" levies. One may question whether we
really need a judicial officer to deliver the piece of paper that
accomplishes the levy.
A quasi-exception to the state monopoly on debt enforcement is
the restraining notice. 65
Newly introduced in 1963, 66 the
restraining notice was "added to the arsenal of judgment creditors
because of the 'great number of judgments which were never
satisfied and those that were satisfied only after years of litigation
involving great expenditures of time and money."'67
Only
Minnesota's "garnishment" summons is similarin this respect. 68
A restraining notice is a court order commanding its recipient to
pay no debt to or transfer rio property of a ,judgment debtor that
might be levied pursuant to an execution. 69 It may issue at any
time after entry of judgment. 70 In federal cases, a restraining notice
s1 C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
52

Id.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a), 6214(a) (McKinney 2014). A sheriff serving an order of
attachment simply serves paper and does not divest a third party garnishee of debtor
property. It is open for a plaintiff to insist that the sheriff seize possession of the debtor's
property capable of delivery, but the sheriff
insist on an "indemnity satisfactory to him or
fixed by the court." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6215 (McKinney 2014).
·
64 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(i) (McKinney 2014) ("A 'garnishee' is a person who owes a debt to a
judgment debtor, or a person other than the judgment debtor who has property in his
possession or custody in which judgment debtor has an interest.''). ·
·
66 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222 (McKinney 2014).
66 Civil Practice Law and Rules, ch. 308, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1297, 1444, 1550. Prior to the
CPLR, Civil Practice Act section 781 provided that a subpoena on a debtor or garnishee had
the effect of restraining alienation by the person served. See, e.g., Prever v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 43 F. Supp 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). But the subpoena had to be issued by a court. See
Act of Apr. 9, 1938, ch. 605, sec. 1, 3-4, §§ 774(1), 779, 781, 1938 N.Y. Laws 1601, 1601-04.
67 Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., Inc., 378 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1975) (citation omitted) (quoting Stathopoulos v. Seaways Shipping Corp., 321
N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1971)).
68 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.71(3) (West 2013) ("[A] creditor may issue a garnishment
summons ... at any time after entry of a money judgment in the civil action."); MlNN. STAT.
ANN.§ 571.73 (West 2013) ("[S]ervice of the garnishment summons upon the garnishee shall
obligate the garnishee to retain possession and control of the disposable earnings,
indebtedness, money, and property of the debtor ....").
69 See SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 508, at 887.
10 See N. Shore Univ. Hosp. at Plainview v. Citibank Legal Serv. Intake Unit, 883 N.Y.S.2d
63

will

a
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may issue under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
("FRCP") 69 (which incorporates state law), 71 although a restraining
notice issued within fourteen days of entry of a federal judgment
violates FRCP 62(a). 72
A restraining notice may be issued by a court, 73 a clerk of the
court, or, most significantly, "the attorney for the judgment creditor
as officer of the court." 74 It may not, however, be issued by the
judgment creditor directly (unless the judgment creditor is an
attorney foolishly representing herself). 75 A judgment creditor
without an attorney will have to apply, hat in hand, to the clerk of
the court for a restraining notice. 76
Prejudgment restraining notices are also available even earlierif "a verdict or decision has been rendered." 77 Unlike the ordinary
898, 903 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 2009); see also Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, 541
N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1989) (restraining notice served one-half hour
after judgment was entered). An order directing the clerk to enter a money judgment is not
the same as actual entry. H & H Reaity Prop. LLC v. Rodriguez, No. L & T 8377/10, 2011
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 348, at *5 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County Feb. 15, 2011). Premature issuance of
the restraining notice may result in awarding attorneys' fees to the judgment debtor per N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.l(a) (2013).
71 EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 131 F. App'x 745, 746 (2d Cir. 2005).
72 See Whale Square Fire Litig. Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. Elul Realty Corp., No.
CV-88-3039, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14353, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 1992) (applying a ten
day period under a prior version of Rule 62(a)). According to Rule 62(a), "[N]o execution may
issue on a judgment, nor may proceedings be taken to enforce it, until 14 days have passed
after its entry." FED. R. CN. P. 62(a).
73 In Riverside Capital Advisors, Inc. v. First Secured Capital Corp., 814 N.Y.S.2d 646
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006), a court was reversed for unilaterally restraining transfers by the
recipient of an information subpoena, as the recipients had never been made parties to a
proceeding. Id. at 649. This is odd, because the attorneys for the creditor could have issued
the same restraint without any hearing or motion of any kind.
74 N.Y. G.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added). Additionally, a restraining
notice may be issued ''by the support collection unit designated by the appropriate social
services district." Id. This unit is concerned with supporting subrogation claims where the
state has paid a family member the amount of alimony or child support and the state now
wishes to reimburse itself through the support collection unit. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
111-h(l) (McKinney 2014).
75 See C.P.L.R. 5222(a).
76 See id. ("[A restraining notice] shall contain an original signature or copy of the original
signature of the clerk of the court or attorney or the name of the support collection unit which
issued it.").
77 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5229 (McKinney 2014).
A "decision" seems to refer to the grant of
summary judgment, see Ibanez v. Pfeiffer, 350 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966-67 (Civ. Ct. Queens County
1973), or victory in an arbitration, see Loew v. Kolb, No. 03 Civ. 5064 (RCC), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15628, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003). In federal cases, the section 5229 restraint is
invoked by FRCP 64. Sequa Capital Corp. v. Nave, 921 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
One court declined relief under section 5229 in a post-arbitration case because only a "trial
judge" can order the prejudgment restraint, and the court was not the "trial judge" of the
arbitration. Unex Ltd. v. Arsygrain lnt'l Corp., 424 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1979). A magistrate judge can at best recommend to the district court judge that a
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postjudgment restraining notice, the prejudgmE;Jnt version requires
a motion to and order by the trial judge. 78 Separately, and even
before there is a verdict, a court might issue a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction as an adjunct to
prejudgment attachment, but these too would require judicial
intervention, plus grounds for the attachment. 79 Only postjudgment
restraining notices can issue without a judicial seal of approval. 80
A restraining notice is to be distinguished from a turnover order
under CPLR section 5225(a) or (b) or under CPLR section 5227. 81
Only a court can issue a turnover order. 82 The CPLR commands
that property be handed over to the sheriff for the purpose of
liquidating it (if illiquid), or that a debt due and owing be paid to
the judgment creditor. 83 Any proceeds received are to be used to
satisfy the money judgment. 84 A turnover order is therefore more
intrusive than a restraining notice. 85 It forces the recipient to do
something, whereas the restraining notice admonishes the recipient
to do nothing. 86
prejudgment restraining notice be issued. See Leser v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. CV 20092362 (KAM)(MDG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33168, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013).
78 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5229 (McKinney 2014).
In general, such a restraint is within the
discretion of the court, Berg v. Au Cafe, Inc., No. 108437/05, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5865, at
*2 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 24, 2009), and requires a reason, such as evidence of
intent to make fraudulent conveyances, see Kaminsky v. Kahn, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1965), or failure of the defendant to show up for the hearing on
the motion. See Loew, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15628, at *4. That the defendant has moved to
reverse the verdict might be considered but is not per se grounds to deny the prejudgment
restraint. See Gallegos v. Elite Model Mgmt. Corp., 768 N.Y.S.2d 134, 139 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 2003). In Gallegos, the court remarked: "The restraints imposed by CPLR 5229
do not affect property that is not otherwise available to satisfy a money judgment, such as
payment of salaries and living expenses that are ordinarily incurred." Id. Surely, it is within
the discretion of a court to restrain transfers in the ordinary course of business, though
undoubtedly it is also open to sculpt the restraint so that ordinary course transfers are
permitted. See, e.g., Berg, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5865, at *3.
79 See Green v. Gaskell, No. 87 Civ. 3861 (CSH), 1988 U.S. DisLLEXIS 3510, at *3, *10-13
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1988) (discussing the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, but refusing to issue an injunction for want of evidence of the defendant's
fraudulent intent); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to
Secure Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 268-85 (1992) (discussing
prejudgment attachment remedies generally, including temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions).
80 See SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 508, at 887-88.
8 1 N.Y. C.P.L.R 5225(a)-(b), 5227 (McKinney 2014).
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(c) (McKinney 2014).
8 5 McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 275 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
86 Thus, a garnishee who has received a restraining notice actually violates it by paying
the debtor's money over to the judgment creditor. In re Estate of Wooton, 361 N.Y.S.2d 137,
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Although it is rarely noticed, the levy by a sheriff of personal
property not capable of delivery ends up being nothing more than a
combined restraining notice and a turnover order. Section 5232(a)'s
seventh sentence establishes the levy as a restraining notice:
Until such transfer or payment is made, or until the
expiration of ninety days after the service of the execution
upon him or her, or of such further time as is provided by
any order of the court served upon him or her, whichever
event first occurs, the garnishee is forbidden to make or
suffer any sale, assignment or transfer · of, or any
interference with, any such property, or pay over or
otherwise dispose of any such debt, to any person other than
the sheriff or the support collection unit, except upon
direction of the sheriff or the support collection unit or
pursuant to an order of the court. 87
A levy pursuant to an execution is also a turnover order.
According to section 5232(a)'s fifth sentence, "[t]he person served
with the execution shall forthwith transfer all such property, and
pay all such debts upon maturity, to the sheriff or to the support
collection unit and execute any document necessary to effect the
transfer or payment."88
Whereas the sheriff is expected to take possession of "property
capable of delivery," the role of the sheriff in levying property not
capable of delivery is quite passive. 89 Once the sheriff serves the
piece of paper (thereby earning a fee of 5 percent), the sheriff takes
no further coercive steps against the garnishee. 90 The levy is purely
injunctive in nature; if the garnishee refuses to comply, the sheriff
is insouciant. 91 Indeed, the levy lapses entirely after ninety days,
and with it the duty of the garnishee not to transfer the debtor's
property or pay debts to the debtor. 92 To perpetuate the turnover
138 (Sur. Ct. Schenectady County 1974).
87 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014). Prior to the CPLR, such a statement existed as
to levies of orders of attachment, but not as to levies of post-judgment executions. Sumitomo
Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1965), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966).
8 8 C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
89 C.P.L.R. 5232(b). The sheriff may not, however, interfere "with the lawful possession of
pledgees and lessees." Id.
90 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8012(b)(l) (McKinney 2014).
Outside New York City, where life is
inexpensive; the fee is 3 percent after the first $250,000. Id.
91 SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 496, at 871-872.
92 Id. Restraining notices last one year, insofar as garnishees are concerned. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5222(b) (McKinney 2014). If a restraining notice is served in addition to a levy, it remains in

I
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order and restraining notice that the levy consists of, the judgment
creditor is expected to commence a turnover proceeding to force the
turnover to the sheriff. 93 The mere commencement of a turnover
proceeding has the effect of extending the restraining and the
turnover aspects of the levy. 94 In comparison, in the absence of a
levy, the mere commencement of the turnover proceeding creates no
lien95-only obtaining the turnover order does. 96 In short, there is
an overlap between a levy, turnover order, and restraining notice. 97
Only the last of these can be issued without judicial involvement. 98
These same points also apply to the prejudgment order of
attachment, except that, presumptively, all levies are paper levies. 99
The levy under an order of attachment is, basically, nothing but a
combined turnover order and a restraining order .100 Such a levy is
purely injunctive, and purely in personam in nature, contrary to
some recent careless analysis by the Court of Appeals. 101

effect even after the levy lapses. See Singh v. Singh, No. 9893/2009, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
5503, at *12-14 (Sup. Ct. Queens County Nov. 10, 2010).
93 SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 496, at 871, § 510, at 896.
94 C.P.L.R. 5232(a) ("At the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made by service of the
execution, or of such further time as the court, upon motion of the judgment creditor or
support collection unit has provided, the levy shall be void except as to property or debts
which have been transferred or paid to the sheriff or to the support collection unit or as to
which a proceeding under sections 5225 or 5227 has been brought.").
96 Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 178 (citing County Nat'l Bank v. Inter-County
Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 317 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970).
96 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2014).
I criticize this aspect of New York law in
Critique II, supra note 1, at 176-82. In ancient times, mere commencement of the equitable
action brought property in custodia legis. See id. at 178-79.
97 One difference between turnover orders and levies of debt might be noted. A turnover
order directs a third party or the debtor to pay money directly to the judgment creditor. N.Y
C.P.L.R. 5225(a)-(b) (McKinney 2014). A levy requires that money be paid to the sheriff, not
to the judgment creditor. C.P.L.R. 5232(a). This may relate to the sheriffs entitlement to a
fee for levying. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8012(b)(l) (McKinney 2014).
98 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014).
99 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214 (McKinney 2014).
A plaintiff may insist that the sheriff take
possession of property capable of delivery, but the sheriff is entitled to an indemnity. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 6215 (McKinney 2014).
10° C.P.L.R. 6214(b).
The levy lasts only ninety days, but is extended if the creditor
commences a turnover proceeding against the garnishee. C.P.L.R. 6214(e).
101 In Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009), the court remarks, "By
contrast, an article 62 attachment proceeding operates only against property, not any person."
Id. at 828. This couldn't be more mistaken. The final product of a levy under an order of
attachment is an in personam injunction against a person. See Michael A. McGarry, Jr.,
Note, Vestiges of Jurisdiction: On the In Rem Nature of Pre-Judgment Attachment in New
York, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2011). The thing garnished is left quite unattended by
the sheriff, though the garnishee is ordered "personally" to hand it over to the sheriff. Id. at
1617.
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B. Lien Significance
Regrettably, service of the restraining notice is not to be
associated with the creation of a lien on the debtor's property. The
restraining notice "is but a 'junior remedy' in the arsenal of
enforcement mechanisms under CPLR article 52." 102
By way of background, a lien can be defined as a power of sale (or
a power of collection, in the case of debts owed to the judgment
debtor). 103 The creation of a lien constitutes a property transfer
between the debtor and the creditor. 104 Once a lien arises, the
debtor has been alienated from an aspect of his property. 105 The
property, if illiquid, can now be sold by a court officer, whether it be
the sheriff, marshal, or a receiver .106
In New York, liens on personal property associated with money
judgments are created in two ways, as described by CPLR sections
5202(a) and (b). 107 Execution liens are authorized under CPLR
section 5202(a). 108 An execution commands the sheriff to levy
property of the judgment debtor. 109 This brand of lien we shall
leave to one side. More pertinent for our current purpose is section
5202(b), which provides:
Where a judgment creditor has secured an order for delivery
of, payment of, or appointment of a receiver of, a debt owed
to the judgment debtor or an interest of the judgment debtor
in personal property, the judgment creditor's rights in the
debt or property are superior to the rights of any transferee
of the debt or property, except a transferee who acquired the
Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1981).
Carlson Critique I, supra note 1, at 1300.
104 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(A) (2012).
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes this by defining
"transfer" to include "the creation of a lien." Id.
105 See id.
106 A marshal might work for a lower state court, such as the City Court of New York. See,
e.g., N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 701(b) (McKinney 2014) ("The provisions of law applicable in
supreme court practice, relating to the execution of mandates by a sheriff and the power and
control of the court over the sheriff executing the same, shall apply in this court; and they
shall apply equally to both sheriffs and marshals."). Or a marshal might be an officer of the
federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 561(c) (2006). In the latter case, FRCP 69 makes the CPLR
relevant to a federal marshal's power to execute judgments. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(l).
107 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)-(b) (McKinney 2014).
108 C.P.L.R. 5202(a).
Basically, an execution lien arises when the sheriff receives an
execution. Id. An execution is a court order directing the sheriff to levy personal property.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a) (McKinney 2014). As with the restraining notice and the subpoena, the
attorney for the judgment creditor, as officer of the court, can issue the execution. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5230(b) (McKinney 2014).
109 C.P.L.R. 5230(a).
102
103
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debt or property for fair consideration and without notice of
such order. 110
It is not easy to wrest from the language of section 5202(b) the
point that liens are created, as the provision does not use the word
"lien."m What one reads here is that a judgment creditor has
"rights in the debt or property'' upon the occurrence of enumerated
events. 112 These rights are said to be "superior to the rights of any
transferee of the debt or property." 113 From this we are to conclude
that the creditor's power to initiate a procedure that will culminate
in a sale (or in the case of a debt, a collection) is superior to the
rights of a subsequent transferee. Of course, the word "subsequent"
does not appear before the word "transferee." But surely this is
what the legislature intended. Otherwise, a turnover order or a
receivership erases any pre-existing transfer by the debtor,
including absolute transfers.
It is significant that only three events trigger the judgment
creditor's "right." First is the securing of "an order for delivery of ..
. an interest of the judgment debtor in personal property." 114 This is
the turnover order described in CPLR section 5225(a) and (b). 115
Second is an order for "payment of ... a debt owed to the judgment
debtor." 116 This is the turnover order described in CPLR section
5227. 117 Third is the securing of an order for the appointment of
receiver of either a debt or property, accomplished pursuant to
CPLR section 5228. 118 When any of these events occurs, the creditor
achieves· a place in the priority scheme when property is finally
liquidated. 119
Conspicuously absent from this list of lien-creating events is the
issuance of a restraining notice or information subpoena. This
omission has led to the conclusion that the creditor gains no
property rights by virtue of serving the restraining notice or
subpoena. 120 A restraining notice is supposed to have no influence
C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
11 5 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225 (a)-(b) (McKinney 2014).
116 C.P.L.R. 5202(b).
117 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227 (McKinney 2014).
118 C.P.L.R. 5202(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a) (McKinney 2014).
119 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(c) (McKinney 2014).
12 0 See Medi-Physics, Inc v. Cmty. Hosp. of Rockland Cnty., 432 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596
(Rockland County Ct. 1980).
110
111

1504

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 77.4

on a creditor's priority. 121 Rather, the restraining notice is good
against the person served, but not good against the world, which is
another way of saying that no lien arises from service of the
restraining notice. 122
Prior to the CPLR, the restraining notice was an adjunct to an
information subpoena. Without a court order, attorneys for the
judgment creditor could serve a subpoena on a third party. 123 The
subpoena implied an injunction against alienating property of or
paying a debt to the debtor. 124 In Wickwire Spencer Steel Co. v.
Kemkit Scientific Corp., 125 the New York Court of Appeals held that
service of a subpoena on a garnishee constituted commencing a
supplementary proceeding, thereby creating a lien on the debtor's
assets. 126 Since subpoenas were also restraining notices, the case
established that the restraining notice was lien significant-that is,
it effectuated a transfer of property from the debtor to the
creditor. 127
Wickwire was controversial because the only reference to the lien
significance of subpoenas was in former Civil Practice Act section
808, which presupposed the appointment of a receiver. 128 Section
808(1) and (2) provided that the title of a receiver to the debtor's
property related back to the service of a subpoena upon either the
debtor or a garnishee. 129 Yet there was no receiver in Wickwire. 130
The Wickwire court induced from the receivership statute a state
policy that commencement of a supplementary proceeding creates a
lien, and that serving a subpoena on the judgment debtor or
garnishee was tantamount to starting a supplementary
121 See Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004)
(citing Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (N.Y. 1981); Princeton
Bank & Trust Co. v. Berley, 394 N.Y.S.2d 714, 721 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); City of New
York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965)); New York v. Birch, 478
N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1984); Steingart Assocs. v. Lots of Fun, Inc.,
485 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (Sullivan County Ct. 1985).
122 See Birch, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
123 Capital Co. v. Fox, 115 F. Supp. 677, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); N.Y. Civil Practice Act §
779(2), L. 1920, ch. 925 (repealed Sept. 1, 1963).
124 See N.Y. Civil Practice Act§ 781, L. 1920, ch. 925 (repealed Sept. 1, 1963).
125 Wickwire Spencer Steel Co. v. Kemkit Sci. Corp., 54 N.E.2d 336 (N.Y. 1944).
126 Id. at 337.
127 City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965) (citing
Wickwire, 54 N.E.2d at 337).
128 Daniel H. Distler & Milton J. Schubin, Enforcement Priorities and Liens: The New York
Judgment Creditor's Rights in Personal Property, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 488 (1960).
129 See N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 808(1)-(2), L. 1920, ch. 925 (repealed Sept. 1, 1963);
Distler & Schubin, supra note 128, at 491.
130 Distler & Schubin, supra note 128, at 488.
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proceeding. 131
After the enactment of the CPLR, it has proved difficult to claim
that the subpoena or a restraining notice is a lien-significant
event. 132 Section 5202(b) seems to endow lien significance on just
the three enumerated equitable remedies-the two species of
turnover order and the commencement of the receivership. 133 Since
the newly created restraining notice is not referenced there, the
restraining notice, like the information subpoena, has no property
significance .134
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals briefly entertained
the notion that service of a restraining notice gave rise to a lien. In
International Ribbon Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc., 135 a
judgment creditor served a restraining notice on the debtor. 136
Shortly after, the judgment debtor made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors. 137 The judgment creditor then sought a
turnover against the assignee pursuant to section 5225(b). 138
Obviously, a turnover was appropriate only if the judgment creditor
already had a lien prior to the transfer of property to the assignee.
If the creditor had to rely solely on section 5202(b) for its lien right,
the earlier assignment for the benefit of creditors made any
turnover order too late. There would have been no debtor property
to which the judgment creditor's lien could attach. The assignee
would have had it all before the turnover order could issue.
Nevertheless, Judge Charles Breitel ruled that, by virtue of the

See Wickwire, 54 N.E.2d at 337.
See Mantovani v. Fast Fuel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Meadow Brook
Nat'l Bank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 260 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1965); Panzirer, 259
N.Y.S.2d at 287-88. Because a judgment creditor has no interest in a debtor's property
merely by serving a restraining notice on a third party, where the third party violates the
restraining notice, the judgment creditor is dis&ntitled to pre-violation interest. Doubet, LLC
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., No. 401544/07, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5607, at *2-4 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 2011).
133 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2014).
134 See id.
13 5 Int'l Ribbon Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 137 (N.Y. 1975).
13 6 Id. at 138.
13 7 Id.
Prior to the permanent institution of federal bankruptcy in 1898, debtors could
commence a collective creditors' proceeding by making an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Although initially contractual in nature, a history of private abuse led the New
York legislature to govern the proceedings by statute. Debtor and Creditor Law, ch. 17, §§ 324, 1909 N.Y. Laws 445, 447-54 (Consol.). Federal bankruptcy law has largely eclipsed the
assignment for the benefit of creditors, but the procedure still exists and is even occasionally
used. See Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, l AM. BANKR. L. REV. 347, 358
(1993).
138 See Int'l Ribbon Mills, 325 N.E.2d at 138.
13 1
13 2
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pre-assignment restraining notice, the judgment creditor was senior
to the assignee. 139 He so ruled even as he acknowledged that the
legislative history disfavored lien significance for the restraining
notice. 140 Early drafts of CPLR section 5222, it seems, had
expressly provided that creditors had a lien upon serving a
restraining notice. 141 This provision, however, was later deleted. 142
The thrust of Judge Breitel's analysis is the truism that an
assignee takes the same rights as the assignor had. 143 Since the
assignor was enjoined from making conveyances, the assignee was
likewise enjoined. 144 The restraint was inherited, as it were, by the
assignee. 145 Or, in our previous terms, the restraining notice was
good against the "world" (and more specifically, against the
assignee) even though the assignee had never been served. 146 The
only way to escape the injunction was for the assignee to pay the
judgment creditor the amount of the judgment. 147
If logic holds sway, this ruling cannot be contained to
assignments for the benefit of creditors. All transfers convey only
the rights of the debtor; any transferee inherits the restraining
obligation if the judgment debtor was so restrained.
So
International Ribbon Mills attributes universal lien significance to
service of the restraining notice. 148 This would, incidentally, make
139 Id. at 139. The court cites, with approval, In re City of New York, where the city owed a
judgment debtor a condemnation award. In re City of New York, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 682 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1968). The creditor served a restraining notice and the debtor made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors in violation of the restraining notice. Id. While
denying that the creditor had a lien, the court ordered the city to pay the creditor-which, of
course, meant that the creditor did have a lien. Id. at 684.
140 Int'l Ribbon Mills, 325 N.E.2d at 138-39.
141 Id.
·
142 See ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, N.Y. Legis. Doc. 15, at A562-A563 (1961); ADVISORY COMM. ON
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, THIRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF STATE
OF NEW YORK, N.Y. Legis. Doc. 17, at 252 (1959).
143 Int'l Ribbon Mills, 325 N.E.2d at 139. Property theorists refer to this as the principle of
nemo dat quod non habet, "the principle that one cannot transfer an interest in property that
the transferor does not have." Thomas E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling
Fundamental Property Principles and Plain Language, 68 Bus. LAW. 439, 441-42 (2013).
144 Int'l Ribbon Mills, 325 N.E.2d at 139.
14s Id.
14s Id.
147 See id.; cf Midlantic Nat'l Bank/N. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 814 F. Supp. 1195, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (serving a restraining notice before a receiver was appointed did not create a
lien on the receivership estate).
148 Int'l Ribbon Mills, 325 N.E.2d at 139; see also Spinello v. Spinello, 334 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) ("There can be little doubt that on December 15, 1971, Mrs.
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the lien for the restraining notice better than the lien for the
turnover order or receivership. According to section 5202(b), the
lien for the turnover or receivership is inferior to the rights of "a
transferee who acquired the debt or property for fair consideration
and without notice of such order." 149 No express bona fide
purchaser protection would exist (at least by statute) with regard to
the lien arising from the restraining notice. 150
Oddly, in International Ribbon Mills, Judge Breitel overruled his
own earlier opinion for the Appellate Division in City of New York v.
Panzirer. There, a judgment creditor (JC1) served a restraining
notice on a garnishee, who held proceeds from the sale of the
judgment debtor's business. 151 A different judgment creditor (JC2)
obtained a levy before JC1 could obtain a turnover order. 152 Judge
Breitel, citing the very legislative history he scorned m
International Ribbon Mills, ruled in favor of JC2:
The result, then, is that in order for a judgment to attain
status in the ranking of priorities there must either be a
levy, an order directing delivery of property, or the
appointment of a receiver. Any other measures taken by the
judgment creditor, no matter how diligent, on an absolute or
comparative basis, do not suffice to qualify for priority. 153
This was quite opposite to the holding in International Ribbon
Mills.
While International Ribbon Mills attributes lien-creating
significance to a restraining notice, the Court of Appeals soon sang
a different tune (albeit in the key of dictum) in Aspen Industries,
Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank. 154
Astonishingly, it cited
International Ribbon Mills as authority for its dictum, 155 even

Spinello, as her ex-husband's judgment creditor personally serving [the garnishee] with a
restraining notice, established her lien against any debt owed to [the debtor] by [the
garnishee].").
14 9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2014).
150 See id.
151 City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285-86 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 288.
154 Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810--11 (N.Y. 1981) ("In
contrast with prior law, service of a CPLR 5222 restraining notice confers no priority upon
the judgment creditor in the form of a lien on the judgment debtor's property." (citations
omitted)).
166 As did Garland D. Cox & Assocs. v. Koffman, 413 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 400 N.E.2d 302 (1979) and Steingart Assocs. v. Lots of Fun,
Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (Cnty. Ct. Sullivan County 1985).
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though International Ribbon Mills held the dead opposite.
The temptation of common law judges to equate a defendant's
equitable duty with a property right in the plaintiff is strong. For
example, real estate law makes contracts enforceable by specific
performance. 156 To assure remedy's bite against transferees of the
contracting seller, it is said that, just as the seller holds title in
trust for the buyer, so the seller's (bad faith) transferee equally
holds property in trust for the buyer. 157 As a result, a third party
with knowledge of the equitable duty takes this "trust" property
from the seller and holds it for the buyer. 158 Similarly, where an
owner of real estate agrees to hold land as security for some
obligation, courts are quick to say that there is an "equitable lien"
on the property. 159 Such doctrines guarantee that a bad faith
purchaser is fully subject to an injunction that a court might issue
with regard to the real property. 160 Only bona fide purchasers for
value take free of such equitable encumbrances. 161
Accordingly, in spite of Aspen's discouraging dictum, some courts,
following this strong instinct, have induced lien-like properties in
the restraining notice. In Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, a
judgment creditor served a restraining notice on a trustee of the
judgment debtor. 162 After the restraining notice, the garnishee
advanced funds to the judgment debtor. 163 It then sought to set off
its loan to the judgment debtor against the corpus of the trust,
thereby defeating the judgment creditor's restraining notice. 164
The court did not permit the setoff, although setoffs are generally
156 Jason S. Kirwan, Note, Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of
Specific Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 4 7 WM. & MARYL. REV. 697, 702 (2005).
157 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2014).
158 This is called the doctrine of equitable conversion. Trs. of Union Coll. v. Wheeler, 61
N.Y. 88, 109 (1874).
159 E.g., Teichman ex rel. Teichman v. Cmty. Hosp., 663 N.E.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. 1996) ("[A]n
equitable lien 'is dependent upon some agreement express or implied that there shall be a
lien on specific property.' The agreement 'must deal with some particular property either by
identifying it or by so describing it that it can be identified and must indicate with sufficient
clearness an intent that the property so described or rendered capable of identification is to
be held, given or transferred as security for an obligation." (quoting James v. Alderton Dock
Yards, 176 N.E. 401, 403 (N.Y. 1931))).
160 See, e.g., Lipshy v. Sabbeth, 520 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1987).
161 Bridges v. Nat'l Bank of Troy, 77 N.E. 1005, 1006 (N.Y. 1906) (citing Buffalo German
Ins. Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank of Buffalo, 56 N.E. 521, 525-26 (N.Y. 1900)).
162 Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, 541 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1989).
1aa Id.
164 See id. at 928.
The case involved some advances made prior to service of the
restraining notice. These were treated quite differently. See infra text accompanying notes
539-51.

2013/2014]

Critique of Money Judgment Part Three

1509

good against levies. 165 In effect, the stuff of the prohibited setoff
was made available to satisfy the judgment creditor's judgment.
This can only be explained if the restraining notice had already
encumbered the corpus of the trust prior to the assertion of the
setoff. 166
Similarly, in Rafkind v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 167 the SEC
had enjoined a bank from paying a bank account. 168 Admittedly, the
restraining injunction had a federal origin, but the court cited CPLR
section 5201(b) to the effect that "[a] money judgment may be
enforced against any property which could be assigned or
transferred." 169 The court reasoned that the judgment creditor
could not bring a turnover proceeding against the bank under
section 5227, because the injunction prohibited the bank from
paying anyone but the SEC. 170 If this is correct, then restraining
notices generally have a lien effect on bank accounts (at least when
they have a federal origin). They reserve for the beneficiary of the
injunction the sole right to collect in satisfaction of a judgment.
In W.J. Towell & Co. v. Perfumer's Workshop Int'l, Ltd., 171
attorneys served with a restraining notice had control over a
debtor's certificate of deposit. 172 The attorneys asserted a "retaining
lien" over the account-something that the common law of New
York permits. 173 The "retaining lien" was held to be invalid because
the judgment creditor had already served the attorneys with a
restraining notice. 174
This result only makes sense if the
restraining notice endowed the creditor with a lien.
In spite of these rare examples, it must be concluded that, on the
Kates, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
This result will be criticized later on several grounds. See infra text accompanying
notes 539-51. For the moment, Kates is cited to illustrate the temptation that courts feel to
create property concepts in order to effectuate equitable court orders.
167 Rafkind v. Chase Manahattan Bank, N.A., No. 92 Civ. 6099 (JSM), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18625 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1992).
16s Id. at *1.
169 Id. at *4 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney 2014)).
110 Ra/kind, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18625, at *3-5, 9-10.
171 W.J. Towell & Co. v. Perfumer's Workshop Int'l, Ltd., No. 83 Civ. 0323, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14551 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1988).
172 Id. at *1-5.
173 Id. at *6--7. "The "retaining lien" gives an attorney the right to keep, with certain
exceptions, all of the papers, documents and other personal property of the client which have
come into the lawyer's possession in his or her professional capacity as long as those items are
related to the subject representation." Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino
& Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 262 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Schneider, Kleinick, Weitz,
Damashek & Shoot v. City of New York, 754 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2002)).
11 4 WJ. Towell & Co., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14551, at *8.
165
166
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text of the CPLR, only those orders enumerated in CPLR section
5202(b) create liens on the debtor's property. 175 Undoubtedly,
courts will tend to assume that the service of a restraining notice
and subpoena no longer give rise to liens, as they did in the fondly
remembered days before the CPLR. 176 An execution can be issued
by the creditor's attorney. 177 If an execution generated by the
judgment creditor's attorney gives rise to a lien when delivered to
the sheriff, why shouldn't issuance of the restraining notice when
delivered to a debtor or garnishee?
Meanwhile, the levy of property incapable of delivery (i.e.,
delivery of the execution to the garnishee) constitutes both a
turnover order and a restraining notice. 178 But only the sheriff may
levy. 179 Yet all the sheriff does is deliver a piece of paper. Why
couldn't the attorney for the judgment creditor deliver this piece of
paper? 180 As it stands, the restraining notice, a piece of paper
delivered by the attorney, has no lien significance. 181 But a piece of
paper delivered by the sheriff constitutes the strengthening of a
preexisting execution lien. 182
To be sure, a levy of property not capable of delivery lasts only
ninety days. 183 But the levy is perpetuated if the judgment creditor
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(b) (McKinney 2014).
One practical concern is whether a garnishee who has received a restraining notice may
commence an interpleader because the property affected is subject to competing claims. The
Federal Interpleader Act requires that "[t]wo or more adverse claimants ... are claiming or
may claim to be entitled to such [interpleaded property]." 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(l) (2006). It
may be questioned whether a restraining notice gives rise to a "claim" for this purpose.
Nevertheless, at least one court has sustained interpleaders on the basis that the
interpleading plaintiff has received a restraining notice. Prudential Inv. Mgmt. Servs. LLC v.
Forde, No. 12 Civ. 5168 (LAP), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89190, at *2-5, *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
2013); see also Caro v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs. LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110405 (D.
Conn. August 11, 2014) (upholding arbitrators who found a broker did nothing wrong by
commencing an interpleader and transferring assets to federal interpleader court over
opposition of customer).
17 7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(b) (McKinney 2014).
178 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
119 Id.
180 This seems to have occurred, however, in Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508, 523
& n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
18 1 See C.P.L.R. 5230(b).
182 By "strengthen," I mean that the lien preexists the levy and arises when the execution
is delivered to the sheriff. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2014). Before the levy, the
execution lien can be defeated by the debtor's conveyance to a purchaser for value. C.P.L.R..
5202(a)(l). But after the levy, the lien is stronger. It is absolutely perfect if the levy nets
property capable of delivery. If not capable of delivery, only a transferee without knowledge
defeats the lien. C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(2).
183 C.P.L.R. 5232(a); Metro Burak, Inc. v. Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc., 372 N.Y.S.2d 781,
785 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1975), modified, 380 N.Y.S.2d 758 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
175
176
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commences a turnover proceeding prior to lapse. 184 In effect, with
regard to property not capable of delivery, a levy is nothing more
than the anticipation of a formal turnover order. Why can't the
attorney for the judgment creditor perform the levy, whenever it
consists only of delivering a piece of paper?
It should be the case that delivery of the restraining notice should
be both a restraint and an order to surrender property to the sheriff.
There is no particular reason I can see why the restraining notice
should be as impotent as it is. As it stands, the restraining notice is
already a half-levy (since all levies are also restraining notices).
Other judgment creditors less diligent than the server of the
restraining notice are invited to sneak ahead of the server if they
motivate the sheriff to act. 185 Why should this be?
Presumably the restraining notice was invented for the case
where the sheriff was insufficiently motivated to levy fast enough.
But if that is the motive, why not empower the judgment creditor's
attorney to levy a garnishee? Then we could simply skip the
restraining notice altogether, insofar as third-party garnishees are
concerned, and proceed directly to a levy.

C. Order of Which Court?
The restraining notice is an order of the court-but which court?
The answer may be induced from CPLR section 5222(a)'s fourth
sentence, which provides that the restraining notice
shall specify all of the parties to the action, the date that the
judgment or order was entered, the court in which it was
entered, the amount of the judgment or order and the
amount then due thereon, the names of all parties in whose
favor 186 and against whom the judgment or order was
entered, it shall set forth subdivision (b) and shall state that
disobedience is punishable as a contempt of court, and it
shall contain an original signature or copy of the original

184 One court has suggested, without much statutory justification, that a restraining
notice, without a turnover proceeding, extends a levy. Metro Burak, Inc., 372 N.Y.S.2d at
788-89.
185 See City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965).
186 Failure to list the judgment creditors does not make the restraining notice ineffective,
and a court need not vacate the restraining notice in light of such mistakes. McLoughlin v.
Altman, No. 92 Civ. 8106 (KMW)(MHD), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11413 at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
7, 1997).
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signature187 of the clerk of the court or attorney or the name
of the support collection unit which issued it. 188
It is reasonable to assume, from the emphasized passage, that the
restraining notice is an order of the court that entered the judgment
in the first place. 189
Now according to CPLR section 5221(b), a "notice" (as in
restraining notice) may be issued from "any court in which a special
proceeding authorized by this article could be commenced if the
person served with the notice . . . were respondent." 190 Venue for
special proceedings is described in section 5221(a). 191 There we
learn, for example:
If the judgment sought to be enforced was entered in ... the
civil court of the city of New York, and the respondent
resides or ·is regularly employed or has a place for the
regular transaction of business in person within that city, a
special proceeding authorized by this article shall be
commenced in the civil court of the city of New York. 192 .
In Zarsky v. Law Office of Maury B. Josephson, 193 a creditor had a
judgment from the Civil Court of the City of New York. 194 Her
attorney issued a restraining notice to a bank in which the
judgment debtor's professional corporation had an account. 195 This
bank had branches in New York City, but the corporation's
particular branch was in Nassau County. 196 The court proclaimed it
had no jurisdiction over the bank and so the restraining notice had
no bite. 197
As we shall see, banks in New York sometimes enjoy the
protection of a ''branch rule," whereby a creditor must serve judicial
process .against the very branch with which the debtor does

187 Want of a signature makes the restraining notice void. Slepian v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No.
2001-634 S C, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 667, at *1-2 (App. Div. 2d Dep't Apr. 3, 2002). The
signature, however, may simply be the typed symbols "!SI." Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank, FSB v.
RS Paralegal & Recovery Servs., 554 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990).
188 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
189 Id.
190 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 522l(b) (McKinney 2014).
191 C.P.L.R. 522l(a)(l)-(5).
192 C.P.L.R. 522l(a)(3).
193 Zarsky v. Law Office of Maury B. Josephson, No. l 764-CV-2005, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3839 (Civ. Ct. New York County Dec. 20, 2006).
194 . Id. at *5.
.
195 Id.
196 Id. at *23-24.
rn1 Id. at *24-25.

I:
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business. 198 This rule is in the course of imploding, because courts
have noticed that banks increasingly have instantaneous worldwide
capacity to communicate by computer with any given branch. 199
Nevertheless, the Zarsky court must have , been applying the
separate branch doctrine, which requires that garnishment must
occur at the Nassau branch where the judgment debtor actually
opened the account. 200 If, however, as some courts think, the branch
rule is dead for computerized domestic banks, the garnishee bank
was indeed present in New York City, and the restraining notice
would have been proper. But, because of the restricted venue rule
of section 5221(a), coupled with the "separate branch" rule, the
attorney for the creditor could not issue the restraining notice to the
Long Island branch of the debtor's bank. 201
What should the judgment creditor have done to obtain a proper
restraining notice?
The matter is surprisingly complicated.
According to CPLR section 5221(a)(4):,
,
In any other case, if the judgment sought to be enforced was
entered in any court of this state, a special proceeding
authorized by this article shall be commenced, either in the
supreme court or a county court, in a county in which the
respondent resides or is regularly employed or has a place for
the regular transaction of business in person or, if there is no
such. county, in any county in which he may be served or the
county in which the judgment was entered. 202
For the creditor in Zarsky to effectuate a restraining notice
against the "respondent" in Nassau County, several steps are
required.
First, the judgment creditor would have to file a
transcript of the civil court judgment with the county clerk in New
York County. 203 Thereafter, the judgment creditor must obtain a
transcript from the county clerk in New York County and file it
with the clerk for Nassau County, where the bap.k branch in Zarsky
was located. 204 "A judgment docketed by transcript ... ha[s] the
same effect as a docketed judgment entered in the supreme court
See discussion infra Part LG.
See discussion infra Part LG.
200 See Zarsky, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3839, at *24-25 (''That the North Fork Bank has
numerous branches in New York City does not confer jurisdiction on this court." citing David
D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, C5221:2, in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5221 (McKinney 2006))).
20 1 See Zarsky, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3839, at *23-24.
202 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5221(a)(4) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
203 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5018(a) (McKinney 2014).
204 Id.
198
199
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within the county where it is docketed." 205 In other words, we may
now consider the judgment to have been entered in Nassau County.
The New York City attorney for the judgment creditor, as officer of
the Nassau County Supreme Court, may now properly issue a
restraining notice as if it were a Nassau County court order. 206
Federal cases have similar restrictions.
In Hassett v.
Goetzmann, 207 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York issued a judgment, and the judgment creditor
issued a restraining notice against a garnishee. 208 The creditor then
sought enforcement in the Northern District of New York. 209 The
Northern District sent the creditor packing back down south. 210 The
creditor had attempted to register the Southern District judgment
in the Northern District but did not succeed in doing so. 211 Had the
registration been successful, undoubtedly the Northern District
would have entertained the supplementary proceeding against the
garnishee. 212 But,' absent local registration, only the Southern
District of New York could enforce a restraining notice in connection
with a judgment entered therein. 213
A different case presents itself when the restraining notice is
served on a debtor. Such a notice is always valid, because if the
underlying money judgment is valid, there is jurisdiction over the
debtor's person. 214 But where a garnishee is served, the order is
valid only if the garnishee can be made to answer in the venue
where the judgment was entered. 215
The point can be expanded nationally. A restraining notice
served on a person not domiciled in New York is valid only if that
person has sufficient minimum contacts in the International Shoe

Id.
Whether such a notice served on a bank is valid with respect to a corporation (where
the corporation is not the judgment debtor) is a matter of much controversy. See infra Part
I.F.7.
207 Hassett v. Goetzmann, No. Misc. 2867, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13218 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,
1992).
20s Id. at *2-3.
209 Id. at *3.
210 See id. at *13-14.
2 11 See id. at *8--12.
212 Id. at *8.
213 See id. at *14.
214 If a court has personal jurisdiction over a debtor and enters a money judgment against
him, the court also has the authority to enforce the judgment by means of a restraining
notice. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965).
216 See Doubet, LLC v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 401544/2007, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3235, at *29--31 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 6, 2011).
206

206
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Co. v. Washington 216 sense:
Without due process limits on the territorial reach of a
restraining notice, it would be fundamentally unfair for a
party to issue a restraining notice that restrains property of
a garnishee located anywhere in the world, with no
minimum contacts to the forum where the restraining notice
is issued, whereas the garnishee might only be able to
challenge the validity of the restraining notice in the state
where it was issued, instead of in forum where he or she was
served. 217

D. Who May Be Served and How?
A restraining order may be served "in the same manner as a
summons 218 or by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested or if issued by the support collection unit, by regular
mail, or by electronic means as set forth in subdivision (g) of this
section."219 A debtor, obligor, or third party may be served with a
restraining notice.220
1. Service on the Judgment Debtor or Obligor

A judgment debtor "or obligor" may be served with a restraining
notice. 221 According to CPLR section 105(m), "a 'judgment debtor' is
a person, other than a defendant not summoned in the action,
against whom a money judgment is entered."222
While it is tolerably clear who the judgment debtor is, it is less
clear who the "obligor" is supposed to be. The term appears in
CPLR section 5222(b) and occasionally appears without definition

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Doubet, LLC, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235, at *31.
Serving the summons is governed by Article 3 of the CPLR. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308-16
(McKinney 2014). Service of persons outside the United States is governed by the Convention
on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361; accord Sonera Holding, B.V. v.
<;ukurova Holding, A.$., No. 11 Civ. 8909 (DLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181485, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012).
219 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014). Subdivision (g) permits service "in the form of
magnetic tape or other electronic means," but only if the garnishee has consented in writing.
C.P.L.R. 5222(g).
220 C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
221 Id.
222 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(m) (McKinney 2014).
2 16
211
218
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throughout Article 52 of the CPLR. 223
A review of New York Domestic Relations Law reveals many
references to "support obligors" in .connection with child support
proceedings. 224 New York Lien Law section 65(1) refers to a lien (for
"[t]he New York state office of temporary and disability assistance")
on:
real property owned by a support obligor when such support
obligor is or was under a court order to pay a child support or
combined child and spousal support to a support collection·
unit and such •support. obligor has accumulated support
arrears/past due support in an amount equal to or greater
than the amount of support due pursuant to such order for a
·.. period of four months. 22 5

223 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a)-(b), (d)-(e), (g), 5230(a)-(d), 5232(a), (c)-(d), 5234(b)
(McKinney 2014). We do get a limited definition in section 5232(d), which governs levies
pursuant to executions:
For the purposes of this section "obligor" shall mean an individual other than a judgment
debtor obligated to pay support, alimony or maintenance pursuant to an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction who has been found to be in "default" of such order as such
term [i.e., default] is defined in paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of section fifty-two
hundred forty-one of this article and the establishment of such default has been subject
to the procedures established for the determination of a "mistake of fact" for 'income
executions pursuant to subdivision (e) of section fifty-two hundred forty-one of this
article, except that for the purposes of this section only, a default shall not be founded
upon retroactive child support obligations as defined in paragraph (c) of subdivision one
of section four hundred forty and subdivision one of section two hundred forty, and
paragraph b of subdivision nine of section two hundred thirty-six of the domestic
relations law.
C.P.L.R 5232 (d). To be noted here is, first, that "obligor" and "judgment debtor" are mutually
exclusive categories. See id. Second, the definition by its terms is limited to the governance
of the sheriffs levy. See id. Under this definition, a person is not an "obligor" unless one is in
default on "three payments on the date due in the full amount directed by the order of
support, or the accumulation of arrears equal to or greater than the amount directed to be
paid for one month, whichever first occurs." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(a)(7) (McKinney 2014).
Furthermore, the definition ·applies only if the obligor has claimed "mistake of fact" with
regard to an income execution for support enforcement. C.P.L.R. 5241(e). When the
definition applies, the "obligor" is entitled to notice of his rights to exempt property (where no
similar notice was sezyed pursuant to CPLR section 5222(e) within the past year). C.P.L.R.
5222(d). We are warned not to extend this definition beyond the purview of section 5232.
C.P.L.R. 5232(d). So it may not be used for the purpose of restraining .notices. Rather, we
must look elsewhere for a definition of "obligor."
224 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§§ 244, 244-b(a) (McKinney 2014).
225 N.Y: LIEN LAW§ 65(1) (McKinney 2014). See also LIEN LAW§ 211(1) ("The New York
state office of temporary disability assistance ... shall have a lien against personal property
owned by a support obligor when s.uch support. obligor is or was under a court order to pay
child support or combined ·child and spousal support to a support collection unit and such
support obligor has accumulated suporot arreas/past due support in an amount equal to or
greater than the amount of of support due pursuant to such order for a period of four
months.").
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CPLR Section 5234(b), governing priorities between multiple
executions delivered by the same sheriff, contemplates that
executions will be delivered to enforce a "past-due child support
order."226 Therefore, it is probably the case that the invocation of
the word "obligor" in CPLR section 5222 is intended to refer to those
liable on child support orders, which are not, strictly speaking,
money judgments. 227
Although restraining notices are effective against "obligors" so
defined, we shall, for ease of reference, refer only to restraints· on
judgment debtors, with the understanding that the rules also apply
to "obligors."
A restraining notice served on corporate judgment debtors is also
binding on the agents of the corporate debtor, and a corporate
officer might be found in contempt for causing the debtor to make
prohibited transfers. 228 In this regard, New York resembles FRCP
Rule 65(d)(2), which states that:
The order binds only the following who receive actual notice
of it by personal service or otherwise:
(A) the parties;
(B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and
C.P.L.R. 5234(b).
See C.P.L.R. 5222; Bank of Lake Placid v. Rhino, 111 Misc. 2d 639, 640, 444 N.Y.S.2d
562, 563 (Sup. Ct. Clinton County 1981) ("The [alimony and support] order ... is not a money
judgment as defined by CPLR 105 (subd (pl)."). It may also be noted that CPLR section 5222
links a definition of "order" (as used in CPLR section 5222 generally) to
an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction directing the payment of support,
alimony or maintenance upon which a 'default' as defined in paragraph seven of
subdivision (a) of section fifty-two hundred forty-one of this article has been established
subject to the procedures established for the determination of a 'mistake of fact' for
income executions pursuant to subdivision (e) of section fifty-two hundred forty-one of
this article except that for the purposes of this section only a default shall not be founded
upon retroactive child support obligations as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one
of section four hundred forty of the family court act and subdivision one of section two
hundred forty and paragraph b of subdivision nine of section two hundred thirty-six of
the domestic relations law.
C.P.L.R. 5222(f) (emphasis added). Presumably this definition of "order" comes and goes. It
applies when the statute refers to a "judgment or order." It does not apply when, for example,
section 5222(c) refers to a court order permitting the judgment creditor to serve a second
restraining notice on the same third party.
228 Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld Assocs., 658 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
("[V]iolations of a restraining notice by the corporation may be imputed to its president if the
president controls the corporation and deliberately disregards a restraining notice that was
served on him." (citing Vinos Argentinos Imports USA, Inc. v. Los Andes Imports, Inc., No. 91
Civ. 2587 (JSM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15826, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1993))); Kramer v.
Skiatron of Am., Inc., 223 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284-87 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1961) (holding a
corporation, its president, and a corporate officer in contempt of court for violating a
restraining notice in a pre-CPLR case).
226

227
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attorneys; and
(C) other persons who are in active concert or participation
with any one described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B). 229
This provision is a codification of the common law of injunctions 230
and therefore probably reflects the law of New York with regard to
injunctions like the restraining notice. If so, any agent with notice,
not just those who were personally served, can be held liable for
violating a restraining notice. 231
Still, courts must not convert restraining notices into liens.
Whereas federal courts enforce injunctions against third party
buyers of assets, 232 any such holding in New York implies that the
restraining notice is a lien, which is not to be tolerated. A
challenging case on this score is Stone Container Corp. v. Tradeway
International Corp., 233 where, following service of the restraining
notice on the corporate debtor, the president and sole shareholder
dipped into his personal funds to pay competing creditors of the
debtor. 234 The president then made a claim against the debtor for
reimbursement. 235 The judgment creditor sought an order holding
the debtor in contempt for violating the restraining notice. 236
Rather creatively, the court ruled that what the president paid from
his personal funds was a "gift" for which he could not seek
reimbursement. 237 Therefore, the corporate debtor was not in
violation of the restraining notice, but the debtor was ordered to
reduce its liability to the president by the amount of the payments
the president had made. 238 The gift was no gift after all! Stone
Containers stands for the proposition that third parties can

FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1945).
Citibank, N. Am. v. Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 447 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1982) (holding that the corporation's president and sole stockholder was personally
served and therefore was liable). "(A person] may not use his position as sole stockholder and
president of the defendant corporations to shield himself from contempt proceedings .... " Id.
232 Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 178-79 (1973) (allowing an injunction
to bind a bona fide purchaser to corporate assets).
233 Stone Container Corp. v. Tradeway Int'l Corp., No. 91 Civ. 6882 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6177 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1994).
234 Id. at *1, 3.
235 See id. at *3.
236 Id. at *L
237 See id. at *5.
238 Id.
Mysteriously, the judgment debtor had filed for bankruptcy, yet the court felt
entitled to adjudicate the debtor's liability for violating the restraining notice. See id. at *6.
Such an adjudication surely contradicts bankruptcy's automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l)
(2012).
2 29

23 0
231
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volunteer to pay the debt of a judgment debtor and be a subrogee
without violating the restraining notice. 239 This seems to presage
the Verizon result, where advanced payment of a too-contingent
debt was held not to violate the terms of CPLR section 5222(b). 240
It is not entirely clear in Stone Container that the officer in
question was personally served with a restraining notice. 241
Perhaps this was unnecessary if the corporate debtor was properly
served and if the corporate officer knew about it. Officers could also
separately be considered garnishable. Indeed, they are third parties
with custody242 of the debtor's property. But where the corporate

See Stone Container Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6177, at *4-5.
Verizon New England, Inc. v Transcom Enhanced Servs. Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 123-25,.
(N.Y. 2013).
241 As occurred in Citibank, N.A. v. Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., where the president
and sole stockholder was personally served with a restraining notice. Citibank, N.A. v.
Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 44 7 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1982).
242 "Custody" is a word sometimes paired with "possession." E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b),
5225(a)-(b), 5232(a), 6214(a) (McKinney 2014). Sometimes it is paired with "possession" and
"control." E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1) (McKinney 2014). Recently, in response to a
certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the New York
Court of Appeals decided that the omission of the words "or control" in the turnover provision
of CPLR section 5225(b) was specifically designed to exclude cases of "constructive
possession," which apparently means control over the person who actually possesses. See
Northern Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 990 N.E.2d 114, 119
(N.Y. 2013). The opinion reduces "possession" to some form of grasping by the hands
(manucaption). Property grasped in the hands of an agent is apparently merely constructive
possession. This opinion promises to wreak much havoc on money judgment law if this
definition of "possession'' is taken seriously. For example, if a garnishee is sued for turnover
on a Monday and parks property with an agent on Tuesday, the garnishee completely escapes
the turnover proceeding because, at the time of the court ruling, the garnishee's possession is
merely constructive.
Indeed, corporations, having no hands at all, always possess
"constructively"-i.e. through agents. Thus corporate garnishees are made virtually immune
from judicial process.
Oddly, the Northern Mariana Islands case involved a garnishee present in New York
whose wholly owned subsidiary maintained a bank account for the debtor. Id. at 116. The
creditor sought a turnover order against the parent corporation. Id. In effect the Court of
Appeals stated that the turnover order was not available to the creditor. See id. at 119. The
court seems to have missed entirely that the case is actually a version of the "separate branch
rule" or "separate entity rule." This is the rule that states every branch is a different entity
than the branch of a bank that actually is garnished. Dewar v. Bangkok Bank Pub. Co. Ltd.,
N.Y. Branch, No. 112560/2010, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5583, at *5 (Sup. Ct. New York
County Oct. 26, 2012) ("The 'separate entity rule' dates back to the early 1900's and provides
that 'each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity, in no way concerned with accounts
maintained by depositors in other branches or at a home office."' (quoting Lanier Saperstein
& Geoffrey Sant, The Separate Entity Rule: The Deep Divide, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 2012, at 4,
col. 1)). As we shall see, this rule is being whittled down, but it still has validity when a
branch is outside the United States, because of the risk that a bank will have double liability
for a debt by honoring a New York garnishment. See discussion infra Part LS. If a foreign
branch of a bank in New York is a separate entity, then surely a foreign branch of a
subsidiary of the New York bank is likewise a separate entity.
239

240
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debtor has been served and the agent violates the order, this should
be enough to render the corporate debtor liable for violating the
restraining notice.
2. Service on Third Parties
A restraining notice may be served on third persons other than
the judgment debtor. 243 The State of New York might be garnished,
though extra procedures are heaped upon creditors. 244 Courts,
however, have proclaimed that executors of estates may not be
served, as that would interfere with the orderly distribution of
estates. 245
At first by case law246 and then by express statute, 247 restraining
notices are ineffective against employers who owe wages. 248 The
reason for exempting employers is that the CPLR has a complex set
of rules for income executions. In order to save judgment debtors
from shame in the workplace, the CPLR requires the sheriff to serve
the income execution on the judgment debtor, either by personal
service or by certified mail. 249 The income execution demands that
the debtor pay the sheriff directly, 250 with the warning that the

243
244

Broome v. Citibank, N.A., 632 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1995).
C.P.L.R. 5222(a). When the State of New York is served, the judgment creditor must

serve
the head of the department, or the person designated by him or her and upon the state
department of audit and control at its office in Albany; a restraining notice served upon a
state board, commission, body or agency which is not within any department of the state
shall be made by serving the restraining notice upon the state department of audit and
control at its office in Albany.
Id. The rules require double service to the same table. Service on one but not the other
renders the restraining notice ineffective. See Remo Drug Corp. v. State, 546 N.Y.S.2d 529,
530, 531 (Ct. Cl. 1989). Oddly, the sheriff, wherever located, is invited to serve a restraining
notice by registered or certified mail. C.P.L.R. 5222(a). Presumably attorneys could do this
too. Service by email, however, is effective only if the third party served consents in writing.
C.P.L.R. 5222(g).
245 E.g., In re Estate of Stein, 303 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1969)
(citing In re Estate of Casey, 260 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (Sur. Ct. Rensselaer County 1965)).
246 Silbert v. Silbert, 267 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966); Power v. Loonam,
258 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137-38 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
247 Act of July 15, 1991, ch. 314, § l(a), 1991 N.Y. Laws 2939.
248 Drawing from CPLR sections 5231 and 5205(d)(2), one court has interpreted wages or
salary to mean "money the debtor receives from 'any source' for 'personal services rendered."'
Patrick Ryan's Modern Press v. Bowler, No. 3066-04, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5504, at *4 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 2009). Thus, managing apartments for a percentage of the rents
constituted wages. Id. at *4-5.
2 49 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 523l(d) (McKinney 2014).
250 If the debtor is paying 10 percent to the sheriff directly, no other creditor can insist that
an income execution be levied on the employer. Citibank v. East, 469 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (Sup.
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employer will be garnished if the debtor defaults. 251 This procedure
was designed "to avoid annoyances to third parties and to give the
judgment debtor an opportunity to make payment without
embarrassment." 2 52
Obviously, if a restraining notice could be served directly on an
employer, the judgment debtor would suffer embarrassment and so
the practice is forbidden. Nevertheless, information subpoenas can
be
served
on
employers
forthwith,
embarrassment
notwithstanding. 253
E. Transfers
If either a judgment debtor or garnishee is served with a
restraining notice, such person "is forbidden to make or suffer any
sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property in
which he or she has an interest."254 As of 2008, new exceptions
apply with regard to bank accounts. These will be separately
considered. 255
"Transfer" is a term that the CPLR neglects to define. In
contrast, the United States Bankruptcy Code defines "transfer" very
broadly to include "each mode . . . voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with ... property."256 So broad a definition257
leaves open the possibility that a judgment debtor violates a
restraining notice if, say, the IRS assesses a tax against the
judgment debtor, thereby obtaining a federal lien on restrained
property. 258 Such a debtor has "suffered" a transfer, within the

Ct. Queens County 1983).
251 C.P.L.R. 5231(a).
The form of the income execution for support is rather different.
Notably, the income execution must notify the debtor that, unless she claims a mistake of
fact, the execution will be served on the employer in fifteen days. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5241(c)(iv)
(McKinney 2014).
2 52 County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cummings, 249 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1964).
253 Mancini v. Marine Midland Bank, 586 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1992)
(holding that an information subpoenas served on plaintiffs employer was not libelous per
se).
254 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
255 See infra Part II.
2 56 11 u.s.c. § 101(54)(D)(i) (2012).
257 For example, depositing a check technically constitutes transferring a debtor's property
to a bank in exchange for a positive balance in the account. At least one court has said that a
debtor who has been served does not violate a restraining notice by depositing checks in his
bank account. Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, No. 90 Civ. 334 (JMC),
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7901, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1992).
258 26 u.s.c. §§ 6321, 6322 (2006).
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meaning of section 5222(b). 259
The creation of a judicial lien under section 5202(a) or (b) is an
involuntary transfer, but it is no violation of the restraining notice.
A restraining notice bars transfers "except upon direction of the
sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court." 260 An execution is a
court order, 261 which when delivered to a sheriff results in a
transfer-the creation of a lien. 262 In contrast, the federal tax lien is
not created by a court order. 263 Issuance of a state tax warrant
(which gives rise to a lien once it is docketed) is a court order, since
the sheriff is instructed to enforce a tax warrant "with like effect,
and in the same manner prescribed by law in respect to executions
issued against property upon judgments of a court of record." 264
Since an execution is a court order and a tax warrant is an
execution, then a tax warrant is a court order.
Liens on a judgment debtor's real estate arise upon the local
docketing of a money judgment. 265 As with the federal tax lien, the
docketing procedure requires no court order, and no intercession of
the sheriff. 266
Technically, a judgment debtor violates the
restraining order by "suffering'' the docketing of some second money
judgment against him (not that he could resist this, of course). But
as these occur involuntarily by operation of law, it is hard to
imagine a court punishing a judgment debtor for contempt when the
transfer was entirely outside the control of the debtor. Indeed,
according to CPLR section 5251, "[r]efusal or willful neglect of any
person to obey a . . . restraining notice issued, or order granted,
pursuant to this title ... shall each be punishable as a contempt of
court."267

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
Id. (emphasis added).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(b) (McKinney 2014).
262 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2014).
263 26 U.S.C. § 6322 (stating that a federal tax lien under § 6321 arises at the time the
assessment is made).
264 N.Y. TAX LAW § 692(f) (McKinney 2014) (regarding personal income tax); accord N.Y.
TAX LAW§ 1141(b) (McKinney 2014) (regarding sales and use tax); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE
§ 11-683(6) (2013); see David Gray Carlson & Carlton M. Smith, New York Tax Warrants: In
the Strange World of Deemed Judgments, 75 ALB. L. REV. 671, 694-95 (2012).
265 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2014).
266 Id. Besides docketing, a lien on real property might arise by the sheriffs levy, which is,
basically, a filing in the real estate records. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5235 (McKinney 2014). These
levies are pursuant to an execution, which is a court order. As a result, the levy does not
violate the restraining notice. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
267 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5251 (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Cadle Co v. Brady,
No. 99-7202, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26509, at *2-3 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (noting that civil
2 59

260
2 61
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Courts would do well to proclaim simply that, when CPLR section
5222(b) uses the word "transfer," only voluntary transfers are
implicated. CPLR section 5222 may prevent judgment debtors (if
served with the restraining notice) from "transferring" property, but
nothing in CPLR section 5222 prevents transferees from taking
property against the will of the debtor. Otherwise, we might as well
say that restraining notices create liens. For better or worse, this is
precisely what we must not say.

F. Property
1. Personal

If service of a restraining notice is made on the judgment debtor
or garnishee "[s]uch a person is forbidden to make or suffer any
sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference with, any such
property . . . to any person other than the sheriff or the support
collection unit." 268 "Such property'' means, inter alia, "[a]ll property
in which the judgment debtor ... is known or believed to have an
interest." 269 Payment of debts (narrowly defined) is also restrained,
but we shall leave that to one side for the moment.
The application of this prohibition with respect to property, as
applied to garnishees, requires some interpretation. A judgment
debtor served with the restraining notice clearly has full power to
alienate her property, as the restraining notice creates no lien in
favor of the judgment creditor. 270 Using this power of alienation
would, of course, violate the restraining notice. 271 The alienation
would nonetheless be effective. Otherwise, restraining notices
create liens, which is not to be tolerated.
The garnishee in possession of the judgment debtor's property

contempt under CPLR 5251 requires the willfull neglect of a restraining notice); Doubet, LLC
v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 401544/2007, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235, at *48 (Sup. Ct.
New York County July 6, 2011) ('Willfulness is required to hold respondent ... in contempt
for violating the restraining notice.").
26s C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
269

Id.

David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, C5222:8, in C.P.L.R. 5222 (McKinney 2014)
("[T]he restraining notice ... gives the judgment creditor no lien on the defendant's property,
personal or real, and no special priority in a race with other judgment creditors.").
2 71 C.P.L.R. 5222(b) ("A judgment debtor or obligor served with a restraining notice is
forbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property
in which he or she has an interest ... except upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to an
order of the court .... ").
2 10
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may well have no power to alienate the judgment debtor's interest
in property, as where the garnishee is a bailee of the debtor's
personal property. 272 The bailee's interest in the debtor's thing
might itself be alienated in a sub-bailment. 273 But this would not
alienate the debtor's interest in the thing. 274 In order to assess the
restraining notice on a bailee, it is necessary to comprehend what
the following words mean: "All property in which the judgment
debtor ... is known or believed to have an interest."275
What is "property''? There are two interpretive possibilities. One
is that "property'' is the thing in which the debtor has an interest.
This is the crude unsophisticated usage of the word "property." The
other possibility is that "property'' is the debtor's interest in a thing.
This is a more philosophically respectable definition.
Choice
between these two definitions is a standard theoretical issue that is
posed in many commercial law contexts. The United States
Supreme Court faced this question in the context of bankruptcy in
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 276 In that case, the IRS had
achieved a tax levy on all tangible property, including pool
chemicals, previously in possession of the taxpayer. 277 The taxpayer
filed for bankruptcy and, as debtor-in-possession, sought turnover
from the IRS on the theory that the chemicals were property of the
estate. 278 Turnover was sought pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
section 542(a), which provides, in relevant part: "[A]n entity ... in
possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property [of the
bankruptcy estate] . . . shall deliver to the trustee . . . such
property." 279 On the debtor-in-possession's view, "property'' was the
pool chemicals. 280
The IRS argued that "property of the bankruptcy estate" did not
mean the pool chemicals. 281 It meant the debtor's interest in the pool

272 See Kaplan's Jeweler, Inc. v. Hammerman, 246 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973-74 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1964).
273 See, e.g., Lovetere v. Stackhouse, 267 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966);
Brindley v. Krizsan, 238 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1963).
274 See, e.g., Lovetere, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 759; Brindley, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
275 C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (emphasis added).
2 76 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
27 7 See id. at 199-200.
278 See id. at 200-01.
279 Id. at 201 n.5 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
280 See id. at 200-01.
281 See generally United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[T]he Government finds in § 541's definition of 'property of the estate' a distinction between
a debtor's interest in property and property in which the debtor has and interest.").
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chemicals. 282 By the time of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor's
interest was reduced. 283 It no longer included the right to possess
the chemicals. 284 It merely encompassed the debtor's power to
redeem the chemicals by paying in full the amount of the tax, or the
right to a cash surplus, if any, following an IRS foreclosure sale. 285
The right to possess the collateral was outside the purview of the
bankruptcy estate, or so said the IRS. 286
The Supreme Court tookthe Neanderthal approach to the concept
of property. It ruled that "property of the bankruptcy estate" meant
pool chemicals, not the right to redeem the pool chemicals or the
right to receive surplus proceeds of the chemicals following the
foreclosure sale. 287
The chemicals were entirely within the
288
bankruptcy estate.
Therefore, the IRS had to surrender the
chemicals to the debtor-in-possession. 289
The same difficulty underlies the interpretation of CPLR section
5222(b). Is "property'' the debtor's thing or the debtor's interest in
the thing? The former definition is totemistic and crude. Airy
philosophy strongly prefers the second definition. 290
Under the CPLR, the answer is clear. Both the grammar and the
purpose behind CPLR section 5222(b) point to the troglodytic view
that property is the un-Hohfeldian thing in which the debtor has an
interest. 291 It is not the Hohfeldian debtor's interest in the thing. 292
Id.
See id. at 149-50.
See id.
285 Id. at 150 n.8.
286 See id. at 150 & n.9.
287 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211 (1983) ("[T]he debtor [i]s the
owner of the property after the seizure but prior to the sale. Until such a sale takes place, the
property remains the debtor's ....").
288 See id.
289 See id.
290 See Plank, supra note 143, at 452-55; Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession
Under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REV. 253, 255-256 (2000);
Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L.J. 1193, 1200
(1998).
291 J.E. Penner, The ''Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 725
(1996) ("Hohfeld could not have been more insistent in his view that rights in rem are not
properly conceived as rights to things.").
292 According to Hohfeld's famous system of opposites and correlatives, all law can be
reduced to eight terms.
See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING xii-xvi (David Campbell & Philip Thomas,
eds., 2001) Arranged by correlatives, any legal relationship between A and B can be
described as follows: If A has a: right, privilege, power, immunity, then B has: no-right, duty,
disability, liability. Id. Hohfeld's system can be viewed as entirely dispensing with the
concept of the "thing
JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES:
292

283
284

•."
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With regard to the grammar, it is impossible to read CPLR section
5222(b) to mean that property is a debtor's interest in a thing.
Otherwise the statute would have said something to the effect that
the garnishee is "forbidden to transfer the debtor's property
interest," not "property in which the judgment debtor ... ha[s] an
interest."293 "Property," as used in CPLR section 5222(b), is some
thing in which the debtor has an "interest."294
Pace the philosophers, the non-Hohfeldian reading corresponds to
the purpose of restraining notices generally. 295 The idea of the
restraining notice is to freeze the status quo until such time as the
judgment creditor can establish a lien on the debtor's property. 296
This can only be achieved if property is some thing, not the debtor's
legal right to the thing.
Let us test this interpretation with a simple hypothetical
involving a bailment. Suppose that a garnishee borrows the
judgment debtor's lawn mower on a Monday. On Tuesday, a
creditor serves the garnishee with a restraining notice.
On
Wednesday, the debtor purports to end the bailment. If the
garnishee surrenders the lawn mower to the judgment debtor, has
the garnishee violated the restraining notice?
The answer has to be yes. The property is the lawn mower (not
the debtor's interest in the mower as bailor). The garnishee
transfers "it" by surrendering possession to the judgment debtor. So
the garnishee has wrongfully "transferred" the lawn mower in the
prosaic sense of handing over physical control. This interpretation
comports with the purpose of restraining notices. The status quo is
preserved, and the judgment debtor is denied access to the lawn
mower. This mower the garnishee must hold pending the sheriffs
levy297 o'r a receiver's demand 298 or a turnover order from a court, 299
which orders the garnishee to hand the mower over to the sheriff for
sale.
In effect, the meaning of the restraining notice is that the debtor
HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE 163-75 (1998).
293 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).

Id.
See Penner, supra note 291, at 733-34 ("In property theory it is considered almost de
rigeur to mention simply to dismiss as the benighted layman's concept of property the idea
294

295

that property concerns the right to things.").
296 C.P.L.R. 5222(b); Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810 (N.Y.
1981).
297 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a)-(b) (McKinney 2014).
298 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a) (McKinney 2014).
299 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227, 5232(b) (McKinney 2014).
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is deprived of the right to terminate the bailment. In the absence of
the restraining ·notice, the debtor could have terminated the
bailment and could even repossess the lawn mower without the
garnishee's consent. But in light of the restraining notice served on
the garnishee, has the debtor acted wrongly by doing so?
The debtor has indeed acted wrongly, but it does not turn on
whether the debtor himself has been served with a different
restraining notice. If the debtor has been served, he is forbidden
from "transferring" his property, but taking back the lawn mower is
receiving the property, not transferring it. The debtor is also
enjoined from "interference with any property in which he or she has
an interest." 300 Interference probably means any act designed to
reduce the chances that the sheriff will end up controlling the thing.
It is possible, but not entirely clear, that taking back the mower
reduces the sheriffs ability to levy the mower. It might be the case
that the debtor intends to hide the lawn mower from the sheriffs
sight, in which case receipt of the property is "interference."301
If anything, it is the garnishee who is at fault for letting the
debtor take back the lawn mower, even if this occurs without the
garnishee's consent. The garnishee is "forbidden to ... suffer any ..
. transfer of . . . any such property." 302 Based on what we said
before, "transfer" includes surrendering the lawn mower back to the
debtor. "Suffer" hints that the garnishee has a duty to resist the
debtor's attempt to end the bailment.
Nevertheless, in spite of the forgoing, the judgment debtor acts
wrongly if he takes back the lawn mower, whether or not the debtor
has also been served with a restraining notice. Without the
restraining notice, the debtor has a license to enter upon the
garnishee's real estate to fetch the mower. 303 The restraining notice
(served on the garnishee) means that the debtor has no such
right. 304
Rather, the restraining notice makes the debtor's
possession wrongful, as the garnishee is forbidden to "suffer" the

C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (emphasis added).
Id.
302 Id. (emphasis added).
30 3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: § 198(1) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)] ("One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another, at a reasonable time
and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of removing a chattel to the immediate
possession of which the actor is entitled, and which has come upon the land otherwise than
with the actor's consent or by his tortious conduct or contributory negligence." (emphasis
added)).
304 C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
300
301
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transfer. For the same reason, the debtor's privilege to use force
against the garnishee to retrieve the property following proper
demand 305 is suspended. 306 In fact, both of the following statements
are true: A debtor served with a restraining notice does not
necessarily violate it by receiving the lawn mower. 307 And, if the
bailee is served with a restraining notice, the debtor's right to
terminate the bailment is suspended. 308
The bailment is
perpetuated against the will of the judgment debtor. That is to say,
the restraining notice assures that the garnishee's continued
possession is rightful, even though the debtor has attempted to end
the bailment.
Accordingly, the bailee violates the restraining notice if he
"suffers" the bailor to take the bailed property back. 309 "Transfer"
must mean surrender of the bailed property back to the debtor. 310
We have already seen that the term "transfer" might encompass
involuntary transfers. 311 So section 5222(b) implies a duty in the
bailee to prevent the debtor from taking possession. 312 Meanwhile,
whether or not served with a restraining notice, the judgment
debtor has no right to take back the bailed property and commits a
tort against the garnishee if she does so.
Sometimes a bailment is coupled with the power to sell the

305 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 303, § 101(1) ("The use of reasonable force against
another for the purpose of recaption is privileged if the other ... has received custody of the
chattel from the actor and refuses to su.rrender it .... ").
3os Id. § 102 ("The use of force against another for the purpose of recaption is not privileged
unless the actor is entitled as against the other to the immediate possession of the chattel.").
If the garnishee "knowingly causes the [debtor] to believe" there is no court order, the debtor
may rightfully use force to obtain the restrained property. Id. § 100.
307 Although we left open the possibility that the debtor "interferes" by terminating the
bailment and taking back the mower. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) ("A judgment debtor ... served with a
restraining notice is forbidden to make or suffer any ... interference with any property in
which he or she has an interest ....").
308 See id.
309 See id.
310 Arguably, the garnishee "disposes of' the lawn mower by surrendering it back to the
debtor. But it is to be noted that "dispose of," as it appears in the fourth sentence of section
5222(b), applies solely to debts, not to property in general. Id. Therefore, we need not decide
if Wednesday's relinquishment of the lawn mower constitutes a "disposition." The bailment
of the lawn mower is no "debt," and termination of the bailment is no payment of a debt.
311 See supra Part I.E
312 Perhaps a garnished bailee interferes with the bailed property when he surrenders it to
the debtor. C.P.L.R. 5222(b)) ("[A garnishee] is forbidden to make ... any interference with,
any such property ...."). We have suggested that "interference" means reducing the chance
of a successful levy by or turnover to the sheriff. See supra text accompanying notes 300-01.
In any case, the matter is disposed of because the bailee who acquiesces in recaption by the
debtor has "suffered" a transfer.
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debtor's interest in the bailed property. For example, a consignee is
a bailee coupled with a power to sell. 313 In recent times, a consignee
is identified as a secured party in Article 9 of the UCC. 314 A
restraining notice served on a consignee bars the exercise of the
consignee's power of sale, because the sale puts the property beyond
the reach of the sheriff. This point can be extended to secured
creditors generally, as we shall see.
2. Secured Creditors as Garnishees
When CPLR section 5222(b)'s fourth sentence refers to
transferring the debtor's "property," it is using the crude totemistic
notion of property, not the sophisticated Hohfeldian usage that
philosophy prefers. Property is a thing, such as a lawn mower or a
caveman's shillelagh. Property is not the de.btor's interest in a
thing, as the eggheads insist.
This causes headaches for senior secured creditors with perfected
security interests in collateral they have repossessed. This is
because the creditor in possession is, basically, a bailee-a person in
rightful possession of property of another. 315 A foreclosure sale
under Article 9 constitutes the transfer of the debtor's property
interest to a buyer. 316 Any such transfer violates the restraining
notice served upon the foreclosing secured party. 317 This is so
whether the debtor equity is valuable or not. 318
This is certainly odd. On the one hand, a senior secured party
can prevent the sheriff from selling collateral at an execution sale;
the sheriff is even guilty of conversion if the sheriff continues an

313 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20) (2012) ("'Consignment' means a,tnansaction, regardless of its
form, in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and: (A) the
merchant: (i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of the person
making delivery; (ii) is not an auctioneer; and (iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; (B) with respect to each delivery, the
aggregate value of the goods is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery; (C) the goods are not
consumer goods immediately before delivery; and (D) the transaction does not create a
security interest that secures an obligation.").
314 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) ("'Security interest' includes any interest of a consignor .... "); see
also U.C.C. § 9-103(d) ("The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a
consignment is a purchase-money security interest in inventory.''):
315 See U.C.C. § 9-207 (limiting the property rights of a creditorin possession).
316 . U.C.C. § 9-617(a) ("A secured party's disposition of collateral after default: (1) transfers
to a transferee for value all of the debtor's rights in the collateral : ... ").
3 17 See C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
31s See id.
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execution sale over the protest of the secured party. 319 Yet an
unsecured creditor with no lien at all can stop the senior secured
party from foreclosing, simply by serving a restraining notice. 320 To
proceed, the secured party needs to procure a court order permitting
the alienation of the debtor's property. 321 According to CPLR
section 5222(b) (fourth sentence), alienation of the judgment
debtor's property interest is forbidden "except upon direction of the
sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court." 322
Could a secured creditor consult a sheriff and obtain immunity
from the restraining notice? It is may seem strange that the sheriff
has authority to negate the effect of the restraining notice, but, in
the context of a garnishee who is a senior secured party, the matter
makes sense. If the sheriff perceives that the garnishee has a
perfected security interest to which any possible judicial lien is
junior, the sheriff can say so and permit the foreclosure sale to
proceed. Where the security interest is senior, the secured party's
possessory right is better than any possessory right of the sheriff
pursuant to judicial process. The sheriff should be competent to
vacate the restraining notice if it serves no purpose in preserving
the status quo in anticipation of a later execution sale. It may be
observed, that, historically, sheriffs were presiding judges. 323 So
this part of section 5222(b) restores to the shrievalty some fragment
of its medieval glory.
If the sheriff is unwilling to authorize the foreclosure sale, then a
secured party must proceed under CPLR section 5240, which invites
the court "at any time, on ... the motion of any interested person, ..
. [to] make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,
extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." 324
In ClMC Raffles Offshore (Singapore) Ltd. v. Schahin Holding

319 See Teddy's Drive In, Inc. v. Cohen, 390 N.E.2d 290, 291 (N.Y. 1979) (concerning a tax
compliance officer who stood in for the sheriff in the enforcement of a tax warrant and was
found personally liable to the secured party).
320 See Rosenstein v. Kravetz Realty Grp., L.L.C., No. 103684/2010, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
1523, at *3-5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Apr. 8, 2011). In Rosenstein, a judgment creditor served an
account debtor with a restraining notice. Id. at *3. The debtor moved to vacate the stay
because the account was entirely encumbered by a security interest. Id. at *3-4. The
restraint was kept in place. Id. at *5.
321 See O'Hara & Shaver, Inc. v. Empire Bituminous Prods., Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192-93
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1971).
322 C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (emphasis added).
323 ROBERT BARTLETT, ENGLAND UNDER THE NORMAN AND ANGEVIN KINGS 1075-1225, at
149 (2000).
324 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2014).
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S.A., 325 the court implied that restraining notices are completely
ineffective against senior secured parties, ~here there is no
valuable debtor equity in the collateral. 326 In CIMC, an account
debtor 327 paid funds to a collateral agent for senior secured
parties. 328 The collateral agent was served with a restraining
notice. 329 The collateral agent froze all the collateral accounts and,
as a result, the routine payment of senior debt service was halted. 330
The senior lenders moved that the restraining notice be vacated so
that the senior payment could go forward. 331 Appropriately, the
court gave that relief, but on grounds far too broad for the problem
at hand.
The restraining notices were effective in the first instance only
against property "which could be assigned or transferred" by the
judgment debtor. 332 According to the CIMC court, the debtor could
not assign or transfer its interest in. the collateral accounts, as these
were encumbered by senior security interests. 333
This misconceives the matter. It is true that a debtor cannot
convey its equity interest free and clear of the senior security
interests. 334 But it could convey its equity interest in the accounts
subject to the security interest. 335 Accordingly the debtor always has
property which could be "assigned or transferred" within the
meaning of CPLR section 5201(b).
Under old Article 9 this was clear. Old section 9-311 provided:
"The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily
transferred . . . notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer
constitute a default." 336 This clear statement of the principle has
now been muddied. Under new section 9-401, "whether a debtor's
325 CIMC Raffles Offshore (Sing.) Ltd. v. Schahin Holding S.A., No. 13 Civ. 52 (JSR), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61765 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013).
326 See id. at *8-11.
327 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (2012) ("'[A]ccount debtor' means a person obligated on an account,
chattel paper, or general intangible.").
328 CIMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61765, at *6-7.
329 Id. at *7.
330 Id.
331 Id. at *8.
332 Id. (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 520l(b) (McKinney 2014)).
333 CIMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61765, at *10-11.
334 See id.
335 This passes as the doctrine of "nemo dat quod non habet: the principle that one cannot
transfer an interest in property that the transferor does not have." Plank, supra note 143, at
441-42.
336 u.c.c. § 9-311 (1972).
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rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred
is governed by law other than this article."337 So in modern times,
one must consult, not the UCC, but New York common law (badly
atrophied since the UCC went effective) as to whether debtor equity
in bank accounts could be transferred.
There is no reason to . think why not; · Bank accounts are
commercial property and are, in general, alienable. 338 Granted, the
transfer is subject to the rights of the senior secured parties. 339 But
it cannot generally be said that encumbered bank accounts are
property which a debtor cannot assign or transfer, within the
meaning of CPLR section 5201(b).
Basically, the CIMC court theorized that if the debtor cannot
convey free and clear of perfected security interest, it cannot convey
at all. 340 On this view, "debtor equity'' is inalienable property not
susceptible to any levy. 341 If the court's theory were taken to its
limit, restraining notices could not be effective to restrain secured
parties, even as to collateral as to which the debtor has a valuable
equity. Where a valuable equity exists, the debtor still cannot
convey free and clear of the senior perfected security interest. On
CIMCs reasoning, that makes the debtor's property inalienable.
As we have seen, the CPLR's theory of property is that property is
a thing-such as a lawn mower. It is not a debtor's interest in a
thing. Either the restraining notice applies to the lawn mower or it
doesn't. Whether the debtor's interest in the lawn mower is
valuable (that is, it is held in esteem by hypothetical buyers in the
market) has no bearing on the application of restraining notice. · It
applies to the lawn mower, not to the debtor's interest in the lawn
mower. . Like it or not, the restraining notice applies to all
collateral, or to none at all, in which case a secured party could
dispose of valuable debtor equity.
Significantly, the security agreement in CIMC provided that one
of the judgment debtors could have a distribution from the

u.c.c. § 9-401 (2012).
See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(D) ("[A] security interest is enforceable against the debtor and
third parties with respect to the collaterial only if: ... the collateral is deposit accounts ...
and the secured party has control ... pursuant to the debtor's agreement.").
339 Id. § 9-203(c); see also U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(l) ("[A] security interest . . . continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale . . . or other disposition thereof unless the secured party
authorized the disposition free of the security interest .... ").
34 0 See CIMC Raffles Offshore (Sing.) Ltd. v. Schahin Holding S.A., No. 13 Civ. 52 (JSR),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61765, at *8-11 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013).
341 Id. at *8-10.
337
338
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encumbered account to cover operating expenses. 342 The restraining
notice was deemed effective to prevent the collateral agent from
distributing to the judgment debtor. This is inconsistent with the
view that the bank account was inalienable by the debtor. If indeed
the judgment debtor had no property interest at all in the account,
then the withdrawal of expense reimbursements should not have
been a transfer of debtor property. In truth, however, the debtor
was receiving encumbered dollars in which the debtor had a
preexisting valueless equity. This transfer was a violation of the
restraining notice. As indeed was any payment of cash collateral to
a senior secured party. Such payments extinguish the debtor's
technical equity in the encumbered dollars. Any transfer of debtor
property (regardless of value) violates the restraining notice.
What the court should have said is that the restraining notice was
completely effective against the collateral agent, but that the court
had discretion to permit payments to the senior secured parties, 343
where the dollars paid were encumbered dollars which the
judgment creditor could not use to satisfy a judgment.
Normatively, should senior secured parties be free and clear of
the restraining notice? The matter is not simple. Where there is no
debtor equity, the restraining notice has no point, as a subsequent
levy by the sheriff will not produce value for the creditor. But
where a valuable equity does exist, the restraining notice serves the
purpose of slowing down the foreclosure sale until the objecting
creditor can establish a junior lien, which the senior secured party
must respect. 344 Writing a statute that differentiates in advance
between valueless and valuable assets poses a profound challenge.
In light of that, perhaps the CPLR is wise to make the senior
secured party, in all cases, to seek a vacation of the restraining
notice from the courts.

See CIMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61765, at *13-14.
The discretion is located in CPLR section 5240, which federal courts have access via
FRCP 69. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
313 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying relief on the merits); AXA Versicherung AG v. N.H.
Ins. Co., No. 12 Civ. 6009 (JSR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60802, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
2013).
344 A secured party is obligated to distribute a surplus to a junior lien creditor if "the
secured party receives from the holder of [the junior lien] ... an authenticated demand for
proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed." U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(3)(A).
34 2

343
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3. Purchasers of Restrained Personal Property
Suppose a garnishee served with a restraining notice is the bailee
of debtor property. A debtor can always sell free and clear of the
restraining notice because restraining notices do not create liens. 345
Yet, according to CPLR section 5222(b)'s fourth sentence, the
garnishee is not to "suffer" a transfer of the thing in which the
debtor has a property interest. 346
Suppose, for example, that on a Monday a bailee holding the
debtor's lawn mower has been served with a restraining notice.
Suppose the debtor sells her bailor's interest in the mower to X, a
purchaser. If the debtor has not been served with a restraining
notice, the debtor does not act wrongly in selling the mower to X. X
then shows up and demands the mower. Does the garnishee violate
the restraining notice by surrendering the mower to X?
CPLR section 5222(b) is ambiguous on this score. We know that
the restraining notice was effective on Monday because the debtor
the_n held debtor property-that is, the mower. Accordingly, the
garnishee is "forbidden to . . . suffer any sale . . . [of] such
property." 347 The word "suffer" arguably could be read to mean that
the garnishee must not recognize X's ownership rights.
This reading ought to be rejected. In interpreting section 5222, it
is wise to remember that the goal of the restraining notice is to
preserve the status quo as to property that might be used to satisfy
a judgment. 348 In this regard, the judgment creditor has no lien on
the mower by virtue of serving the restraining notice. This implies
that the judgment creditor cannot pursue the mower once X buys it.
If the debtor rightfully or even wrongfully conveys the property, the
garnishee should not be punished for honoring the rights of the
assignee.
Preferred Display, Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 349 is a recent
example of a sale of a debtor's interest when a third party had been
served with a restraining notice. 350 In CVS, a judgment creditor

Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (N.Y. 1981).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
341 Id.
348 See Gryphon Domestic VI, LCC v. APP Int'l Fin. Co., 792 N.Y.S.2d 14, 14 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2005) (disseminating bondholder lists of the judgment debtor held not to be a violation
of section 5222 as these could not be used to satisfy a judgment).
349 Preferred Display, Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 560 (KBF), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20622 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013).
350 Id. at *2-3.
345
346
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served a restraining notice on a customer (CVS). 351 CVS had been
buying inventory from the judgment debtor on unsecured credit. 352
The judgment creditor served CVS with a restraining notice. 353
Thereafter, CVS bought further inventory from the debtor on credit
but regretted the purchase. 354
Meanwhile, a senior secured party (who had not been served with
a restraining notice) declared a default and sold all remaining
collateral-inventory and accounts-to a buyer X. 355 As a result of
this sale, CVS owed its debt for inventory to X, not to the judgment
debtor. 356
CVS made a deal with X for the return of the unwanted
inventory, in exchange for a credit against future purchases of
inventory from X. 357 CVS did not pay down its debt, now owed to
X. 358 The court reasoned correctly that CVS had "title" to the
inventory free and clear of the debtor, and that it did not violate the
restraining notice by "selling'' this inventory on credit to X. 359 It
also went further to suggest that, had CVS paid X, CVS would not
have been in violation of the restraining notice because, as a result
of the foreclosure sale, CVS owed the debt to X, not to the judgment
debtor. 360 This suggestion assumes correctly that once the debtor's
interest in a thing is sold, the restraining notice no longer applies to
that thing (in this case, the account receivable).
4. Real Property Analogies
We have seen that a bailee may not surrender bailed goods back
to the debtor. 361 The real estate equivalent to bailment is the

Id. at *6.
See id. at *4 & n.1.
353 Id. at *6.
354 See id. at *6-7.
355 Id. at *4. Or, to be more precise, the secured lender (Citibank) assigned its security
interest to PMW, who held an auction. PMW was the winner of the auction. PMW then sold
the assets to Zaimu, whom I refer to in the text as X. Id.
356 See id. at *4-5.
357 Id. at *7.
358 Id. at *8.
359 Id. at *13; see also U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (2012) ("[T]itle passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of
the goods .... ").
360 Preferred Display, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20622, at *16-17. According to the Preferred
Display court, even if CVS had paid the debt owed for the regrettable inventory, "the debt
thus extinguished would be one CVS owed [X], not one CVS owed [the debtor]." Id.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 297-302.
351

352
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leasehold tenancy. 362
Each consists of rightful possession of
property belonging to another. From what was said in the last few
sections, it follows that a holdover tenant or tenant at will of real
property is prohibited by section 5222(b) from surrendering the
premises back to the judgment debtor. Quitting the premises would
be like returning the lawn mower in our previous examples.
In truth, the departure of a holdover tenant actually helps the
judgment creditor. A recalcitrant tenant is a positive encumbrance
on the value of the real property. A better price will be received if
the buyer does not need to pursue an expensive eviction action
against the holdover. Yet, if consistency governs between real and
personal property, the tenant who, in the absence of the restraining
notice, properly ought to get out violates the order by leaving, even
though this enhances the prospect of the judgment creditor to
maximize recovery on the judgment.
Furthermore, one can argue that the holdover tenant gets to live
rent free. It has been held that when a garnishee who owes a debt
to a judgment debtor is served with a restraining notice, the
garnishee's duty to pay interest is suspended, because interest is a
penalty for withholding capital. 363 That is to say, where a garnishee
rightfully withholds capital from the judgment debtor, the
garnishee may hold the money interest free. Interest is to capital
what rent is to real property (the fee simple in real property being
capital in dirt form). It therefore follows from this analogy that a
holdover owes the debtor no rent during the time the restraining
notice is in effect. 364 This is at least the result if logic governs this
area oflaw.
Of course, when logic confronts common sense, common sense is
bound to prevail. Common sense, "seeing reason leads, finds safer
footing than blind reason stumbling without fear ." 365 Indeed, the
New York legislature has codified the priority of common sense over
the logic of the statute. According to CPLR section 5240: "The court
362 See United States v. Wexler, 621 F.2d 1218, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1980). Indeed, the old
nineteenth century term for personal property leases was ''bailment leases"-bailments that
could not be terminated at will because the bailment was coupled with an interest-a paid-for
right of possession for the duration of the lease. See id.
363 Teller v. Hernandez, No. 570446/08, 2009 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 2133, *1 (App. Term 1st
Dep't Aug. 14, 2009); Spodek v. Feibusch, No. 10723/1994, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3873, *1314 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Nov. 27, 2006).
364 Later, we will see that New York has bizarre and complicated rules on whether the
obligation of a tenant to pay rent is a debt, payment of which might be restrained by a
judgment creditor. See infra Part LL.
365 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 3, SC. 2.
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may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any
interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an
order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or
modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." 366 We may
therefore expect that a court will not pursue the analogy between
leases of real property and bailments of personal property with too
much vigor. If so, the tenant must keep his landlord's lawn mower
but perhaps he should get off the premises and take the mower with
him.
5. Exempt Property
A d~btor served with a restraining notice who pays nonexempt
cash for groceries to feed his hungry children is, of course, in
contempt of court. 367 But what if the cash is proceeds of an exempt
income stream, such as a social security benefit? 368 Does the
restraining notice affect exempt property?
According to the third sentence of CPLR section 5222(b):
All property in which the judgment debtor or obligor is
known or believed to have an interest then in and thereafter
coming into the possession or custody of [a garnishee] .
shall be subject to the notice except as set forth in
subdivisions (h) and (i) of this section. 369
This sentence does not distinguish between nonexempt and
exempt property.
Worse, in 2008, the legislature added as
exceptions subdivisions (h) and (i), which refer to exempt funds in
bank accounts. 370 One could plausibly argue that, since the New
York legislature knew how to make exemptions with regard to bank
accounts, it must have intended to restrain disposition of any other
kind of exempt property.
Nevertheless, courts reason differently from the purpose of the
restraining notice, which is to preserve the status quo until the
sheriffs busy schedule allows for a levy of the debtor's property. If
the sheriff may not levy because the property is exempt, then the
restraining notice oversteps its purpose. Therefore, it is uniformly
assumed, contrary to the literal words of section 5222, that a debtor

366
367
368
369
3 70

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2014).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b), 5251 (McKinney 2014).
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006).
C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
Exempt Income Protection Act, ch. 575, § 3, 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4088-89.
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or a third party may dispose of exempt property. 371
That restraining notices do not affect exempt property was
presupposed without discussion in Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 372
which proclaimed the CPLR's restraining notice procedure, as it
then existed, unconstitutional for failing to warn debtors that
exempt property cannot be restrained. 373 If it were really the case
that restraining notices restrain the disposition of exempt property,
then the due process right of the debtor to notice and a hearing
would be useless, as a claim to exemption would not serve to get rid
of the restraint.
Given the fact that the restraining notice does not create a lien
(i.e., transfers no property right to the creditor), does a restraining
notice actually deprive a debtor of property, as the Deary court
presupposed? The answer is yes. The exact wording of the
Fourteenth Amendment is "nor shall any State deprive any person
of ... property, without due process of law."374 It may be true that a
debtor's property has not been "taken" by a creditor, as no lien was
created, but the debtor has been "deprived" of the use of the
restrained property.
An examination of the due process
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reveals that the ability to use
organizes the definition of property in the Fourteenth
Amendment-not the ability alienate. 375 For instance, the IRS
might obtain a lien on real property or illiquid property. 376 But as
this does not interfere with a debtor's ability to use the collateral,
371 See Sequa Capital Corp. v. Nave, 921 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Balanoff v.
Niosi, 791 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556, 560 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005); Scheer v. City of Syracuse, 277
N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967). In Legal Servicing, LLC v. Mostafa, 959
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 2013), the court carried the protection of exempt funds
too far. In this case, the State of New York had contracted to pay the rent of a welfare
recipient to a landlord who was the judgment debtor. Id. at 653. The creditor served a
restraining notice on the State of New York, but the restraining notice was vacated on the
spurious grounds that the funds were exempt. Id. at 654-55; see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 137
(McKinney 2014) ("All moneys or orders granted to persons as public assistance or care
pursuant to this chapter shall be inalienable by any assignment or transfer and shall be
exempt from levy and execution under the laws of this state."). This would be a good point if
the welfare recipient were the judgment debtor. But the landlord was no welfare recipient.
To the landlord, the income stream from the State of New York was just rent. See Mostafa,
959 N.Y.S.2d at 653. But restraining rent ends up raising profound metaphysical difficulties
which will be discussed later. See infra Part LL. For the moment, the exemption grounds of
the decision must be categorically rejected.
372 Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
373 Id. at 1188.
374 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
375 See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The attachment affects the
debtor's interest by depriving her of the continued use of her property.").
376 26 u.s.c. § 6321 (2006).
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the tax lien regime is constitutional. 377 Lien creation as such does
not trigger any right to notice or a hearing. 378 Restraint of a liquid
asset, such as a bank account, coupled with the creation of a lien,
does create a due process issue. 379 This is because the restraint (not
the lien) deprives the debtor of her use of the funds. 380 Restraint,
not the taking through creation of lien, is the key to due process.
Therefore, the Deary court was correct that the restraining notice
procedure, though it creates no lien, poses a due process issue. 381
After 2008, the CPLR carefully regulates the restraint of bank
accounts containing exempt funds. 382 We will cover this regulation
in due course. 383 For the moment, it may be noted that, in 2008, the
legislature certainly assumed that restraining notices do not affect
exempt property of the debtor. 384
The thrust of the reasoning in Deary was that a debtor may have
received due process in the course of procedure leading up to the
issuance of the money judgment, but the issue of which property is
liable to and which property is exempt from the creditor's judicial
lien poses a different question: "While notice of and an opportunity
to be heard on the merits is directed to the question whether the
debt is actually owed, the attempt to enforce the judgment raises
the distinct issue whether particular property of the judgment
debtor is available to satisfy the judgment."385 Given that property
affected by the restraining notice might be exempt from judgment,
due process jurisprudence required a weighing of creditor interests
in prompt enforcement and the debtor's right to exempt property
from the execution process. 386
The Deary court ruled that, at a minimum, the debtor has the
right to be informed of the availability of a procedure for contesting
See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 593-601 (1931).
See id. at 593-94.
See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969).
3 80 Carlson & Smith, supra note 264, at 684----85.
38 1 See Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1183, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
3 82 Exempt Income Protection Act, ch. 575, § 1, 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4085-86.
383 See infra Part II.
384 See id.
385 Deary, 534 F. Supp. at 1185.
3 86 Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane) ("[T]he available
procedures must afford the debtor adequate protection against erroneous or arbitrary
seizures. The procedural protection is adequate if it represents a fair accommodation of the
respective interests of creditor and debtor."). The balancing of interests in due process
jurisprudence goes back to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See McCahey v. L.P.
Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1985).
377
378
379
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application of the restraint to exempt property. 387 Debtors, the
court predicted, typically do not know that restraints can be
challenged pursuant to CPLR sections 5239 and 5240. 388
The legislature responded to the Deary decision by adding CPLR
sections 5222(d) and (e), requiring that debtors be notified of the
restraining notice and the possibility of exempting property from
judicial process. 389 The exemption notice that the debtor must
receive is printed word-for-word in section 5222(e). 390 The notice
must set forth a list of possible exemptions that a natural person
might claim, such as social security payments and various other
exempt income streams. 391 Among other things, the notice must set
forth: "If you claim that any of your money that has been taken or
held is exempt, you may contact the person sending this notice." 392
There is no requirement, however, that the devil creditor respond if
the Hotspur debtor calls. 39s
The obligation to send the restraining notice to the debtor,
however, is contingent on the debtor never having received the
notice set forth in section 5222(e) "within a year before service of a
restraining notice." 394 So if a creditor serves a restraining notice on
A, the creditor must serve both the section 5222(e) notice (plus a
copy of the restraining notice) to the debtor. 395 When the creditor,
within a year, serves a separate restraining notice on B, neither the
section 5222(e) notice nor the second restraining notice need be
served on the debtor. 396
The notice of exemption rights must be served upon the debtor no
later than four days after the garnishee is served with the

Deary, 534 F. Supp. at 1187.
Id. at 1188; Diana Gribbon Motz & Andrew H. Baida, The Due Process Rights of
Postjudgment Debtors and Child Support Obligors, 45 MD. L. REV. 61, 73-74 (1986).
389 McCahey, 774 F.2d at 546--47.
390 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(e) (McKinney 2014).
301 Id.
302 Id.
393 Contact Res. Servs., LLC v. Gregory, 806 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410-11 (Rochester City Ct.
2005). In McCahey, a debtor claimed that this part of section 5222(e) violates due process
because it is misleading: "[T]h[e] recommendation leads the debtor into believing that 'the
person sending this notice,' usually the attorney for the judgment creditor, will protect the
debtor's rights. She also claims that the notice must state that mere contact with the sender
does not necessarily protect exempt property from seizure." McCahey, 774 F.2d at 552. The
court rejected this claim because other sentences in the section 5222(e) notice recommended
that the debtor contact a lawyer. Id.
394 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(d) (McKinney 2014).
395 Id.
396 Id.
387
388
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restraining notice. 3.97 What are the consequences of failing to do
this? Certainly the restraint can be vacated. 398 But is it void of its
own account? This is far from clear. With regard to restraining
notices served on banks, the 2008 legislation makes clear that
failure to provide banks with the exemption notice (which it must
forward to the debtor) makes the restraining notice void. 399 The fact
that such a rule does not apply to nonbanks casts doubt on the
status of the restraining notice when the section 5222(e) notice has
not been timely served.
In Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld Associates, a creditor served a
restraining notice but not the exemption notice. 400 The court
nevertheless ruled that the restraining notice was binding, where
the judgment debtors were sophisticated tricksters who clearly
understood the concept of exempt property. 401 Garnishees therefore
take a risk that their clients are sophisticated when they disregard
the restraining notice. However, where the creditor fails to send the
restraining notice to the debtor and where the creditor permits the
restraint to endure after the four days, the creditor is liable to the
debtor for any damages caused. 402 Of course, if the debtor is a
sophisticated trickster, damages under this provision are likely to
be zero.
Id.
Cadles of Grassy Meadows II, L.L.C. v. Katz, No. 106022-2006, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
10299, at *21 (Sup. Ct. New York County Sept. 16, 2008); Lincoln Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Miceli,
No. 2342/01, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6811, at *15 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County Oct. 9, 2007);
Friedman v. Mayerhoff, 592 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1992). Because CPLR
section 5222 uses the word "may," a court can simply deny a creditor a restraining notice for
any good reason, as when it interferes with workout negotiations. EM Ltd. v. Republic of
Arg., 131 Fed. App'x 745, 746-47 (2d Cir. 2005).
399 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(l) (McKinney 2014) ("Failure to serve the notice and forms
together with the restraining notice renders the restraining notice void, and the banking
institution shall not restrain the account.").
40
Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld Assocs., 658 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
4 0 1 Id. at 523.
402 See Banks v. Leef, 467 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157-58 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983). Banks
involved a tort action commenced by the service of a complaint. Id. at 157. The plaintiff can
also bring a "special proceeding'' to recover damages. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239 (McKinney 2014). A
special proceeding is governed by article 4 of the CPLR. Basically, the time period for
answering the petition is much accelerated. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 403(b) (McKinney 2014).
In McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), the plaintiff
claimed the creditor failed to send the restraining notice to the plaintiff. Id. at 279. The
plaintiff's cause of action for damages was dismissed: "Nothing in the case law indicates that
a defendant's failure to comply with CPLR 5222(d) provides the plaintiff with recourse in the
form of money damages." Id. at 280. Banks, however, is direct authority for the proposition.
See Banks, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58. In McCarthy the bank supplied a copy of the restraining
notice, even if the creditor did not. McCarthy, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 280. In light of this, the
existence of damages was unlikely. See Friedman, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
397
398

°
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The notice requirement seems to apply only to debtors who are
"natural persons." 403 This certainly makes sense, as the notice
described in section 5222(e) deals exclusively with exempt property
and how a debtor might get relief if exempt property is
restrained. 404 Only natural persons are entitled to exemptions. 405
The creditor must send the debtor a letter when the first
restraining notice issues. 406 What if the letter is returned to the
creditor by the post office? Then the notice must be sent
to the defendant in care of the place of employment of the
defendant if known, in an envelope bearing the legend
"personal and confidential" and not indicating on the outside
thereof, by the return address or otherwise, that the
communication is from an attorney or concerns a judgment
or order ....407
Here we again see that the CPLR aspires to avoid shaming a debtor
in front of his employer. This is a major motivation in the CPLR's
regulation of the income execution. 408
A return from the post office is likely to be after the four-day
period.
Nevertheless, the restraining notice continues to be
effective, as mailing to a known address is all that is required. 409
But the above-quoted language indicates that the creditor cannot
rest on her laurels in light of the unsuccessful mailing. 410
Apparently a second mailing to the employer's address is
required. 411 By what time must this second mailing occur? The
statute does not say. The instinct of a commercial lawyer would be
to say that the second mailing must occur in "a reasonable time." 412
Finally, if the creditor knows neither the residence nor the place
of employment, then the mailing must be made "to the defendant at

403 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(d) (McKinney 2014) ("[M]ailed by first class mail or personally
delivered to each judgment debtor or obligor who is a natural person within four days of the
service of the restraining notice."); accord Vinos Argentinos Imps. USA, Inc. v. Los Andes
Imps., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2587 (JSM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15826, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
1993).
404 C.P.L.R. 5222(e).
405 Vinos Argentinos Imps., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15826, at *3.
4os C.P.L.R. 5222(d).
401 Id.
40B Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 157-60.
409 C.P.L.R. 5222(d).
410 See id.
411 See id.
41 2 E.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-204, 2-205, 2-309(1) (2012).
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any other known address." 413 Presumably the "known address"
must bear a reasonable relation to the debtor. 414 Mailing to a
known friend of the debtor, for instance, might suffice. Mailing to
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue would not, for most debtors.
In McCahey v. L.P. Investors, the court declined to rule the postDeary regime was unconstitutional; but it left at least one question
open. 415 When a debtor is deprived of the use of property by an ex
parte order, due process requires that the debtor be guaranteed a
prompt hearing:
It is true that the statutory scheme in question does not
provide a mandatory outside time limit on according a
hearing on an exemption claim. It is also true that the
majority of courts that have squarely addressed the issue
have stated that only a mandatory period can withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 416
In New York, a motion to vacate a restraining notice is made
under CPLR sections 5239 or 5240, neither of which set a limit on
the promptness on the post-restraint remedy. 417 The plaintiff in
McCahey, however, "made no effort to recover her property by using
New York's procedures. We are therefore not faced with a concrete
example of the New York statute in action, and we are unwilling to
invalidate a statute because it might, but need not, be applied in an
unconstitutional manner." 418 Therefore it might still be open to
challenge the restraining notice procedure for its failure to
guarantee a prompt hearing on vacating orders that wrongly
restrain exempt property. 419
This remaining ambiguity no longer exists when a bank is the
garnishee. After 2008, special rules apply to banks in consumer
cases, and these provide for a very prompt hearing. 420 To those

C.P.L.R. 5222(d).
See id.
415 McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 1985).
416 Id. at 552-53 (citing Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1353 (1st Cir. 1985)); Finberg v.
Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 59 (3d Cir. 1980).
41 7 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239, 5240 (McKinney 2014).
41s McCahey, 774 F.2d at 553.
419 This question impacts upon tax collection procedures, which require a taxpayer to pay
presently with no express guaranty of a prompt hearing. Carlson & Smith, supra note 264, at
685.
420 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(d) (McKinney 2014) ("Except where the provisions of section fiftytwo hundred twenty-two-a of this article are applicable, pursuant to subdivision (a) of such
section ....").
41a
414
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rules we will return later. 421
6. Fraudulently Conveyed Property
One contentious issue is the effect of a restraining notice when
the debtor is alleged to have made fraudulent conveyances.
Suppose a judgment debtor has fraudulently conveyed property to a
garnishee. A judgment creditor then serves the restraining notice
on the garnishee. The restraining notice
is effective only if, at the time of service, [the garnishee] ...
is in the possession or custody of property in which he or she
knows or has reason to believe the judgment debtor ... has
an interest, or if the judgment creditor ... has stated in the
notice that . . . the judgment debtor . . . has an interest in
specified property in the possession or custody of the person
served. 422
Fraudulent conveyance law presents a difficult conceptual issue:
If a debtor fraudulently conveys a thing to the garnishee, does the
debtor still own the thing?
Properly, the answer is no. The transfer is voidable but not void.
The debtor has conveyed the thing once and for all and can never
get it back. Only the creditors can reach the fraudulently conveyed
property on an in rem basis with their judicial liens. 423 A garnishee
holds such property in trust for the creditors of the debtor. So
ownership of the fraudulently conveyed thing must be viewed as
owned by a garnishee in trust for the creditors. The debtor has no
interest in the fraudulently conveyed things at all. 424
See infra Part II.C-D.
C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
423 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (hereinafter "UFTA'') has altered the classical in
rem nature of fraudulent conveyance law. Under the UFTA, a creditor may at will substitute
an in personam remedy againi,t the garnishee. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § S(b)
(1984); First Nat'! Bank of Seminole v. Hooper, 48 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. App. 2001),
(involving in personam liability for property valued at time of fraudulent transfer), rev'd on
other grounds, 104 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2003). Accordingly, under the older Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (hereinafter "UFCA''), the garnishee is not personally obligated to the
debtor's creditors (unless the garnishee wrongfully interferes with the creditors' property
right). See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 278(1) (McKinney 2014); see generally 30 N.Y. JUR. 2D
Creditors' Rights§ 312 (2013) (explaining that New York adopted the UFCA by enacting New
York Debtor and Creditor Law). Under the UFTA, the fraudulent transfer is the wrongful act
of "conversion" that makes the garnishee personally liable to the creditors. Unif. Fraudulent
Transfer Act § 8(b). The garnishee's liability, however, is limited to the value of the property
actually conveyed. Id.
424 David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable
Subordination 45 WM. & MARYL. REV. 157, 168 (2003).
421
422
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Although it is literally true that the debtor "alienates" all right
title and interest of the debtor when he fraudulently conveys, this
does not imply that a restraining notice cannot affect fraudulently
conveyed property under the literal terms of CPLR section 5222(b)'s
second sentence. 425 If the restraining notice falsely states that the
debtor has an interest in a thing, it is an effective restraining
notice. 426 It is a striking feature of CPLR section 5222(b)'s second
sentence that, if we read it literally, a restraining notice can
restrain on the basis of a known falsehood. Yet, as we shall see,
courts have concluded, not unreasonably, that restraining notices
that falsely allege that the debtor has an interest in a thing does not
restrain the thing. In any event, in a fraudulent conveyance case, a
creditor is not always in a position to designate a specific thing as
having been the subject of a fraudulent conveyance. Therefore, a
deeper inquiry is required as to whether a restraining notice is
capable of affecting garnishee property that is founded on a
fraudulent conveyance.
Account must be taken of the remedial section of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (still the law in New York). 427
According to New York Debtor & Creditor Law section 278(1):
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may ...
a. Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled
to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or
b. Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution
upon the property conveyed. 428
This emphasized portion states that the creditor may levy
execution against the garnishee's property as if it were still the
debtor's property. 429 We may observe in passing that creditors may
not levy at all. Only sheriffs can do this. 430 But clearly this archaic
statutory language is intended to empower the sheriff to take the
garnishee's property to satisfy the creditor's, claim against the
debtor. 431

425

C.P.L.R. 5222(b).

426

See id.
Creditors' Rights, supra note 423, § 312.

427
428

N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 278(1) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).

42s

Id.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a)-(b) (McKinney 2014).
Carlson, supra note 424, at 172 n.47. On the constitutional issue raised thereby, see
Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 201-02.
430

43 1
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This emphasized passage is consistent with the proposition that a
debtor still owns property after she fraudulently conveys it. But it
does not require any such view. It could be the case that the
garnishee (not the debtor) is the legal owner of property (though the
garnishee holds in trust for the creditors of the debtor). Yet the
sheriff is invited (without any notice or hearing to the garnishee) to
simply take the garnishee's property.
On the basis of Debtor and Creditor Law section 278(1)(b), the
court in Blue Giant Equipment Corp. v. Tee-Ser, Inc., 432 held that a
creditor of the debtor could validly bind a garnishee by serving her
with a restraining notice, where the garnishee has received a
fraudulent transfer from the judgment debtor. 433 Such a holding
implies that a debtor still owns property after he fraudulently
transfers it. 434 The lower court had vacated the restraining notice
because the debtor had no interest in a fraudulently conveyed thing
once it was conveyed. 435 In reversing, the appellate division noted
that, under New York's fraudulent conveyance law:
[P]laintiff has the option of ignoring the conveyance of [the
debtor's] interest and pursuing its remedies to enforce its
judgment, including the device of service of restraining
notices .... Section 278 (subd 1, par b) of the Debtor and
Creditor law clearly provides, however, that a judgment
creditor has the alternate remedy to "[disregard] the
conveyance and . . . levy execution upon the property
conveyed." In pursuance of its right to levy execution on its
judgment in the first action, plaintiff also had the right to
employ the device of a restraining notice to preserve the
property upon which it sought to execute. 436
On the basis of Blue Giant, a garnishee has to assume that, under
New York law, a restraining notice will encumber property that the
garnishee received from the debtor, provided the debtor conveyed it
fraudulently. 437

Blue Giant Equip. Corp. v. Tee-Ser, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1983).
Id. at 949-50.
434 See id. at 949.
435 Id.
436 Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §
278(1)(b) (McKinney 1983)) (citing Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., 378 N.Y.S.2d
859, 864 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1975)); accord United States v. Ceparano, No. 98CR0922
(ADS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131257, at *6-10, *12 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2009).
437 See Blue Giant, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 949; see also Ceparano, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131257,
at *9-10 (holding that issuance of a restraining notice against assets of a third party is
432

433
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How can a garnishee know whether a trans.fer was fraudulent?
At least the garnishee knows that if the garnishee bought the thing
from the debtor in good faith for value, the garnishee received the
thing free and clear of a fraudulent conveyance right. According to
New York Debtor & Creditor Law section 278(1), the judgment
creditor has no rights against "a purchaser for fair consideration
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one
who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a
purchaser."438 Where the garnishee paid no consideration, she risks
liability to the judgment creditor if she conveys away property
received from the debtor. 439
In Blue Giant, the judgment creditor served a garnishee. 440 A
different case is where the judgment creditor serves a third party's
bank where the third party has not yet been held liable as the
recipient of a fraudulent conveyance. In Save Way Oil Co. v. 284
Eastern Parkway Corp., 441 the judgment creditor tried to stretch the
restraining notice to cover the third party's bank from paying the
account to the third party. 442 Such restraining notices the court
would not allow:
What is sought here is to extend the creditor's reach to a
third tier. Plaintiff is not seeking to restrain money owed
directly to the judgment debtor, but rather money owed to
one who in turn is allegedly indebted to the judgment debtor.
It is eminently clear that CPLR 5222 does not encompass
this step. 443
This is put rather confusingly. If a third party has received a
fraudulent conveyance from the debtor, she is not "indebted to the
judgment debtor." Rather, she holds property that could be used to
satisfy the creditor's judgment against the debtor. In New York,
this is strictly an in rem relation between the third party transfer
and the creditor. 444 Nevertheless, putting this,.confusion aside, the
appropriate where the government has made a prima facie showing that the conveyance in
question was fraudulent).
438 DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 278(1).
4 39 See id.
440 Blue Giant, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
441 Save Way Oil Co. v. 284 Eastern Parkway Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1982).
442 Id. at 555-56.
443 Id. at 556 (citing Smith v. Amherst Acres, Inc., 350 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1973)).
444 See Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Interstate Cigar Co. v. Interstate Distrib., Inc.,
620 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994). Under the newer Uniform Fraudulent
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point is valid. Under cases like Blue Giant, the judgment creditor
could serve a restraining notice on the garnishee and the garnishee
would be bound by it. 445 But the creditor cannot restrain the
garnishee's bank until the creditor has a money judgment against
the garnishee directly. 4 46
A question not considered in Save Way Oil is that a third party's
bank account might itself be proceeds of the fraudulent conveyance
the garnishee has received. Suppose for instance that the judgment
debtor gratuitously writes the third party a check, meaning that the
proceeds of the check, when it clears, is a fraudulent conveyance.
The third party then deposits the check with her bank. For
simplicity's sake, let us assume that the bank account contains
nothing but the proceeds of the fraudulent check. The bank's
obligation to its customer is proceeds of the debtor's fraudulent
conveyance. In general, if the third party holds a thing that is a
fraudulent conveyance, and the third party sells that thing, the
consideration received is held in trust for the judgment creditor. 447
Similarly, the bank's obligation to pay the third party is proceeds of
a fraudulent conveyance that the creditors of the debtor could get. 448
Now, if the bank is served with a restraining notice, the bank must
not honor the third party's checks. On a proceeds theory, the
creditors of a judgment debtor can indeed restrain the third party's
bank account.

Transfer Act section 8(b), a third party is indebted by the very fact of accepting the fraudulent
transfer. See generally First Nat'l Bank v. Hooper, 48 S.W.3d 802, 808-10 (Tex. App. 2001)
(rejecting argument that the creditor must show knowing participation by the third party in
the commission of the fraud in order to obtain a money judgment against the third party),
rev'd on other grounds, 104'S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 2003).
44 s See Blue Giant, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
446 See, e.g., H.J. O'Connell Assocs. v. Ins. Pension & Welfare Fund of Roofers, 381
N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976).
447 See, e.g., Rabin v. Delacruz (In re St. Claire Clinic, Inc.), No. 94-3943, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1416, at *3, *7-11 (6th Cir. 1996).
448 This conclusion is based on the idea that fraudulent conveyance law creates a
constructive trust on the conveyed item, and proceeds theory is a routine attribute of trust
law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202(1) (1959); Carlson, supra note 424, at 171-83.
In Bingham v. Zolt, 64 7 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996), a judgment debtor deposited
funds in his wife's account. Id. at 221. The court upheld a restraint on the wife's account
because it held debtor funds, of which the wife was trustee. Id. Bingham is directly
analogous to the case where a nondebtor deposits fraudulently conveyed funds into her bank
account. See also ERA Mgm:t. v. Morrison Cohen Singer & Weinstein, 605 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1993) (similar holding).
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7. Alter Ego Cases
In cases where the judgment debtor has fraudulently conveyed
property to a garnishee and a creditor has served the garnishee
with a restraining notice, courts have held that the garnishee is
bound by the restraining notice on the metaphysically questionable
premise that a fraudulent conveyance is no conveyance. 449 Such a
conveyance is void, not voidable. What the debtor conveyed the
debtor still owns. A restraining notice served on third party
transferee's bank, however, is not effective, unless the bank account
itself is proceeds of the fraudulent conveyance. 450
A distinguishable case arises when the third party is the alter ego
of the debtor and the judgment creditor serves a restraining notice
on the third party's bank. 451 In such a case, the third party's bank
account is the debtor's account, and the third party's bank is the
debtor's bank, capable of being restrained. 452 Alter ego cases
routinely uphold the restraint of the bank account merely on the
allegation that the corporate veil between the third party and the
judgment debtor ought to be pierced. 453
In Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., the court, in an alter ego case, made clear that the bank
ignores the restraining notice at its own risk. 454 If indeed the
corporate form is legitimate, the restraining notice has no effect,
and the bank may honor checks on the account. But if the alter ego
theory is correct, the bank owes damages for disobeying the
restraining notice. 4 55
449 See United States v. Ceparano, No. 98CR0922 (ADS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131257, at
*6-10, *12 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2009); Blue Giant, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 949; see also RCA Corp. v.
Tucker, 696 F. Supp. 845, 851-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (nullifying the assignment of a promissory
note to the judgment creditor's wife as a fraudulent conveyance and ruling that the judgment
creditors were entitled to the proceeds of the note as a matter of law).
450 See, e.g., Bingham, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 221; ERA Mgmt., 605 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
451 Save Way Oil Co. v. 284 Eastern Parkway Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1982).
452 See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Briarpatch Film Corp., No. 603364/01, 2013 Misc. LEXIS
2503, at *26-27 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 13, 2013) (illustrating that an investment in
a company is debtor property when the company is the alter ego of the debtor).
453 See Ivor B. Clark Co. v. Hogan, 296 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Thompson v.
Pollack, 873 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009) (refusing to vacate restraining notice
where creditor presented prima facie evidence of alter ego). But see Plaza Hotel Assocs. v.
Wellington Assocs., 378 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1975) (indicating that
prima facie evidence of alter ego is required to "pierce the corporate veil").
454 Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1965), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966).
455 Id. at 358-59.
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In ruling that, where the restraining notice expressly indicates
that the bank account is property of a judgment debtor, the
restraining notice is invalid, the court exceeds the text of section
5222(b). In fact, the second sentence of section 5222(b) says that
the restraining notice is binding whether their allocations are true
or not: "A restraining notice served upon a person other than the
judgment debtor ... is effective ... if the judgment creditor ... has
stated in the notice that a specified debt is owed by the person
served to the judgment debtor." 456 But in this interpretation, the
Sumitomo court behaved sensibly, as the restraining notice is about
maintaining the status quo with regard to property that could
actually be used to satisfy a judgment. 457 Thus, a restraining notice
that falsely designates property as belonging to the debtor is,
apparently, entirely ineffective. Why should a court order built on a
lie be accorded any respect, especially where no public official issues
it?
On this view, if the "alter ·ego" claim is substantively correct
(though not yet adjudicated), the bank violates the restraining
notice by honoring checks:
A judgment creditor's specification of debt or property in a
restraining notice is binding on the person served to the
extent of forbidding payment or transfer except pursuant to
an order of the court. If such person does make payment or
transfer in disregard of the restraining notice, he takes the
risk of liability for damages and contempt if the judgment
creditor can establish that the debt was owed to the
judgment debtor or that he had an interest in such property.
Judgment debtor's "interest" in property must be understood
to mean a direct interest in the property itself which, while it
may require a court determination, is leviable, and not an
indirect interest in the proceeds of the property, such as that
of a stockholder in the entity to which the property
belongs. 458
In Sumitomo, the garnishee bank honored checks on the
corporate account, even though the corporation was not the
judgment debtor. 459 This was inappropriate if the alter ego theory
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
See, e.g., Sumitomo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
458 Id. at 358; accord Mazzuka v. Bank of N. Am., 280 N.Y.S.2d 495, 500 (Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1967).
459 Sumitomo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
456

457
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was true. This put the garnishee bank in the odd position of
litigating, in a special proceeding, 460 the genuineness of its
customer's corporate form.
Meanwhile, the customer, having
cleaned out its account, may have no clear motive to cooperate in
this litigation, except for a possible liability for having received an
unjust enrichment or payment by mistake. This is small incentive
where the bank's customer is insolvent. 461
New York Banking Law section 134(5) does not, apparently,
protect a bank that honors checks on the corporate account. 462
According to that provision:
Notice to any bank ... of an adverse claim ... to a deposit of
cash ... standing on its books to the credit of ... any person
shall not be effectual to cause said bank ... to recognize said
adverse claimant unless said adverse claimant shall also
either procure a restraining order, injunction or other
appropriate process against said bank . . . from a court of
competent jurisdiction in the United States in a cause
therein instituted by him wherein the person to whose credit
the deposit stands . . . is made a party and served with
summons .... 463
When the bank is served with a restraining notice designating a
corporate account as property of the debtor, the corporation has
never been made a party to an action which culminated in an
injunction. 464 The Sumitomo court ruled that the judgment creditor
was not making an adverse claim against the bank account. 465 This
is true; the restraining notice does not create a lien. The claim of a
lien would be an adverse claim, 466 but no lien arises from the

460 The garnishee is not entitled to insist that the matter be litigated in a plenary action or
in a contempt action, rather than a special proceeding. Id. at 359.
461 Of course, the bank loses only if the alter ego theory is true. But any such holding
against the bank has no res judicata effect against the corporate customer. The whole matter
will have to be litigated again. See supra text accompanying notes 446-50.
462 See N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 134(5) (McKinney 2014).
463

464

Id.
See Sulil Realty Corp. v. Rye Motors, Inc., 257 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114 (Westchester County

Ct. 1965) ("[S]ervice of a restraining notice or an information subpoena does not commence a
'proceeding' ....").
465 See Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 35657, 359 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1965), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1966).
466 One sees this assumption in U.C.C. § 8-502 (2012): "An action based on an adverse
claim ... whether framed in ... [terms of an] equitable lien ... may not be asserted against a
person who acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501 for value and without notice
of the adverse claim." Id.
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issuance of a restraining notice. 467 Thus, restraining notices served
on banks are more powerful than levies of banks. A bank is
empowered by Banking Law section 134(5) to ignore the levy. 468
But the bank owes damages if it violates the supposedly weaker
restraining notice. 469
The Sumitomo court implied that a garnishee acts correctly in
restraining the debt or property, even if the judgment creditor is
mistaken that the judgment debtor has an interest in the restrained
thing. 470 A bank that, for example, refuses to honor checks is not
guilty of wrongful dishonor because it is compelled to dishonor the
check by a valid court order. 471 Therefore, banks have every
incentive to honor a restraining notice, no matter how exotic and
wrong the theory of the judgment creditor is. 472
The court in JSC Foreign Economic Ass'n Technostroyexport v.
International Development & Trade Services, Inc., 473 denied that a
restraining notice on a nondebtor can be sustained on the allegation
that the served person is the alter ego of the debtor. 474 In so ruling,
the court had to get rid of the above-discussed contrary authorities
from New York state courts. 475 Ignoring, at least for this purpose,
the Sumitomo case476-direct authority for the validity of the
See supra Part LB.
BANKING LAW§ 134(5).
469 Where the underlying money judgment is paid, the cause of action for violating the
restraining notice evaporates. Tri-Mar Contractors v. Bank of Suffolk Cnty., 440 N.Y.S.2d
556, 556---57 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981); Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No.
150151/2011, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47, at *43 (Sup. Ct. New York County Jan. 11, 2012).
Attorneys' fees may not be recovered as damages for violating the restraining notice absent
express authority for their recovery. Global, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS, at *46.
470 See Sumitomo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58; accord Schaeffer v. Chem. Bank, 435 N.Y.S.2d
474, 475-76 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
471 In comparison, a judgment debtor who has been served with a restraining notice cannot
use that notice as an excuse for not performing an unrelated contract. See Studio No. 54
Disco, Inc. v. Pee Dee Jay Amusement Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 439 N.Y.S.2d 395 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981).
472 On appeal, only the "true owner" of the bank account has standing to vacate the
restraining notice or to appeal a lower court's refusal to vacate. See Kuslansky v. Kuslansky,
Robbins, Stechel & Cunningham, LLP, 966 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013). A
debtor attempting appeal for the "true owner" curiously confesses that the alter ego theory is
correct. See id.
473 JSC Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
474 Id. at 393.
475 Id. at 392-93.
476 Sumitomo is cited for the proposition that the "[j]udgment debtor's 'interest' in property
must be understood to mean a direct interest in the property itself which, while it may
require a court determination, is leviable and not an indirect interest in the proceeds of the
property." Id. at 391-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chem.
467
468
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restraining notice-the JSC court thought it could get rid of just
one of the many authorities upholding the restraining notice and
then call it a day. The case it chose to distinguish was Plaza Hotel
Associates v. Wellington Associates, which upheld a restraining
notice on an allegation that a nondebtor was an alter ego of a
judgment debtor. 477 According to the JSC court, Plaza Hotel was a
fraudulent conveyance case, where restraining notices should be
upheld. 478 In fact, even a casual glance at this opinion shows that it
upheld the restraining notice on an alter ego theory. 479 It was no
fraudulent conveyance case. 480 JSC should therefore be viewed as a
feeble Erie guess of New York law.
G. Debts

One of the many errors of judgment by the drafters of the CPLR
was its very narrow definition of "debt." According to CPLR section
5201(a), "[a] money judgment may be enforced against any debt,
which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon
demand of the judgment debtor." 481 Contingent debts are not debts
at all. It has been suggested that
[c]ertitude is the key to the kingdom of debt. This morbid
dread of contingency is entirely outmoded . . . . Article 9 of
the UCC sees no reason why contingent debts cannot be
collateral. Yet New York courts have a woeful history of
equating contingent debt with no debt at all. This anxiety
has been legislated into the CPLR to no good end. 482
Section 5222(b) says of debts, so defined, that the garnishee is not
Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1965)). Otherwise,
Sumitomo is ignored.
477
Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., 378 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863-64 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1975).
478 See JSC, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
479 See Plaza, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
480 See id.• The Plaza Hotel court remarks, "[P]laintiff has shown, at least prima facie, that
movant partnership and defendant corporation are in fact on and the same." Id. at 864. As to
fraudulent conveyances, the Plaza Hotel court remarks, "Movant's additional argument, that
plaintiffs sole remedy is a proceeding pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law, is likewise
meritless. That plaintiff may also proceed in accordance with section 273-a of the Debtor and
Creditor Law in no way precludes appropriate proceedings pursuant to CPLR Article 52." Id.
That is, fraudulent conveyance law is considered just another theory that the creditor could
have, but did not, pursue. See id. For the record, however, the alter ego theory is
inconsistent with the fraudulent conveyance theory. If A and B are the same person, there
can be no conveyance, fraudulent or otherwise, between A and B.
481 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
48 2 Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 97 (footnotes omitted).
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to "pay over or otherwise dispose of any such debt, to any person
other than the sheriff or the support collection unit." 483 So if the
garnishee is served on a Monday at a time when he owes a debt (as
narrowly defined) and if the garnishee pays on a Tuesday, the
garnishee has violated the restraining notice. 484 What if the
garnishee mailed a check on Sunday the day before he received the
restraining notice? The garnishee is expected to stop payment on
that check. 485
Payment of a debt on Tuesday after receipt of a binding
restraining notice on Monday gives rise to a suit for damages, but it
does not imply that the creditor, as of Monday, has expropriated the
debtor's right to be paid. Any such conclusion implies that the
restraining notice is a lien, which is strictly prohibited. After
Tuesday, the creditor may not insist that the garnishee pay a
second time, but the creditor does have a suit for damages, which
may or may not equate with the amount of the debt that the
garnishee should not have paid. This distinction makes a difference
with the regard to the accrual of interest on the creditor's remedy.
Because the creditor is not the owner of anything on Monday, the
creditor cannot claim that interest begins to accrue on Monday,
rather than on the date when damages are awarded. 486
Greatly complicating the restraint of debt-paying is the fact that
restraining notices apparently do not restrain setoffs at all. This
will lead to puzzles which threaten to undermine the restraining
notice altogether.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
With regard to debts, it should be the case that only paying a debt to, or to the order of,
the debtor should be restrained. Paying the debtor's employer on a debt owed to the employer
for service performed by the debtor should not be restrained for the simple reason that such a
debt is not owed to the debtor. A case apparently to the contrary is Ray v. Jama Productions,
Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980). In this case, the garnishee hired the
services of an employee of a company. Id. at 631. The judgment creditor received a judgment
against the employee. Id. The garnishee fulfilled its contract by paying the company. Id.
Because the company used some of this money to meet the expenses of the employee, the
court held that the garnishee had violated the restraining notice served upon it. Id. Carried
to its logical conclusion, if a creditor had a judgment against, say, an employee of IBM and
the creditor served a restraining notice on IBM's largest customer, the customer is restrained
from paying IBM if IBM's debt was generated by the debtor's services rendered to IBM. This
seems rather to break down the pales and forts of reason.
485 Conde v. Anton Adjustment Co., 508 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (Civ. Ct. New York County
1986).
486 See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Briarpatch Film Corp., No. 603364/01, 2013 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2503, at *38-39 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 13, 2013).
483
484
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H. Right of Seto{{
Banks jealously guard the common law right of setoff. If a bank
has received a restraining notice from a judgment creditor, does the
creditor violate it by declaring the setoff?
The metaphysics of setoff have never been well understood. A
setoff is the unilateral but reciprocal right of any creditor to declare
a mutual countervailing debt to be canceled. 487 Is canceling through
setoff a debt the same as paying it? If so, the setoff would seem to
violate CPLR section 5222(b) (fourth sentence). In this regard, it
may be pointed out that section 5222(b)'s fourth sentence prohibits
not only paying a debt, but also "otherwise disposing' of it. 488 In the
context of a third party garnishee, what could "otherwise disposing"
mean but setting it off against some mutual debt?
The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, has vindicated the setoff right
against restraining notice in Aspen Industries, Inc. v. Marine
Midland Bank. 489 The court did so on the strength of New York
Debtor and Creditor Law section 151, which holds:
Every debtor shall have the right upon:
(a) the filing of [bankruptcy] petition ... ;
(b) the making of an assignment by a creditor for the
benefit of its creditors;
(c) the application for the appointment . . . of any
receiver ... ;
(d) the issuance of any execution against any of the
property of a creditor;
(e) the issuance of a subpoena or order, in supplementary
proceedings, against or with respect to any of the
property of a creditor; or
(f) the issuance of a warrant of attachment against any
of the property of a creditor,
to set off and apply against any indebtedness, whether
matured or unmatured, of such creditor to such debtor, any
amount owing from such debtor to such creditor, at or at any
time after, the happening of any of the above mentioned
events, and the aforesaid right of set off may be exercised by

48 7 E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. (In re Bennett
Funding Grp., Inc.), 146 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
488 C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (emphasis added).
489 Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1981).
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such debtor against such creditor . . . receiver or execution,
judgment or attachment creditor of such creditor, or against
anyone else claiming through or against such creditor . . .
receivers, or execution, judgment or attachment creditor,
notwithstanding the fact that such right of set off shall not
have been exercised by such debtor prior to the making,
filing or issuance, or service upon such debtor of, or of notice
of, any such petition; assignment for the benefit of creditors;
appointment or application for the appointment of a receiver;
or issuance of execution, subpoena or order or warrant. 490
When enacted, a subpoena, per section 151(e), also entailed a
restraining notice. 491 But when the CPLR divorced subpoenas and
restraining notices, section 151(e) ceased referring to restraining
notices. 492 In modern times, the restraining notice is no longer
described in section 151(e), which refers to an "order, in
supplementary proceedings ... with respect to any of the property
of a creditor."493 A restraining notice is an order, to be sure, but it
may be issued without the commencement of a supplementary
proceeding. 494
In Aspen, the garnishee bank froze a segment ($9,677.60) of the
debtor's bank account in accord with the sixth sentence of section
5222(b):
If a garnishee served with a restraining notice withholds the
payment of money belonging or owed to the judgment debtor
in an amount equal to twice the amount due on the judgment
or order, the restraining notice is not effective as to other
property or money.495
The bank accepted post-service deposits and honored post-service
checks, consistent with the "twice the amount" freeze. 496 After a
while, however, the bank declared a partial setoff of its $124,597.64
claim against the debtor. 497 The creditor then brought a special

N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (McKinney 2014).
See West Harlem Pork Ctr., Ltd. v. Empire Nat'l Bank, 400 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App.
Div. 2d. Dep't 1978).
492 See id.
493 DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151(e); see Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 812.
494 C.P.L.R. 5222(a).
496 Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 811 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 1981)). The
amount required to be frozen in the case was $9,677.60, twice the "balance of $4,838.80, still
owing." Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 809.
496 Id. at 810.
497 Id.
490
491
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proceeding to obtain a turnover order for the amount of its
judgment ($4,846.51).498
A majority at the appellate division level thought that the bank
had misbehaved, because it honored checks after receiving the
restraining notice (even though this was always done by crediting
that portion of the account that exceeded the "twice-the-amount"
portion of the account). 499
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no lien arose by
virtue of the restraining notice. 500 The court found that the bank
had not violated the restraining notice by honoring checks, since at
no time did the balance in the account fall below $9,677.60. 501 As
for the manifestation of the setoff, this was rightful under Debtor
and Creditor Law section 151:
Although the statute does not expressly refer to restraining
notices, it seems abundantly clear that, by enacting section
151 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, the Legislature
intended to "cover the field" in terms of the garnishee's right
of setoff vis-a-vis the various enforcement devices. 502
This decision is in accord with the purpose of the restraining
notice, which is to keep the bank account in place for the
subsequent execution or turnover order. 503 Since the setoff right is
guaranteed against such subsequent events, there is no sense in
.saying otherwise with regard to the restraining notice. Why should
the bank be forced to seek relief from the restraining notice to
manifest the setoff, where the creditor can never obtain the bank
account by ordinary judicial process?
'
Id.
See id. This was actually the correct result at this time. The Court of Appeals had
proclaimed, in International Ribbon Mills, that restraining notices constitute liens, so that
after service of a restraining notice the bank account belonged to the creditor. Int'l Ribbon
Mills, Ltd. v. Arjan Ribbons, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1975). Given that lien significance,
the setoff was no longer possible once the restraining notice was served. Meanwhile, Debtor
and Creditor Law section 151 no longer referred expressly to restraining notices, given the
divorce between subpoenas and restraining notices imposed by the CPLR. See supra text
accompanying notes 488-93. Two judges dissented. Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank,
426 N.Y.S.2d 620, 623 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980) (Cardamone, J.P., dissenting). They
thought the bank had violated the restraining notice by honoring postservice checks. Id. But
they also thought that the creditor was limited to a damages claim. Id. Because the bank
had the right of setoff which could have been exercised in lieu of honoring checks, the creditor
had not been damaged. Id.
500 Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 810-11.
501 Id. at 811.
602 Id. at 812.
503 See, e.g., City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1965).
498

499
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Suppose a bank has a setoff opportunity. That is, there are
mutually countervailing debts, but the bank has not yet manifested
its intent to set off. Setoffs, at least as a matter of state law, are
subject to the rule of "use it or lose it." So, for example, a bank with
a setoff opportunity honors a check, it is obviously too late to declare
a setoff. The setoff horse has already left the barn.
Section 151 protects setoffs against judicial process and, per
Aspen, against the restraining notice. 504 But section 151 does not
protect honoring the debtor's checks in violation of the restraining
notice. 505 Nevertheless, in Nielson Media Research, Inc. v. Carlton
Hotel, LLC, 506 the court held that, where the payor could have set
off, the payment of a debt to a judgment debtor does not violate the
restraining notice. 507 In Nielson Media, the judgment debtor was a
contractor. 508 The account debtor forwarded money to the debtor so
that it could pay the subcontractors. 509 It can be pointed out,
however, that in the context of real estate improvements, New York
Lien Law section 72(2) makes the contractor the trustee of
receivables for the benefit of subcontractors, and "[t]rust assets
shall not be levied upon or subject to a restraining notice issued
pursuant to section fifty-two hundred twenty-two of the civil
practice law and rules as the individual property of the trustee." 510
A trust asset includes "any right to receive payment at a future
time." 511 So Nielson Media was correctly decided without any
reference to setoff, because the New York Lien Law applied. Under
the law of setoff, a fiduciary may not set off a trust obligation
against a personal obligation. 512
Had the New York Lien Law not applied, Nielson Media suggests
that a creditor with a setoff opportunity is free to pay a judgment
debtor in spite of the restraining notice. 513 This is a very doubtful
proposition.
The Aspen court perhaps stretched Debtor and
Creditor Law section 151 to cover setoffs in the face of a restraining

N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (McKinney 2014); Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 812.
See DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151.

504
505
506

Nielsen Media Research, Inc. v. Carlton Hotel, LLC, 774 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 1st Dep't

2004).
5o7

508
509
510
511
512
51 3

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
N.Y. LIEN LAW§ 72(2) (McKinney 2014).

Id. § 70(1)(a).
See, e.g., Bohlinger v. Zanger, 117 N.E.2d 338, 341 (N.Y. 1954).
Nielson Media, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
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notice, 514 but section 151 cannot be made to extend to payments
where the creditor chooses to lose rather than use the setoff
opportunity.
Nevertheless, the result in Nielson Media is consistent with dicta
from the Aspen opinion. The Aspen court thought the restraining
notice had never been violated, but conceding otherwise arguendo,
the creditor could prove no damages on the premises that if the
bank did not honor the checks, the bank would have taken the
corresponding bank balance as part of the setoff. 515
Another case that stretched the concept of setoff past its proper
breaking point is Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, where a bank was
a fiduciary of a trust and the judgment debtor was the
beneficiary. 516 The bank had, in effect, a commitment to lend to the
judgment debtor. 517 If it advanced funds, it could liquidate assets of
the trust to reimburse the advance. 518 In effect, the bank had a
security interest in the rest of the trust of which it was trustee. 519
Half an hour before a restraining notice was served on the bank,
the judgment debtor received an advance in the form of a wire
transfer to an out-of-state bank. 520 After service of the restraining
notice, the bank liquidated money market shares and took the
proceeds in reimbursement for the wire transfer. 521 The judgment
creditor claimed that this selling of the money market shares
violated the restraining notice. 522 The court, however, declared the
entire transaction to be a setoff, which could be manifested in spite
of the restraining notice. 523
The subsumption of this security interest in money market shares
under the concept. of setoff is most unwarranted. In effect, the bank
was simply foreclosing on its security interest on Article 8
Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 811-12 ("[E]ven if it were assumed that [the bank] violated the restraining notice,
[the judgment creditor] would not be entitled to recover. While a violation of a restraining
notice can subject the garnishee to liability, a judgment creditor, in order to recover, must
establish that it sustained damages as a result of the granishee's disobedience of the notice ...
. Here, however, because of [the bank's] right of setoff to satisfy a pre-existing obligation of
the judgment debtor to the bank, [the judgment creditor] cannot establish such damages."
(citations omitted)).
516 Kates v. Marine Midland Bank, 541 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1989).
511 Id.
518 Id. at 928--29.
519 Id. at 928.
520 Id. at 927.
521 Id. at 927, 928.
522 Id. at 927.
52a Id. at 928--29.
514
515
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securities. The money market is nothing more than a series of
mutual funds that invest for shareholders in short-term debt
obligations. 524 Shares in these funds are redeemed rather than
traded. 525 We have seen, for better or worse, that foreclosure sales
are violations of the restraining notice. 526 Properly, the garnishee
was in violation of the restraining notice by foreclosing on its
security interest. . However, as the bank was an over-secured
creditor, damages would have been zero.

I. Paying Debts v. Setting off Debts
The setoff exception to the restraining notice is subversive of the
entire idea of the restraint. Suppose a garnishee owes a debt
(narrowly defined) of $100 and is served with a restraining notice.
The garnishee violates the order by paying. Suppose on the other
hand the garnishee does not pay the debt but instead lends $100 to
the debtor. The lending of money does not violate the restraining
notice and the debtor's subsequent setoff of the two countervailing
debts doesn't either. Therefore, the setoff exception permits a
cooperative garnishee to structure the payment as a loan free and
clear of the restraining notice.
Obviously there is something very wrong with this picture. May a
garnishee so easily avoid the restraining notice? Courts, jealous of
their powers, are unlikely to allow this. They are likely to pierce
the form of the loan and proclaim it in essence a payment, where
the garnishee can tell no tale of ordinary course of business lending
between the garnishee and the creditor. Because the concept of
payment and setoff are so intimately intertwined, I can think of no
other tactic-the privledge of substance over form-whereby the
courts can protect the force of the restraining notice.
Yet such a tactic-accusing the garnishee· of bad faith in
characterizing the payment as a loan setting up a setoff
opportunity-can be defeated if in fact the setoff is nevertheless
undeclared. In that case, no debt has been "paid." Meanwhile, the
debtor has the cash and can hide it from the sheriff as he will.
Furthermore, a payment being a voluntary act of the debtor, it is up
to the debtor-not the courts-to proclaim what the transfer of
624 See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 Wrs. L. REV.
1155, 1164 (explaining the development of the Reserve Fund-the.first money market fund).
525 Id. at 1167-68.
526 See supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
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funds means. 527 Especially given the . fact that the garnishee is
initially not everi. a party to any lawsuit (other than by virtue of the
restraining notice), it seems a dangerous assault on liberty for
courts to announce that the garnishee may not lend funds to the
debtor.
We may note, however, that this contradiction would not
disappear if.the restraining notice instituted a lien. In such a case,
the payment intangible that the garnishee owes to the debtor would
be transferred to the creditor, so that only payment to the creditor
would satisfy the obligation. However, it is still true that the
garnishee could defeat this by lending money to the debtor. Debtor
& Creditor Law section 151 still protects the garnishee from liens if
the garnishee elects to · manifest a setoff in lieu of paying the
creditor. 528 Although a lien interfere.s with setoffs in the absence of
section 151, the very purpose of section 151 is to permit post-lien
advances to be used in setoffs. 529 This contradiction is therefore
endemic to New York law. Perhaps the only solution to it is
terrorism. If the courts were to hang a few garnishees for their bad
faith, it might discourage bad faith games and increase the
efficiency of debt collection. If garnishees think that a setoff
strategy buys litigation expense, perhaps they will think twice
before trying it.

J. Contingent Debts
Contingent obligations are not debts, as "debt" is defined by
CPLR section 5201(a). 530 As a result, in Verizon New England, Inc.
v. Transcom Enhanced Services, Inc., a garnishee was able to evade
a restraining notice by simply paying for services in advance. 531
Since the prepayments were not "pay[ing] over ... any ... debt" 532
(narrowly defined), the restraining notice had no bite. 533 The
strategy of prepaying a contingent debt constitutes a potential
527 See 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1795 (3d ed. 1972).
528 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (McKinney 2014). Where. the lien is an execution lien, it
should be remembered that the sheriff's levy pursuant to the execution is nothing but a
restraining notice. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
529 Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 153.
630 See N.Y. C.P.L:R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2014).
531 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 124
(N.Y. 2013).
532 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
533 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 124.
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threat to the efficac:v- of a restraining notice. Whether this is so is
the topic for the remainder of this section.
The New York Court of Appeals has issued a well-known and
progressively complex series of cases on contingent debts and
whether they can be garnished. I have analyzed this sequence of
cases elsewhere. 534 Here I will summarize the pertinent holdings
very briefly, with a digression as to a contradiction that may have
recently arisen.
The sequence starts with Glassman v. Hyder, 535 where a
prejudgment defendant owned rental property in New Mexico. 536
The plaintiff sought prejudgment attachment in New York and, to
that end, served an insurance company present in New York but
renting space from the defendant in New Mexico. 537 The Glassman
court ruled that the insurance company's obligation to pay future
rent was not a debt because the future debt was contingent on the
landlord not being in breach of the lease. 538 Meanwhile, the
contingent obligation of the garnishee was "property" and this could
be reached, but not in New York. 539 Since the rental property was
located in New Mexico, so was the contingent debt to pay rent. 540
This contingent obligation could not be reached by an order of
attachment in New York.541
Next in the sequence is ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Apple Films,
Inc. In this famous case, a plaintiff sought to attach a film
royalty. 542 The court held that the royalty obligation was not a debt
because it was contingent. 543 It was not clear that enough people
would pay to see the film such that a royalty "debt" would be
absolutely due. 544 But the same royalty obligation was contingent

Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 97-106.
Glassman v. Hyder, 244 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 260.
531 Id.
638 See id. at 261.
53 0 See id.
540 See id. at 262.
541 Id. If the real property had been located in New York, a paper levy under CPLR section
6214(a) would have been ineffective, since paper levies suffice for personal property, and rent
receivables are real property. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2014). According to CPLR
section 6216, the sheriff levies on real property ''by filing with the clerk of the county in which
the property is located a notice of attachment." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6216 (McKinney 2014)
(emphasis added). Since the land in Glassman was located in New Mexico, the sheriff could
never have satisfied this requirement.
542 ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, 900 (N.Y. 1976).
643 Id. at 901.
544 Id.
534

535
636
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(i.e., unvested) property. 545 This could be garnished. 546 Unlike the
garnishee's rent obligation in Glassman, which was located in New
Mexico, the obligation of the ABKCO garnishee was located in New
York, and therefore garnishable. 547 The ABKCO principle fully
applies to restraining notices. 548 So, for example, a restraining
notice served at the time a third party owes a contingent broker's
fee for property not yet purchased effectively restrains payment of
the fee when the deal closes. 549
The ABKCO court held that a defendant's right to a film royalty
could not be levied as a debt because film royalties are
contingent. 550 But the royalty could be levied as property within the
meaning of section 52O1(b).551
At this point, a digression is called for, to point out something
heretofore unnoticed. The court focused on section 52O1(b), which
makes contingent property leviable. 552 But to levy contingent
property requires a plaintiff to pass through the pastern gate of
section 5232(a). 553 It hardly matters that contingent debts are
property under section 52O1(b) if, by the terms of section 5232(a),
the sheriff is not empowered to levy. 554
According to section 5232(a):
A levy by service of the execution is effective only if, at the
time of service, the person served . . . is in the possession or
custody of property not capable of delivery in which he or she

545 Id.; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney 2014) ("A money judgment may be enforced
against any property which could be assigned or transferred ... whether or not it is vested,
unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment.").
546 ABKCO Indus., 350 N.E.2d at 901-02.
541 Id. at 902.
548 Doubet, LLC v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 401544/2007, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3235,
at *35 (Sup. Ct. New York County July 6, 2011).
549 See id. at *25. The court rejected the respondents' argument that they did not owe a
debt to the judgment debtor because "the obligation to pay a broker's fee was contingent upon
the closing of the sale of the property." Id. at *25, *38.
550 ABKCO Indus., 350 N.E.2d at 901.
551 Id.
552 According to section 5201(b), a "judgment may be enforced against any property which
could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest
and whether or not it is vested." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKiney 2013). Vested means
"noncontingent." Christian v. Cnty. of Ontario, 399 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. Ontario
County 1977).
553 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014). Because ABKCO was a prepetition attachment
case, the proper citation is to CPLR section 6214(b), but everything I will say about postjudgment execution under 5232(a) is equally true on the face of section 6214(b). N.Y. C.P.L.R.
6214(b) (McKinney 2014).
564 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b); C.P.L.R. 5232(a).
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knows or has reason to believe the judgment debtor or
obligor has aninterest ... ,555
The garnishment of the film distributor presupposes that the film
distributor is a person "in the possession or custody of property'' in
which the defendant has an interest. So, implicit in ABKCO is the
view that a garnishee "possesses" property of the defendant by
virtue of owing the defendant a contingent debt. Owing money to
and possessing property of the judgment debtor must have been the
same thing.
In Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 556 however, the Court of
Appeals ruled that a debtor (not the garnishee) "possesses" her
intangible property. 557 In Falor, a defendant was served with an
order of attachment. 558 This was held to encumber the defendant's
right against various limited liability companies not present in New
York. 559 Attachment presupposes that "property to be levied upon is
in the defendant's possession or custody." 560
The Falor opinion holds, in effect, that a creditor possesses
intangible property (not the garnishee). In other, words, owing
money is not the same as possessing the debtor's intangible
property. Falor arguably denies that the garnishee is in possession
and, ifso, it is inconsistent with ABKCO. If Falor is applied to the
ABKCO facts, although the royalty agreement may have been
debtor property, · only the debtor had possession of it. 561 The
garnishee did not have possession, so that the royalty obligation
could not be levied from the garnishee. In short, when it comes to
contingent debts (or even vested debts), the debtor is in possession
and the creditor is out of possession. If so, the garnishment in
ABKCO-did not conform to section 5232(a) or section 6214(b).
In order to avoid this conclusion, somehow it must be possible
C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (emphasis added).
Hotel 71 Mezz Lender, LLC v. Falor, 926 N.E.2d 1202 (N.Y. 2010).
557 "Because personal jurisdiction was properly asserted over [the defendant] . . . the
Supreme Court had the authority to order prejudgment attachment of the property [the]
defendant ... owned and/or controlled, and service of the order upon him while he was in
New York was appropriate." Id. at 1208 (emphasis added). "Just as debt clings to the debtor
when he enters a state other than the state where the debt was incurred, it follows that
defendants' uncertificated ownership interests, which defendant Mitchell possesses or has
custody over, travel with him, and were attachable in New York based on his presence in this
state." Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
55s Id. at 1204-05.
559 Id. at 1209.
560 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2014).
561 Jeanne L. Shroeder & David Gray Carlson, Where Corporations Are: Why Casual Visits
to New York Are Bad For Business, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1141, 1153 (2013).
555
556
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that the garnishee and the debtor are cotenants of the royalty. If so,
ABKCO and Falor can coexist without contradiction. But this
seems absurd. Possession is, fundamentally, the right to exclude
others. 562 Surely the debtor has the right to exclude the garnishee
from intangible property. For example, the debtor might forgive the
contingent obligation to pay, because the debtor is in possession of
her intangible property. The garnishee could not forgive itself and
abrogate its obligation to pay. This implies that the garnishee is out
of possession. The right of forgiveness, or the right to be paid, is
exclusive to the debtor who is in possession. It will take some fancy
word chopping to show that ABKCO has not been overruled by
Falor. The best I can do to defend ABKCO from Falor is that
property is a bundle of sticks, as the Verizon court acknowledged. 563
Of this bundle, the garnishee "possesses" some sticks and the debtor
possesses some. By owing a contingent debt, a garnishee possesses
just enough sticks to eke out a levy under section 6214(b). 564 But
the debtor owns enough sticks to sustain a levy against the debtor's
property pursuant to section 6214(a). 565 They are not cotenants in
that the garnishee's set of sticks is disjoint from the debtor's set of
sticks. In topological terms, garnishees and debtors occupy disjoint
normal Hausdorff spaces. 566 On this view, both parties have
possession, but somehow they are not cotenants.
But what is the garnishee's set of sticks when the defendant has
only an in personam claim against the garnishee? The best that
could be said is that the garnishee possesses the means by which
payment of the contingent debt could be realized. But, as the
defendant's claim is in personam, the defendant owns none of these
means before the garnishee voluntarily conveys them to the
defendant, or before the defendant obtains some judicial lien
against specific property of the garnishee. In short, possession of
intangible property in section 6214(b) means one thing, and it
means quite the opposite thing in section 6214(a). By considerable
violence to the English language and common sense, it might be

562 College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaidpostsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) (''The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.").
563 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 124-25
(2013). The court cites Penner who, ironically, argued at length that a "'bundle of [sticks]' .. .
[is a] linguistic expression [that] can be nothing more than a slogan, [which] has no .. .
critical power." Penner, supra note 281, at 819-20.
564 See C.P.L.R. 6214(b).
565 See C.P.L.R. 6214(a).
566 See JAMES R. MUNKRES, TOPOLOGY 195-96 (2d ed. 2000).
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possible to rule that ABKCO is not overruled.
But let's set aside the interesting contradiction between ABKCO
and Falor. Let us assume that an ABKCO garnishment is still
possible on some sort of stick-partitioning gambit. What does a levy
actually mean in the case of a levied contingent debt? In particular,
since Verizon involved the status of prepayments for services, could
the ABKCO garnishment have been defeated by a careful scheme of
prepaying the defendant for royalties not yet due? I contend that
the garnishment, if valid, can be defeated by prepayment. And if
garnishments can be defeated, so can restraining notices pertaining
to contingent debt.
Ordinarily, creation of a lien on a debt, contingent or vested,
would interfere with the strategy of setoff. But we have already
seen that Debtor & Creditor Law section 151 plays havoc with liens.
First, recall that a sheriffs levy is both a restraining notice and a
turnover order. 567 But an execution, which authorizes the levy,
gives rise to a lien. We know this from CPLR section 5202(a), which
provides:
Where a judgment creditor has delivered an execution to a
sheriff, the judgment creditor's rights in a debt owed to the
judgment debtor or in an interest of the judgment debtor in
personal property, against which debt or property the
judgment may be enforced, are superior to the extent of the
amount of the execution to the rights of any [subsequent]
transferee of the debt or property .... 568
While this section does not mention the word "lien," it refers to
the plaintiffs "right" to a debt or to personal property. 569 This
"right," -whatever it is, is better than the right of subsequent
transferees.
Section 5202 establishes that a creditor's rights are better than a
transferee's rights. The challenge is that the creditor needs to have
better rights than the garnishee, who claims to have paid a debt in
advance. Therefore, we must contrive to make the garnishee into a
transferee of debtor property, such that the creditor's right is better
than the garnishee's subsequent right.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2014). Omitted are two exceptions, which protect
good faith and bad faith transferees for value (before the levy) and good faith transferees of
property not capable of delivery (after the levy). Id. The addition of the bracketed word
"subsequent" is justified supra in Part 1.B.
569 Id.
567
568
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The key to the interpretive move is to see that payment does not
extinguish the garnishee's obligation but transfers it to the
garnishee. The garnishee is thus like a corporation that buys its
public debt on the market. It is a buyer of its own debt. To buy a
debt (when one owes the debt) is to extinguish it. In that sense,
every payor is a transferee. So, on this basis, flimsy as it may seem,
the creditor's rights, per section 5202, are better than the
garnishee's rights. If the garnishee pays after the execution is
delivered to the sheriff, the garnishee's right to the debt it has
''bought" is inferior to the creditor's right. The garnishee, having
"paid" the judgment debtor, must pay the sheriff a second time. 570
In effect, what section 5202 says, however inarticulately, is that
service of the execution on the sheriff transfers the garnishee's
obligation to the sheriff (who holds it as agent of the creditor). Once
the execution is served, the only way for the garnishee to buy back
his obligation (i.e., pay it) is to pay the sheriff (to the extent of the
lien). Any attempt to pay the defendant does not extinguish the
garnishee's obligation, which now belongs to the sheriff (on behalf of
the judgment creditor).
Using this insight, we can analyze an advance payment, not as a
payment, but as a transfer of collateral to the debtor. 571 Bestowing
extra collateral or property of any sort on the debtor does not violate
the restraining notice. 572 It does not extinguish the contingent debt
simply because the debt is still contingent at the time of the
prepayment. When the debt finally becomes due, the debtor is
empowered to declare a setoff of the debt (narrowly defined). 573
In the absence of Debtor & Creditor Law section 151, a levy prior
to prepayment interferes with the debtor's right of setoff. Where,
prior to the prepayment, an execution has been served and a levy

570 The same issue arises as to whether forgiveness of debt is a fraudulent conveyance. In
order for this to be true, it must be the case that the insolvent debtor transfers the debt to the
garnishee. If forgiveness is a transfer, then extinguishment by the garnishee's payment is
likewise a transfer. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 587, 594-96 (1989), for discussion in the context of insolvents renouncing inheritances.
571 The appellate division analyzed the prepayment as the garnishee's "credit balance."
Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2012), aff'd, 990 N.E.2d 121 (2013).
572 See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Briarpatch Film Corp., No. 603364/01, 2013 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2503, at *29 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 13, 2013). For example, a well-wisher
who has been served with a restraining notice may still send a birthday gift to a judgment
debtor. But if the well-wisher asks a garnishee to forward a gift, the garnishee violates the
restraining notice if he complies. See id.
573 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (MCKINNEY 2014).
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accomplished, the debtor is divested of the claim against the
garnishee and can no longer exercise the setoff right. The setoff has
become triangular and therefore not permissible. The garnishee's
obligation can only be satisfied by paying the sheriff. Meanwhile,
the prepayment was certainly not intended to be a gift, so the
garnishee would undoubtedly have a restitutionary right to retrieve
the advance payment from the debtor, if he can.
Key here is that the creditor, under section 5202, has received a
transfer from the debtor of the right to collect. 574 This is precisely
what is absent with regard to restraining notices, which are not
supposed to be liens. 575 After the restraining notice is served, the
debtor is still "in possession," as it were, of the right to collect from
the garnishee.
But now we must add Debtor & Creditor Law section 151 back to
the mix. This allows for setoffs free and clear of any lien. 576
Whenever a countervailing debt exists, a levied garnishee need
never pay the sheriff. 577 Instead of paying the sheriff, the garnishee
can simply declare a setoff, even though it is quite triangular in
shape. 578
To summarize, prepayment defeats the ABKCO style levy because
Debtor & Creditor Law section 151 always authorizes the setoff of a
previously encumbered obligation. Prepayment is designed to give
the debtor a setoff opportunity. In the absence of Debtor & Creditor
Law section 151, the setoff right is defeated by the existence of a
lien. But given section 151, prepayment should effectively defeat
the lien by substituting the concept of setoff for the concept of
payment.
Already it should be apparent that Verizon was rightly decided on
the text of the CPLR. But Verizon has one more angle that requires
a visit to the third in our parade of cases on contingent debt. In
Supreme Merchandise Co. v. Chemical Bank, a bank issued a
documentary letter of credit to a defendant. 579 Basically, the bank
was obligated to pay the defendant, no questions asked, if the
defendant tendered conforming documents. 580 The lower court

574
575
576
577
578
579
580

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2014).
Siegel, Practice Commentaries, supra note 260, C5222:8.
DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151.
Id.
Id.
Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 514 N.E.2d 1358, 1358 (N.Y. 1987).
Id.
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reasoned, from ABKCO, that contingent debts are property and the
garnishment is good. 581
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Appellate Division's reversal of the lower court because ABKCO, as
applied to letters of credit, would undercut the certainty of
payment, which is cherished by the letter of credit industry. 582
Although the Supreme Merchandise decision casts the matter as
an exception to the ABKCO principle, subsequent lower courts have
analyzed that the contingent letter of credit obligation was simply
"too contingent" to be property. 583 Such obligations cannot be
garnished at all, because they are neither debts nor property. 584
Only "slightly contingent" debt can be property. 585
Verizon is basically an application of the Supreme Merchandise
principle that some contingent debts are simply too contingent to be
considered property. In Verizon, the debtor was in the business of
supplying "voice-over-internet termination services." 586
The
judgment creditor had domesticated a federal judgment from
Massachusetts and had served restraining notices on the debtor and
on various garnishees in New York. 587
The garnishee, Transcom, denied owing a debt or having
"possession or custody of property" of the debtor. 588 Transcom's
relation to the debtor was this: the parties had signed an underlying
contract that did not obligate Transcom to buy services, but if
Transcom paid in advance for services, the debtor would provide

See id. at 1359.
Id. at 1362.
583 Carlson, Critique II, supra note 1, at 104.
584 Id.
585 See Supreme Merch., Co., 514 N.E.2d at 1361 ("[E]ven claims that depend on further
action by the debtor may constitute 'property' and ... this distinction from ABKCO is not
alone dispositive.").
586 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012). Voice termination refers to the routing of telephone calls from one
telephone company to another and "termination" refers to the end point of the call. Wholesale
Call Origination, Call Termination and Transit Services Provided Over Fixed Electronic
Communication Networks, MALTA COMM. AUTHORITY, 42 (Sept. 18, 2006),
http:l/www.mca.org.mt/sites/default/files/articles/wholesale_call_OrigTerm%26TransFixed.pd
f. Where the end point was within the debtor's network, the debtor could charge a fee for
routing the call. See Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., No.
104208/10, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1988, at *2 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2010), aff'd,
N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012), aff'd, 990 N.E.2d 121 (2013).
587 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 122
(N.Y. 2013). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5401 (McKinney 2014) ("'[F[oreign judgment'
means any judgment . . . of a court of the United States . . . ."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5402(a)
(McKinney 2014) (explaining how to file a foreign judgment).
588 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 122.
581
582
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them. 589 The Court of Appeals characterized the "week-to-week"
decision to pay in advance as an oral agreement. 590 Properly, in
prepaying, 591 Transcom was offering the debtor a unilateral
contract, the mode of acceptance being actually providing the
service. 592 No "debt" was being paid when the prepayment was
tendered. 593
The restraining notice was served on Transcom on Thursday,
April 2, 2009. 594 On Wednesday, April 1, Transcom had sent a
personal check by overnight courier, covering services to begin in
the week commencing Sunday, April 5. 595 Presumably this check
was not honored until the middle of the next week. 596 This meant
that, while the check was pending, the debtor must have provided
services to the garnishee even though the check had not cleared. If
so, the check, when it cleared, in part constituted payment for
services already rendered and in part constituted a payment for
services not yet rendered-an advance payment. 597 None of this
matters, however, if the restraining notice was not effective on April
2. If ineffective, Transcom was free to pay the debtor for any future
debt when it became due any time after April 2. 598 The after-

Id.
Id. at 124.
591 The prepayments were actually in response to an invoice submitted by the judgment
debtor to the garnishee, customer, but this did not prove that the garnishee was paying a
debt. Id. at 123. The invoice was simply a request for advance payment. Id. at 122.
Transcom presented testimony that it had a week to week arrangement with GNAPs
that allowed Transcom to decide weekly whether to engage GNAPs for services. Various
Transcom witnesses testified that GNAPs sent monthly invoices for proposed services to
be rendered the following month, and Transcom prepaid for services each week, rather
than paying monthly for services rendered by GNAPs as provided by 2003 contract.
Id. at 123.
592 Id. at 124.
593 Id.
594 Id. at 122.
595 See Verizon New England Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 245,
247 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012), aff'd 990 N.E.2d 121 (2013).
596 In a proceeding against a different garnishee who had a similar arrangement to that of
Transcom, the court noted that the garnishee's check did not clear for eight days. Verizon
New England, Inc. v. IDT Domestic Telecom, Inc., 950 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
2012).
597 See supra note 570 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of an advance
payment).
598 As of April 1, Transcom's name is on a negotiable instrument. Does this·means a "debt"
(narrowly defined) exists after April 1? If so, the restraining notice is effective on April 2.
But issuance of the check does not mean that Transcom owed a debt at the time the
restraining notice was served. According to New York's version of the Uniform Commercial
Code, "[t]he drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft ... he will pay the amount of the
draft." N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 3-413(2) (McKinney 2014). This clearly describes a contingent
589
590
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acquired debt clause in section 5222(b)'s third sentence 1s
contingent on the restraining notice being effective on April 2. 599
Following service of the restraining notice, the creditor brought a
turnover proceeding against Transcom, which had made $2,454,250
in similar payments to the debtor. 600 It also brought an action for
civil contempt and a special proceeding for a money judgment in the
amount of this sum. 601 The supreme court dismissed all these
actions, concluding "that there is no property or debt in the instant
matter subject to a restraining order, levy or turnover pursuant to
Article 52 of the CPLR." 602 The appellate division and Court of
Appeals both affirmed. 603
The Court of Appeals held that Transcom could not be
constrained because, at the time the restraining notice was served,
Transcom owed no debt. 604 Nor was Transcom "in the possession or
custody of property in which [Transcom knew or had] ... reason to

obligation. Therefore, issuance of the check does not create a debt to which the restraining
notice of April 2 applies.
599 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
600 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 122
(N.Y. 2013). A procedural quibble is more than possible here. A turnover proceeding does not
seem like the proper procedure. Under CPLR section 5227, an order requiring a garnishee to
pay a debt requires that the garnishee "is or will become indebted to the judgment debtor."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227 (McKinney 2014). If indeed Transcom had paid a "debt," a matter in
dispute, the creditor could only show that, historically, the creditor once owed a debt which it
then paid (in violation of the restraining notice). This is not good enough to sustain the
turnover proceeding. It will not serve to claim that equity will view as not done that which
ought not to have been done (because the payment violated the restraining notice). This
turns the restraining notice into a lien. This, apparently, must not be done. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-92.
The other turnover provision, CPLR section 5225(b), also fails. This requires that the
garnishee be "a person in possession or custody of money . . . in which the judgment debtor
has an interest." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2014). But the debtor would have no
interest in "money" possessed by Transcom until that money was actually transferred to the
debtor. By that time, Transcom was no longer in possession of it, and so the turnover
proceeding does not lie.
The proper procedure is for the creditor to seek a contempt order, or to sue the garnishee in
a money judgment for tort. See Aspen Indus. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 811
(N.Y. 1981) ("[V]iolation of the restraining notice by the party served is punishable by
contempt and subjects the garnishee to personal liability in a separate plenary action or a
special proceeding under CPLR article 52 brought by the aggrieved judgment creditor.")
(citation omitted).
601 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 122.
602 Id. at 123 (quoting Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., No.
104208/10, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1988, at *11 (Sup. Ct. New York County June 17, 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
603 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 123, 125.
604 Id. at 124.

1572

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 77.4

believe the judgment debtor or obligor ha[d] an interest." 605
On the debt side of the equation, recall that debt is defined as
that "which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or
upon demand of the judgment debtor." 606 On April 2, 2009, the time
Transcom had been served with the restraining notice, Transcom
had already issued a check intended to pay for services not yet
delivered. 607 Provision of the services created a debt, but this debt
was "after-acquired" and did not exist on April 2. 608 Therefore, the
restraining notice was ineffective on April 2. 609 It was incapable of
having an after-acquired effect on a debt (narrowly defined) that
only arose the next week. 610 It seems clear that the court was
correct on the debt side of the equation.
On the property side, we have the ABKCO rule that contingent
debt is property. 611 But we also have the Supreme 1v.lerchandise rule
that a debt that is "too contingent" is not property. 612 If Supreme
Merchandise applies, the restraining notice could have no bite
because Transcom possessed no debtor property on April 2.
Indeed, Verizon fell into the "super-contingent" category.
According to the Verizon court, "the expectation of any continued or
future business is too contingent in nature and speculative to create
a present or future property interest."613
Suppose, however, that the contract had been of the ABKCO
variety. How exactly would the restraining notice operate? The
answer is that the restraining notice is impotent to prevent the
prepayment dodge exploited in Verizon. Thanks to Debtor & .
Creditor Law section 151, not even a lien can interfere with
prepayment, because prepayment establishes a setoff opportunity,
which is senior to any lien. 614 If the setoff is free and clear of a lien,
it is certainly free and clear of the restraining notice, which does not
give rise to liens.
Meanwhile, having received the advance payment and upon the
vesting of the garnishee's obligation to pay for services, the debtor

C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 520l(a) (McKinney 2014).
607 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 122.
6os See id. at 123.
609 Id. at 124.
610 See supra text accompanying note 34.
611 See ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1976).
612 Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 514 N.E.2d 1358, 1361 (N.Y. 1987).
613 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 124.
6 14 See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 151 (McKinney 2014).
605
606
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does not lose the ability to declare a setoff. 615 And the garnishee is
specifically invited to set off a countervailing debt, even when that
debt postdates a lien on the debt that the garnishee owes the
debtor.
One last consideration. We have suggested that a garnishee who
pays a debt is a transferee who has "bought" the debt from the
debtor. 616 We have also suggested that ABKCO implies that the
garnishee is in possession of the debtor's claim against him (though
Falor suggests the opposite). Assuming these two premises, it is
still true that the prepaying garnishee must not "suffer" transfers of
debtor property against the garnishee's will. Has the garnishee
"suffered" a transfer of possession of the debt (previously contingent
but now due) when the debtor exercises his unilateral right of
setoff?
Earlier, we suggested that some involuntary transfers of bailed
property (those not arising from court orders) technically violate the
restraining notice, but given this is against the will of the
garnishee, the garnishee cannot be held in contempt of court. A
setoff is also an involuntary transfer, on the above-mentioned
assumptions.
But the setoff opportunity arises because the
garnishee has consented to a tricky prepayment strategy. May we
say that the willfulness of the prepayment authorizes a contempt
proceeding?
Courts will be sorely tempted to punish a garnishee who is so
tricky as to attempt a prepayment strategy. But on behalf of our
tricky garnishee, the prepayment itself is clearly no violation of the
restraining notice. 617 The later manifestation of the setoff, at that
point in history, is entirely against the will of the garnishee and
therefore is no different from the attachment of a lien arising from
operation oflaw.

K. After-Acquired Property and After Arising Debts
One of the reasons Verizon seems so provocative is that, on April
2, the garnishee knew perfectly well that, starting the next Sunday,
the garnishee would receive services from the judgment debtor. 618
615 This follows from what was said about bailees served with restraining notices, where
the debtor sells the bailor's interest. See supra text accompanying notes 299-304.
61 6 See supra text accompanying notes 569-572
617 Verizon, 990 N.E.2d at 124.
Indeed, it is open for the creditor to garnish that
prepayment from the judgment debtor, now that it has become the debtor's property.
61 s Id. at 122.
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Yet the restraining notice was ineffective on April 2. 619 Restraining
notices served on third parties other than a judgment debtor are
effective only if the third party knew or had reason to believe, at
some level, that she was in possession of debtor property. 620 With
regard to knowledge in any of its forms, the test is to be performed
at the time the restraining notice is received. 621 If none of the
enumerated forms of knowledge exists, the restraining notice is not
effective as to after-acquired property or after-arising debts. But if
on that date the restraining notice is effective, it does succeed in
applying to after-acquired property.
All property in which the judgment debtor or obligor is
known or believed to have an interest then in and thereafter
coming into the possession or custody of such a person,
including any specified in the notice, and all debts of such a
person, including any specified in the notice, then due and
thereafter coming due to the judgment debtor or obliger, shall
be subject to the notice except as set forth in subdivisions (h)
and (i) of this section. 622
This third sentence of CPLR section 5222(b) is conditioned by the
second sentence, which states that the restraining notice is
completely ineffective if, at the time of service, the garnishee
"possesses" (that word again!) no property or owes no debt that is
(or is believed to be) property of the debtor. 623
For example, suppose a garnishee is served with a restraining
notice on Monday. At that time the garnishee possesses no property
of the debtor. On Tuesday, however, the garnishee borrows the
judgment debtor's lawn mower. It is no violation of the restraining
notice to return the lawn mower to the judgment debtor on
Wednesday, because on Monday the garnishee held no property of
the debtor. The reason for this is apparently that garnishees who
have no connection with the judgment debtor on Monday are not
expected to watch for after-acquired property thereafter. 624
Oddly, if we read the CPLR literally, the after-acquired property
clause of the third sentence is triggered if the creditor designated
Id. at 124.
N.Y. C.P.L.R 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
621 Id.
622 Id. (emphasis added).
62a Id.
624 A similar rule exists for levies of after-acquired property. If the levy is not good on day
one, it does not encumber after-acquired property. If effective on that day, after-acquired
property is caught in the dragnet. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
619
620
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(wrongly) some thing that the garnishee owns is really debtor
property. We may apply this observation to the Verizon facts.
Suppose the restraining notice in that case had falsely alleged, "the
garnishee has possession of the judgment debtor's stapler." The
restraining notice is effective on April 2 because "the judgment
creditor ... has stated in the notice that ... the judgment debtor ...
has an interest in specified property in the possession or custody of
the person served."625 Later, on Sunday, when a debt for services
rendered actually accrues, the restraining notice bars effectively
payment. Though a check was written on April 1, it probably had
not cleared by Sunday. Therefore, the garnishee has a duty to stop
payment of the check because if it is cashed, it satisfies, in part, a
debt, as the CPLR narrowly defines that term. 626
It is unlikely courts will read the CPLR literally, because it
rewards judgment creditors who tell base falsehoods in official court
orders. Rather, it must be the case that the restraining notice is
effective on April 2 only if it accurately claims that the garnishee
possesses the debtor's stapler.
The key to after-arising debts is that, on the day of service, the
garnishee must owe a debt or be in possession of debtor property.
In the case of banks, it has been held that the restraining notice is
ineffective if, at the time the restraining notice is served, the
judgment debtor's bank account is overdrawn. 627 If later wire
transfers post funds into that same account, the now-healthy bank
account is not restrained because of the overdraft on the day the
restraining notice was received. 628
It is possible, however, to argue that the restraining notice 1s
effective if served on a bank at a time when the account 1s
C.P.L.R 5222(b).
See supra text accompanying notes 482-84.
See European Am. Bank v. Bank of Nova Scotia, No. 107603/01, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
1598, at *2-4 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2003).
628 See id. In spite of this principle, the court in River Seafoods, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, 796 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2005), over a dissent, found that the bank was
estopped from claiming the court order was not effective. Id. at 74. The bank had responded
to a restraining notice and accompanying subpoena with a form letter that stated, "a hold has
been placed on the judgment debtor(s) accounts(s)." Id. at 72-73 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The letter gave the type and number of the account and included the words ''NO
FUNDS AVAILABLE." Id. at 73. The attorney for the judgment creditor wrote back, "stating
that he trusted the ... account remained restrained." Id. The bank responded again, "a hold
has been placed on the judgment debtor(s) accounts(s)," together with the information that
the account now amounted to $2,140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thereafter,
wire transfers hit the account. Id. The bank let the judgment debtor withdraw the funds. Id.
This was held to be grounds for an estoppel. Id. at 74.
6 25

626
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temporarily overdrawn. True, the bank owes no "debt" at that time,
as the CPLR defines it. But the bank has a contractual relation
with the customer that obliges the bank to accept deposits, and so
forth. Because of this, it could be said that the customer has a
contingent claim against the bank. Since, in New York, contingent
claims are garnishable property, 629 the restraining notice is effective
after all. Because it is effective, any after-acquired deposits are
restrained as well.
Of course, tempering this point is the
observation that the bank's right of setoff is completely senior to
any judicial process; thanks to New York Debtor & Creditor Law
section 151.
But to reach the conclusion that a restraining notice is effective if
the bank account is overdrawn on the day of service, we must find
that the overdrawn bank is in "possession" of debtor property. This
is what the second sentence of CPLR section 5222(b) requires:
A restraining notice served upon a person other than the
judgment debtor or obligor is effective only if, at the time of
service, he or she . . . is in the possession or custody of
property in which he or she knows or has reason to believe
the judgment debtor or obligor has an interest. 630
Once again, New York law is deeply ambiguous on the question of
who, between a contingent debtor and a contingent creditor,
"possesses" intangible property. The conflict between ABKCO and
Falor as to who possesses property not capable of delivery is fully
present in CPLR section 5222, which governs restraining notices.
L. Rent as a Conditional Debt
Justice Mazzarelli has said of the Verizon result that, "[t]he
majority's narrow view ... hands a virtual road map for frustrating
the efforts of judgment creditors." 631 To what extent does the
strategy of advance payment of contingent debt compromise the
worth of restraining notices? A vital test case is prepayment of rent
not yet due. Under Glassman v. Hyder, rent obligations are not
debts (narrowly defined). 632 They are contingent obligations. 633 And
62 9
63

ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1976).

° C.P.L.R 5222(b).

631 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 245, 25556 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012) (Mazzarelli, J., dissenting), aff'd, 990 N.E.2d 121 (2013).
632 Glassman v. Hyder, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. 1968) (citing In re Estate of Ryan, 60
N.E.2d 817, 821 (N.Y. 1945)).
633 Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 261.
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these obligations are the debtor-landlord's property, but not his
personal property.
We saw in a prior section that when the creditor has an execution
lien, advance payment of a contingent debt relieves the garnishee
from the obligation to pay the sheriff, since Debtor and Creditor
Law section 151 invites triangular setoffs at the sheriffs expense.
As applied to the garnishment of rent, we note first that rent
receivables are not considered personal property at all. They are
considered real property. 634 Therefore, rent cannot properly be
levied under CPLR section 5232(a), which applies only to personal
property. 635
How can a judgment creditor obtain rent? The Court of Appeals
gives helpful advice in Glassman: the appointment of a receiver is
required to reach rents. 636 Under New York law, the rule is that a
tenant of real property must pay the owner of the reversionary
interest until that owner is dispossessed. The act of dispossession is
the court appointment of a receiver. 637 Once the receiver is in
"possession," the tenant owes rent to the receiver. In this scheme, a
levy of the tenant can play no part.
So far we may observe that when a tenant prepays .rent, the
tenant is not paying a debt because at the time of the prepayment,
the debt is contingent, as the Glassman court.emphasizes.
Suppose a tenant who has paid last month's rent on time receives
a restraining notice. The restraining notice cannot restrain the
payment of next month's rent because that future obligation is
contingent at the time the tenant received the restraining notice.
Therefore, assuming the tenant has not borrowed the landlord's
power drill or lawn mower, the restraining notice is completely
ineffective under the second sentence of section· 5222(b). 638
634 Id. at 262 ("Under traditional, even ancient law, rents were not personal obligations but
rights and duties (however treated) associated with or 'emanating from' the land." (citing
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 2880 (8th ed. 1914)).
635 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
636 Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 261.
63 7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5228(a) (McKinney 2014).
638 According to that sentence:
A restraining notice served upon a person other than the judgment debtor or obligor is
effective only if, at the time of service, he or she owes a debt· to the judgment debtor or
obligor or he or she is in the possession or custody of property in which he or she knows or
has reason to believe the judgment debtor or obligor has an interest, or if the judgment
creditor or support collection unit has stated in the notice that a specified debt is owed
by the person served to the judgment debtor or obligor or that the judgment debtor or
obligor has an interest in specified property in the possession or custody of the person
served.
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Therefore, when next month's rent becomes overdue, the tenant
properly pays the debtor-landlord without violating the CPLR.
To further complicate matters, suppose, by coincidence, at the
exact moment the creditor serves the tenant with the restraining
notice, the tenant owes back rent. Overdue rent qualifies as a debt
(narrowly defined). 639 Therefore, the restraining notice is effective
when served. Now, under the third sentence of section 5222(b), all
debts that thereafter become due are subject to the restraining
notice.
So far, we have established that a tenant who is paid up on rent
owes no debt (narrowly defined) on the day she receives the
restraining notice. The ABKCO principle applies to say that the
rent obligation is unvested property-not personal property, to be
sure, but real property. Could we now say that the restraining
notice served on a tenant who is current on rent is binding?
According to the troublesome second sentence of section 5222(b),
the restraining notice is effective only if the tenant is "in the
possession or custody of property in which he or she knows or has
reason to believe the judgment debtor . . . has an interest."640 A
tenant is obviously in possession of the land, but is the tenant also
in possession of the landlord's entitlement to receive rent?
A classic New York case on receiverships in mortgage foreclosures
indicates that (a) the tenant is in possession of the land but (b) the
landlord is in possession of the rent receivable.
In Holmes v.
Gravenhorst, 641 a mortgage lender had obtained the appointment of
a receiver. 642 The mortgagee was still in residence, and so the
receiver thought the mortgagee should have to pay rent for
occupancy after the commencement of the receivership. 643 The court
ruled that the receiver was not entitled to rent. 644 The receiver was
only entitled to "take possession" of a rent income stream, if any. 645
In the case of rent, the word "possession" was used in the following
way: the tenant was in possession of the land. 646 But the landlord

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
639 See Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan v. Abbruzzese, 293 N.Y.S.2d 634, 640 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1968).
64 0 C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (emphasis added).
641 Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 188 N.E. 285 (N.Y. 1933).
642 Id. at 285.
643 Id.
644 Id. at 286-87.
645 Id.
646 See id.
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was in possession of the rent receivable. 647 The receiver had no
right to take possession of the land from either the landlord or the
tenant, but the receiver did have the right to take possession of the
landlord's right to receive rent. 648 Here is an extended passage from
Holmes in which such usage is apparent.
Where, however, the mortgagor is not in possession during
the foreclosure . . . a receiver may be appointed in a proper
case to take possession of the premises, collect the rents and
apply them to the payment of the carrying charges on the
property and the reduction of the mortgage debt.
It seems to us that there is no inconsistency in holding, in
the absence of an express agreement in the mortgage to that
effect, that while a mortgagor-owner in possession during the
pendency of a foreclosure action ... may not be disturbed in
his possession or required to pay rent which he was not
theretofore obligated to pay, when he has relinquished that
possession to others and is receiving an income from the
premises which might be applied to the payment of carrying
charges and the reduction of the mortgage debt, a receiver
upon a proper showing may be required to take possession
and control of the premises and so apply the revenue. Under
the law governing the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee
of real property as now firmly established in this State, a
mortgagee himself has no right of possession by virtue of a
mortgage pending its foreclosure, and he does not acquire
such a right by applying for and having appointed a receiver
.... The right of possession given to a receiver is incidental
to the purpose for which the receiver is appointed, namely,
the collection of the rents and profits, and if there be no rents
and profits because actual possession is in one having the
right of possession inherent in his ownership, no right of
possession exists which may be conferred upon a receiver.
It is conceivable that a receiver might find applicable to
the maintenance of the property and reduction of the
mortgage debt an income from property wholly in the actual
possession of the mortgagor-owner, as where the mortgagorowner in full possession of the premises is receiving income
therefrom. As illustrative of this possible situation, we

647
. 648

See id. at 287 .
See id.
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might suggest a case where the exterior walls of a dwelling
house are used for the display of advertising matter not
connected with the business of the mortgagor-owner in
possession and for which a rental is being paid or could be
collected. Right of possession, beyond the extent of its
existence in the lessee of the advertising space, would not
thereby be conferred upon the receiver.
While he
undoubtedly would be entitled to collect such rental for
advertising space, his right would not extend to the use in
that manner of premises where advertising space was not
theretofore in- use, as to accord to him possession of premises
not theretofore so used for such a purpose would be to
interfere with the actual possession of the owner. 649
The import of this passage is that the landlord is in possession of
the rent receivable, and the tenant is not. Therefore, although the
rent receivable is definitely "property," it is not property that the
tenant possesses. Since CPLR section 5222(b)'s second sentence
requires garnishee possession, the restraining notice must fail, if all
we have before us is a garnishee that owes the landlord some rent
next month. If the garnishee has also borrowed the landlord's lawn
mower, that is another matter entirely. The lawnmower bailments
makes the restraining notice effective when served and thereby
triggers the after-acquired debt feature in the third sentence of
section 5222(b).
True, the tenant possesses the land. We have seen that the
tenant must not, apparently, abandon possession of the land back to
the landlord, as that would violate the restraining notice. 650 But the
tenant's obligation to pay rent is something that the landlord
possesses and as.to which a receiver might dispossess him.

M. Voluntary Compliance
Reverting to our prior lawn mower example, where the garnishee
has borrowed nothing on Sunday, receives the restraining notice on
Monday, and borrows the debtor's mower on Tuesday, the
restraining notice is not effective, because on Monday the garnishee
was not in possession of any debtor property at the moment of
service.
Id. at 286-87 (emphasis added).
See supra Part I.F.4. CPLR section 5222 refers to "property" generally, never to "real"
or "personal" property. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222 (McKinney 2014).
649

650
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A restraining notice served upon a person other than the
judgment debtor ... is effective only if, at the time of service,
he or she . . . is in the possession or custody of property in
which ... the judgment debtor or obligor has an interest ...
651

The garnishee may return the mower at any time. But what if the
garnishee chooses to honor the restraining notice, even though it is
not effective? May the garnishee resist the debtor's demand for the
lawn mower?
One might be tempted to conclude that there is no court order in
this case. The garnishee violates the debtor's rights by retaining
the mower against the debtor's demand for return. The court in
Palestine Monetary Authority ("PMA'') v. Strachman652 has implied
that garnishees can choose to be bound. 653 The decision involved an
intermediary bank in the middle of a chain of wire transfers. 654
In this case, the PMA was a judgment debtor. 655 The PMA had an
account with the Palestine International Bank ("PIB"). 656 PIB had
an account with the Bank of New York (BNY). 657
To understand the holding in PMA, it is necessary to fathom how
wire transfers work. Let us imagine that PMA wished to pay X for
some reason. PMA (the originator) has an account with PIB (the
originator bank). 658 PIB has account with BNY. BNY has an
account at X Bank. X has an account with X Bank. A chain exists
linking PMA to X through three banks.
To accomplish the payment, PMA must instruct PIB to debit
PMA's account at PIB659 and to debit PIB's account at BNY, on
651

C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
Palestine Monetary Auth. v. Strachman, 873 N.Y.S.2d 281 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).
653 See id. at 291-92.
654 See id. at 284.
655 Id.
656 Id. at 286.
651 Id.
658 An originator bank is "the receiving bank to which the payment order of the originator
is issued." U.C.C. § 4A-104(d) (2012).
659 ''When a receiving bank accepts a payment order, the bank normally receives payment
from the sender by debiting an authorized account of the sender." U.C.C. § 4A-502 cmt. 1.
PIE is a receiving bank. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4). A payment order is
an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank ... to pay, or to cause another bank to pay,
a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary if: (i) the instruction does not
state a condition to payment to the beneficiary other than time of payment, (ii) the
receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving
payment from, the sender, and (iii) the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly
to the receiving bank . . . .
·
U.C.C. § 4A-103(1). "Acceptance" of a payment order occurs when a receiving bank executes
652
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further condition that PIB instruct BNY to takes the steps to
accomplish payment of X. None of the banks in the chain has any
discretion. The steps are very mechanically set forth by the
originator. 660 Thus, on instruction from PIB, BNY debits PIB and
credits X Bank. X Bank credits X and X is successfully paid. Each
accepts the payment order from a prior party in the chain when it
executes the order it has received. 661
In PMA, a judgment creditor served a restraining notice on
BNY. 662 Under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), BNY could have ignored this restraining notice. 663
According to UCC section 4A-503:
For proper cause and in compliance with applicable law, a
court may restrain (i) a person from issuing a payment order
to initiate a funds transfer, (ii) an originator's bank from
executing the payment of the originator, or (iii) the
beneficiary's bank from releasing funds to the beneficiary or
the beneficiary from withdrawing the funds. A court may not
otherwise restrain a person from issuing a payment order,
paying or receiving payment of a payment order, or otherwise
acting with respect to a funds transfer. 664
Applying this section to our hypothetical wire transfer, a
restraining notice might be issued to PMA under clause (i) or PIB
under clause (ii) or X Bank or X under clause (iii). BNY, however,
falls entirely under the last sentence of section 4A-503.
Accordingly, the restraining notice is not effective.
Nevertheless, BNY volunteered to receive PIB funds pursuant to
the payment order and, instead of sending them on to X Bank,
simply :restrained those funds (as if they were PMA funds) for the
benefit of the judgment creditor. 665
[I]n this case, it was the BNY who chose to obey the court
order and froze funds, all of which happened to be wire-fund
transfers. The BNY sought no relief with regard to the
injunctions. Consequently, we do not find that the order by
which BNY restrained the funds was improper or a violation
the payment order. U.C.C. § 4A-209(a).
66
For an example, see Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 160 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
1998).
661 U.C.C. § 4A-209(1).
662 Palestine Monetary Auth., 873 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
663 Id. at 291-92.
664 U.C.C. § 4A-503 (emphasis added).
665 Palestine Monetary Auth., 873 N.Y.S.2d at 291-92.

°
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of DCC § 4A-503.
Moreover, we find persuasive the uudgment creditor's]
argument that nothing in DCC § 4A-502 prohibits the bank
from honoring creditor process to turn over the funds. The
uudgment. creditor] point[s] to DCC 4A-502(4) which
provides as follows:
"Creditor process with respect to a payment by the
originator to the beneficiary pursuant to a funds transfer
may be served only on the beneficiary's bank with respect
to the debt owed by that bank to the beneficiary. Any
other bank served with the creditor process is not obliged
to act with respect to the process."
. [T]he plain meaning of the provision is that it allows a
bank to honor the process if it so chooses but it does not
always have to honor that process. 666
The court, however, did not go so far as to order a turnover of
funds to the judgment creditor. The funds might not belong to PMA
but rather to PIB. On the other hand, perhaps PIB was the alter
ego or agent of PMA. In the latter case, the frozen funds would be
available to satisfy the judgment. Nevertheless, the funds were
successfully frozen because BNY chose to be bound.
There is clearly a contradiction in the case. On the one hand, the
court order did not bind BNY. But BNY chose to be bound. Since
choice was involved, it cannot really be said that BNY was bound.
But because it acted under color of law, it apparently had no Article
4A liability for failing to execute the payment orders.
Meanwhile, if a garnishee chooses to ignore a restraining notice
and then later wishes it hadn't, it cannot retroactively choose to be
bound and seek restitution. In Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.
v. Brown, 667 a restraining notice had designated the bank account of
the debtor's ex-spouse. 668 There seemed no evidence that the exspouse was holding any funds for the debtor. 669
The bank
nevertheless honored the debtor's check. 670 Retroactively, the bank
tried to claim that the honor was an overdraft in light of the

666
667

Id. (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-502(4) (McKinney 2009)).
Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Brown, 312 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Civ. Ct. New York County

1970).
6 68
669
670

Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-46.
Id. at 346.
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restraining notice (and subsequent levy). 671 It therefore sought to
recover the mistaken payment from its customer. 672 The court
dismissed the complaint on the basis that the restraining notice was
ineffective when it was served. 673 According to the court:
The bank by its action assumed to contract a liability for the
defendant without her knowledge or authority and without
inquiry as to the validity of the claim. Their red-carpet
treatment of the judgment creditor sets a dangerous
precedent which could lead to great abuses, putting in
jeopardy the bank accounts of all relatives of judgment
debtors. 674
Although these comments generally condemn "red-carpet"
treatment for creditors, these remarks should probably be limited to
the facts: a garnishee who chooses not to be bound cannot change its
mind.

N. Effectiveness and Reason to Believe
A restraining notice is effective if the garnishee isn't certain but
nevertheless has reason to believe the judgment debtor has an
interest. The phrase "reason to believe" could imply (1) the
judgment debtor does have an interest in a thing, and a reasonable
garnishee should know of that interest (but doesn't in fact know). It
could also imply that (2) the judgment debtor has no property
interest in the thing but the garnishee reasonably believes
(incorrectly) that the debtor does have an interest.
These possibilities have their attractive and unattractive sides.
With regard to the first possibility, suppose a warehouse, in
possession of debtor property, is served with a restraining notice.
The agents of the warehouse haven't memorized who every client is,
but they have goods records that could easily be consulted. These
records show that the debtor has stored property with the
warehouse. The debtor then shows up at the warehouse and
demands the property; the warehouse complies. Hailed before the
court for contempt, the court need not listen to the claim that the
garnishee was subjectively confused, because objectively it should
not have been confused. Consultation of the records gives the
671

672
673
674

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 345-46.
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warehouse reason to know that it is in possession of debtor
property. 675
The second possibility, however, is that the debtor does not have
an interest in property; the garnishee mistakenly thinks otherwise.
For example, a broker maintains an account for a debtor and the
debtor's corporation is the judgment debtor. The garnishee, without
any prompting from the judgment creditor, assumes that the
corporation is simply the alter ego of its customer. Has the broker
committed a wrong against its customer?
We have just seen that a garnishee served with an ineffective
restraining notice can choose to be bound. So it must be the case
that where the creditor, under a mistaken belief that the
restraining notice is binding, operates under color of law when it
obeys the restraining notice based on its erroneous belief.
Therefore, reasonable belief in an ineffective restraining notice does
not give rise to garnishee liability.

0. Specified in the Notice
A notice is effective if the garnishee knows or should know that
the debtor owns property in the possession of the garnishee. 676 But
knowledge of any sort becomes irrelevant if the judgment creditor
specifies the property that is to be restrained. 677 As redacted, the
second sentence in section 5222(b) provides:
A restraining notice served upon a [garnishee] ... is effective
... if ... the judgment creditor ... has stated in the notice
that ... the judgment debtor ... has an interest in specified
property in the possession or custody of the person served. 678
If indeed the judgment debtor obviously has a property interest in
the specified thing, this sentence is not problematic. But often,
whether a debtor does have property in a thing is a deep matter

6 7 5 See Schulman v. N. Fork Bank, No. 116595/07, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4597, at *5 (Sup.
Ct. New York County Mar. 6, 2009). In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Chemical Bank,
433 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1980), the corporate name on the restraining notice was
slightly different from the name on the bank account. Id. at 160. The bank honored the
judgment debtor's check and the creditor sought to recover the amount of the check from the
bank. Id. The court held that the restraining notice was effective if the bank had reason to
believe that the restraining notice actually referred to its customer. Id. The matter was
remanded for further findings on this score. Id.
676 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Young, 523 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1987) (citing DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE§ 508, at 688 (1st ed. 1978)).
677 SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 508, at 889.
67s N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
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requiring complex adjudication. A garnishee can always find out by
moving to vacate the restraining notice. If the judgment creditor
has insufficient evidence to prove the debtor has a property interest,
the court will vacate the restraint. 679
We have already opined that the literal meaning of the CPLR
must be supplemented. An allegation of property ownership makes
a restraining notice effective only if the allegation is true.
Otherwise, creditors have an incentive to tell lies in order to trigger
the after-acquired property clause contained in the third sentence of
CPLR section 5222(b).
Suppose a lie is told and the garnishee, out of caution, does
nothing, as the restraining notice commands. The true owner of the
property designated in the restraining notice, whether it be the
garnishee or someone else, has a remedy against the judgment
creditor. According to the fifth sentence of section 5222(b): "A
judgment creditor ... which has specified personal property or debt
in a restraining notice shall be liable to the owner of the property ..
. if other than the judgment debtor . . . for any damages sustained
by reason of the restraint." 680 Because the judgment creditor681 has
this absolute liability in case a mistake is made, 682 it follows,
according to the court in Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., that the garnishee receiving
the restraining notice has no liability at all if it honors the
restraining notice on the strength of an incorrect designation of
property in the restraining notice. 683
Special emphasis is made by the Sumitomo court on the fact that

See, e.g., Claymont v. Levitt, 528 N.Y.S.2d 644, 644 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1988).
C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
There seems to be a cause of action against the judgment creditor's attorney if he was
negligent in wrongfully restraining a third party's property. Walter v. Doe, 402 N.Y.S.2d 723,
725-26 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1978).
682 In Reisman v. Kerry Lutz, P.C., 774 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004), a
garnishee's complaint was dismissed when the facts showed that her husband deposited
funds in her account. Id. at 345. Although the court did not say so, presumably the deposited
funds were indeed fraudulently conveyed to her. See id. If the judgment creditor simply
erred, then the complaint had merit. In Stathopoulos v. Seaways Shipping Corp., 321
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1971), the court held that damages could not be
awarded against a creditor who in good faith believed that the debtor had an interest in
property at the time of service. Id. at 720-21.
683 Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358--59
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1965), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966); see
also Walter, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 726 ("[CPLR 5222(b)] was not intended to permit, or encourage
lack of care on the part of those seeking to collect the judgment." (citing Stathopoulous, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 719-20)).
679

680
681
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the restraining notice designates a specific item of property as
belonging to the judgment debtor. 684 What if the restraining notice
does not designate a specific account? What if, instead, the
restraining notice in general requires debtor property to be
restrained, but, insofar as the bank knows, the corporate account is
genuine? In such a case, it is doubtful that the restraining notice is
effective. 685 What made the restraining notice binding on the
garnishee in Sumitomo was the "judgment creditor's specification of
debt ... in a restraining notice." 686
Sumitomo makes it dangerous for a garnishee to ignore a
restraining notice that designates specific property as belonging to
the debtor (even though facially that does not appear to be the case).
In Sumitomo, no levy had occurred-only service of the restraining
notice. 687 A levy would have been an adverse claim, authorizing the
bank to ignore the 'levy, as it created an "adverse claim" to the
checking account, thereby triggering Banking Law section 134(5).
Oddly, the bank was vulnerable to the weaker restraining notice,
when it would have been immune from the stronger levy pursuant
to an execution. 688
Courts say broadly that "[i]f third parties 'do not have property or
debts in which the judgment debtor has an interest, the restraining
notices are not effective."' 689 But this assessment is not accurate.
Reasonable but erroneous belief makes the restraining notice
effective on the plain meaning of the statute.
In Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak

Sumitomo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
See Bregman v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 111953/08, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5720, *4-5
(Sup. Ct. New York County May 28, 2009) (holding a restraining notice ineffective when
served on an account debtor of a corporation partly owned by a judgment debtor, where the
account debtor had no reason to believe that the corporate entity was not separate).
686 Sumitomo, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
687 Id. at 356.
688 The procedural posture of Brown was rather odd. In a restraining notice, a creditor had
designated the bank account of the debtor's ex-spouse. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Brown,
312 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1970). There seemed to be no evidence that
the ex-spouse was holding any funds for the debtor. Id. The bank nevertheless honored the
debtor's check. Id. Retroactively, the bank tried to claim that the honor was an overdraft in
light of the restraining notice (and levy). Id. It therefore sought to recover the mistaken
payment from its customer. Id. The court dismissed the complaint on the basis that the
restraining notice was ineffective. Id. at 346.
689 Verizon New England, Inc. v. IDT Domestic Telecom, Inc., No. 104207/2010, 2010 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 4243, at *4 (Sup. Ct. New York County Sept. 1, 2010) (quoting JSC Foreign
Econ. Ass'n Technostroyexport v. lnt'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)), aff'd, 950 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2012).
684
686
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Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 690 a bank received a restraining notice with
regard to bank accounts that, at the time, might have been fiduciary
accounts for the benefit of a third party, or might have been wholly
the property of the judgment debtor, where the third party was
simply an unsecured creditor of the judgment debtor. 691 In the
midst of this uncertainty, the bank kept a restraint on the entire
account. 692 Later, the accounts were found to be mostly (i.e., 60/65)
fiduciary. 693 The balance constituted a commission to which the
judgment debtor was entitled in its own right. 694 Nevertheless, in
this period of uncertainty, the bank kept up the restraint and
apparently had no liability to the third party, who was deprived of
the funds for years. 695 Such a result reflects the view that a
garnishee served with a restraining notice has a duty to freeze
assets of non-judgment debtors if the restraining notice states
(however falsely) that designated property belongs to the judgment
debtor. 696
Once again, CPLR section 5222(b) provides that a judgment
creditor "which has specified personal property or debt in a
restraining notice shall be liable to the owner of the property."697 It
might seem that the negative pregnant of this sentence is that an
attorney who does not specify specific debtor property bears no
liability to a wronged garnishee. But this is not the case. 698 For
example, negligent service of a restraining notice when the attorney
should have known that he entered a default judgment against the
wrong defendant might sustain a finding of the creditor's liability. 699
P. Duration
Restraining notices served on judgment debtors are effective as

°

69 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 305 F.
Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
59 1 Id. at 307.
692 See id. at 311.
693 See id.
694 See id. at 308-09.
695 See id. at 311.
696 See generally id. (stating that pursuant to CPLR section 5222(b), the bank was required
to apply the restraining notice to all funds that it knew or believed that the judgment debtor
had an interest in).
69 7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
698 Feldman v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 740 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791-92 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 2002).
699 See id. at 792-93; Walter v. Doe, 402 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (Civ. Ct. New York County
1978).
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long as the judgment is. 700
Restraining notices served on
garnishees, however, are effective 701 for "one year after the notice is
served upon him or her, or until the judgment or order is satisfied
or vacated, whichever event first occurs." 702 Pursuant to CPLR
section 5240, however, a court may extend the effective period on
motion of the creditor. 703
It has been held that a court order staying a restraining notice is
not the same as an order vacating a notice, and so the restraining
notice is still effective upon being stayed. 704
"Staying'' the
restraining notice seems to make no difference at all-a
meaningless event.
A restraining notice is automatically canceled if the creditor's
default judgment is vacated. 705 Failure of an attorney to remove a
restraining notice in light of an order vacating a default judgment is
sanctionable. 706

70° Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld Assocs., 658 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Beller & Keller v. Kindor, No. 94 Civ. 7682 (RPP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13171, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003); Singh v. Singh, No. 9893/2009, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5503, at *12
(Sup. Ct. Queens County Nov. 10, 2010); In re City of New York, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 682-83
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).
701 Even though attorneys are officers of the court, they are still obliged to honor
restraining notices served upon them. Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Briarpatch Film Corp., 932
N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011). This is so even when the attorney holds debtor
funds as a retainer for future employment. Potter v. MacLean, 904 N.Y.S.2d 551, 553 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 2010).
702 C.P.L.R. 5222(b). After the year has lapsed, it is error for a court not to order the
lapsed notice vacated. Tweedie Constr. Co. v. Stoesser, 409 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1978).
703 See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P., 932 N.Y.S.2d at 452; Kitson & Kitson v. City of Yonkers, 778
N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004). A restraining notice on a commingled fund was
perpetuated pending further proceedings to determine which funds were exempt from the
levY, Int'l Airline Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Jonas, No. 570769-01, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
534, at *2 (App. Term 1st Dep't May 10, 2002).
704 Nardone v. Long Island Trust Co., 336 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972)
("Were the rule otherwise, any judgment debtor could obtain such an order, without notice to
the court that a restraining notice had been served, or to the judgment creditor, and recover
his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice."); USA Auto
Funding, LLC v. Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 16440/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1310, at *3 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County Mar. 30, 2006).
705 See Brookhaven Anesthesia, Assocs. v. Flaherty, No. 2003-1258 S C, 2004 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1590, at *2 (App. Div. 2d Dep't Sept. 20, 2004) (citing Citibank, N.A., v. Second Dev.
Servs., Inc., 708 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (App. Term 2d Dep't 2000)); 215 African & Hispanic Am.
Realty of N.Y., LLC v. Air Chef, Inc., No. 117923/09, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4001, at *10
(Sup. Ct. New York County Aug. 20, 2012).
706 See Phx. Consulting, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. 97 CV 3249, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2854, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,. 1998).
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Q. Court Permission for a Second Restraining Notice
What if the judgment creditor fails to levy property in the
possession of the garnishee during the year in which a restraining
notice is valid? May a second restraining notice be served in the
second year?
The answer is yes, but "[l]eave of court is required to serve more
than one restraining notice upon the same person with respect to
the same judgment or order." 707 A second restraining notice served
without the required court permission is invalid. 708
Second
restraining notices, however, are utterly prohibited within the
original one year with regard to "a natural person's banking
institution account." 709 But, as the original restraining notice lasts
for a year, there are little grounds for a creditor to seek permission
within that year. Beyond the one-year period (or within the oneyear period for unnatural persons), the failure of the restraining
notice to be effective against a bank in the first place is grounds for
a court to approve a second notice. 710
Can a debtor sue a judgment creditor for serving a second
restraining notice on a garnishee? One court held no. 711 The rule
against second restraining notices is for the benefit of garnishees to
prevent their being harassed. 712 Judgment debtors are not harmed
by wrongful service of the second restraining notice. 713
C.P.L.R. 5222(c).
Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld Assocs., 658 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). It is
not, however, an unlawful collection practice under the New York Penal Law. N.Y. PENAL
LAW§ 190.50 (McKinney 2014) ("A person is guilty of unlawful collection practices when, with
intent to eriforce a claim ... he knowingly sends ... a notice, document or other instrument
which has no judicial or official sanction and which in its format ... simulates a summons ...
or process . . . ."); accord Finkelstein, Mauriello, Kaplan & Levine, P.C. v. McGuirk, 395
N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1977) ("[T]he act of issuing [a] restraining order
without prior court approval does not fall within the parameters of the provisions of section
190.50 of the Penal Law as an unlawful collection practice .... ").
709 C.P.L.R. 5222(c). The court in Friedman overlooks this point in suggesting that, where
the creditor does not serve the debtor with the restraining notice within four days of serving
the bank, the creditor can simply serve a new restraining notice. Friedman v. Mayerhoff, 592
N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1992).
71
Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, No. 90 Civ. 334 (JMC), 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7901, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1992).
711 Tadeo Constr. Corp. v. Gottesman, No. 603259/06, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5746, at *10
(Sup. Ct. New York County May 26, 2009).
712 See, e.g., Grossman v. Liker, 442 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1981).
713 Nevertheless, this same second restraining notice became the basis of a successfully
pleaded abuse of process claim, as the restraining notice violated an earlier stipulation
suspending enforcement of the judgment. See Tadeo Constr. Corp., 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
5746, at *11-14.
7o7
708

°
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We have seen that garnishees served with ineffective restraining
notices can choose to be bound. 714 If this is so, then certainly a
garnishee who receives a second restraining notice without court
permission may choose to view it as binding and therefore enjoy the
color of law in refusing to surrender property or to pay a debt that is
due. This possibility, however, is apparently not enough to justify
the debtor receiving damages from the judgment creditor.
A "second restraining notice" must be distinguished from a
"corrected restraining notice." A second notice that does not extend
the one-year effective period and that merely corrects mistakes does
not require a court order. 715

R. Twice the Amount of the Judgment
A garnishee served with a restraining notice may rely upon that
order and refuse to pay debts, but there is a quantitative limit to
this privilege. According to CPLR section 5222(b):
If a garnishee served with a restraining notice withholds the
payment of money belonging or owed to the judgment debtor
or obligor in an amount equal to twice the amount due on the
judgment or order, the restraining notice is not effective as to
other property or money. 716
This rule applies only to money, not to illiquid property
generally. 717 "The purpose of securing twice the amount due upon
the judgment is to ensure payment of costs and interest in addition
to the balance outstanding on the judgment."718 It is no violation of
the restraining notice if a bank honors checks out of that part of the
bank account that is more than twice the amount of the

See supra Part I.M.
McLoughlin v. Altman, No. 92 Civ. 8106 (Kl\.'.lW)(MHD), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11413,
at *6---7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1997).
716 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) (McKinney 2014).
Courts may use section 5240 to alter the
"twice the amount" rule. C.P.L.R. 5240; see Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2002), ("Finally, we modified the stay
to apply only to those funds that would be necessary and sufficient to satisfy a judgment.").
Another use of section 5240 is to facilitate the debtor's desire to open a new bank account.
The court directed that any future restraining notice include a sentence instructing the
garnishee not to restrain if it appeared that the garnishee had received exempt social security
payments. Contact Res. Servs., LLC v. Gregory, 806 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412-13 (Rochester City
Ct. 2005).
717 See C.P.L.R. 5222(b).
718 Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 535 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1988) (citing Aspen Indus. V. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808, 811
(N.Y. 1981)).
714
715
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judgment. 719
This excess
constitutionally permissible. 720

of

restraint

has

been

found

S. Foreign Entities Present in New York
New York has recently expanded the power of courts to force
garnishees to bring property outside New York into the state. 721
Koehler u. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd. involved a turnover proceeding
against a bank that was holding collateral from a judgment debtor
in Bermuda. 722 Answering a question certified from the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
that, where the garnishee is jurisdictionally present in New York,
such an injunction is approprfate. 723
These holdings fully apply to restraining notices, which are a
form of injunctive relief only slightly different from turnover orders.
The turnover order commands that the garnishee do something.
The restraining notice commands that the garnishee do nothing.
They are both personal obligations that can be imposed on entities
jurisdictionally in New York.
Thus, a restraining notice served on a bank in New York restrains
a bank account in Florida. However, McCarthy u. Wachovia Bank,
N.A. adds a constitutional wrinkle. 724 The debtors claimed that the
default judgment against them in New York was unconstitutionally
obtained for want of personal jurisdiction. 725 The court, however,
swept this objection aside, suggesting that, if the allegation was
true, the debtors should have traveled to New York and had the
default judgment set aside pursuant to CPLR section 5239. 726
Nevertheless, the restraining notice had what real estate lawyers
might call "color of title." The McCarthy court held that the bank
ns Aspen Indus., 421 N.E.2d at 811.
720 See A.R. Fuels v. A.F. Supply Corp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1985).
721 See, e.g., Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009); Global Tech.,
Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47, at *30-31 (Sup. Ct.
New York County Jan. 11, 2012).
n 2 Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 827.
723 Id. at 831. The Court of Appeals has recently added that only property held outside
New York directly by an entity present in New York can be reached by a turnover order while
property held by a subsidiary controlled by the New York entity cannot be reached. See
Northern Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 990 N.E.2d 114 (N.Y.
2013).
724 See McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
725
726

Id.
See id. at 276.
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could rely on the facial validity of the restraining notice to freeze
the account, noting that "there is no requirement that a garnishee
bank be required to investigate the validity of a restraining notice
served upon it." 727 The court cited CPLR section 5209 as a safe
harbor. 728 According to this provision:
A person who, pursuant to an execution or order, pays or
delivers, to the judgment creditor or a sheriff or receiver,
money or other personal property in which a judgment
debtor has or will have an interest, or so pays a debt he owes
the judgment debtor, is discharged from his obligation to the
judgment debtor to the extent of the payment or delivery. 729
One can see that CPLR section 5209 does not literally apply, as a
bank that has received a restraining notice h.as. not paid either the
sheriff or the judgment creditor. Still, one cah imagine that section
5209 embodies the policy that a garnishee should be protected when
it follows a court order (even if that order is unconstitutional).
At the sub-constitutional level, a relevant rule for executions
naturally carries over to restraining notices. This is the fiction that
every branch of a bank is a different entity than every other branch
of a bank. The reason for this is as follows:
·
Unless each branch of a bank is treated as a separate entity
for attachment purposes, no branch could safely pay a check
drawn by its depositor without checking with all other
branches and the main office to make sure that no warrant
of attachment had been served upon any of them. Each time
a warrant of attachment is served upon one branch, every
other branch and the main office would have to be notified.
This would place an intolerable burden upon banking and
commerce .... 730
Under this rule, 731 if it still exists, 732 McCarthy was wrongly
121
1 2s

Id. at 277-, 78.
Id. at 278 (quoting Yu v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 670 N.Y.S.2d 187, 187 (1st Dep't 1998)).

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209 (McKinney 2014).
Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1950), aff'd
mem., 126 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953). The rule is a matter of New York law.
Where purely federal law applies-that is, FRCP 69.does not apply-there is no separate
branch rule. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965).
731 The rule can be traced back to English cases in the 1920s., See United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965); Thomas S.
Erickson, Comment, Garnishment of Branch Banks, 56 MICH. L. REV. 90, 91-92 (1957). The
first New York appearance of the rule seems to be in Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange Bank,
159 N.Y.S. 385, 388 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem., 122 N.E. 877 (1919).
7 32 See generally Geoffrey Sant, The Rejection of the Separate Entity Rule Validates the
120
73

° Cronan v.
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decided. McCarthy was correctly decided if the branch rule no
longer exists.
The separate branch rule was recently upheld in Global
Technology, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, where an American
company had a New York judgment against a Mexican company. 733
The Mexican company had a sizable bank account at a Canadian
branch of a Canadian bank. 734 The Canadian bank, however, was
jurisdictionally present in New York. 735 The judgment creditor
served a restraining notice on the bank in New York, but the bank
permitted its client to empty the account at the Canadian branch. 736
The Global Technology court refused to hold the bank liable for
damages. 737
The rule now seems to be that if a bank has computerized its
records and if the branches are all within the United States, the
branch rule serves no purpose; service "on the bank's main office" 738
is service on all the branches. 739 But where a bank is not
computerized, 740 or where the branch to be restrained is located

Separate Entity Rule, 65 S.M.U. L. REV. 813, 814-15 (2012) (discussing the conflict between
New York State and Federal courts regarding the branch bank rule).
7 33 Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47,
at *1-2, *37-39 (Sup. Ct. New York County Jan. 11, 2012); see also Shaheen Sports, Inc. v.
Asia Ins. Co., No. 98-cv-5951 (LAP), 11-CV-920 (LAP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36720, at *1420 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2012) (reviewing recent New York State court decisions involving the
bank branch rule and endorsing the proposition that the rule exists in post-judgment
execution proceedings).
134 Global Tech, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47, at *2.
135 Id.
73 6 Id. at *2, *4.
737 Id. at *43, *49; see also Dwight Healy & Marika Maris, New York Court Determines
That Banks Still Have the Protection of the "Separate Entity" Doctrine After Koehler, 128
BANKING L.J. 668, 671 (2011) (examining a recent New York Supreme Court case that applied
the bank branch rule).
738 Calton v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 2117 (LMM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119284, at *6-7 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 08
Civ. 7834 (GEL) (DCP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86498, at *12, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009),
aff'd, 654 F.3d 210 (2010), rev'd on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Advanced Emp't Concepts, Inc., 703 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000).
739 Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding restraining
order served in New York as affecting conduct of the bank outside the state). But see Nat'l
Union, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (noting that Digitrex was subsequently "clarified" and that the
separate branch rule only applies when the main branch and the branch where the accounts
in question are maintained are in the same jurisdiction). National Union, however, seems to
rule on the basis that a New York court has no jurisdiction over property located outside New
York, even if it has jurisdiction over the person in custody of the property. Id. This instinct
has been overruled by Koehler. Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., N.E.2d 825, 831 (N.Y. 2009).
740 Therm-X-Chem. & Oil Corp. v. Extebank, 444 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1981).
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outside the United States, 741 the branch rule still breathes and
reigns. 742 Such holdings with regard to foreign banks are based on
a fear that, in the foreign country, New York's restraining notice
will be given no "full faith and credit," resulting in the bank's double
liability. At least one federal court, however, reads Koehler to mean
that the separate branch rule is dead even in the case of bank
accounts at branches outside the United States. 743 Some lower state
courts disagree and insist that the rule has merit, at least where the
branch is outside the United States. 744 It has been suggested that
application of the rule requires "a case-by-case determination based
on practicality and fairness, i.e., reasonableness, under the
circumstances." 745 The entire matter has recently been certified to
the New York Court of Appeals in the context of a restraining notice
served on a branch of an international bank. 746

T. The Effect of a Bankruptcy Petition
Suppose a judgment debtor responds to a restraining notice by
filing for bankruptcy. Technically, bankruptcy is a transfer from

741 See Allied Mar., Inc. v. Descatrade SA, 620 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2010); Limonium Mar.,
S.A. v. Mizushima Marinera, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 600, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); McCloskey v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 183 N.E.2d 227, 227 (N.Y. 1962). But see Abuhamda v. Abuhamda,
654 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11-12 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1997) (affirming injunction, per an order of
attachment, directing a bank present in New York not to pay out funds from an account in
Jordan).
742 The Court of Appeals' holding in Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce can be viewed as a version of the single branch rule.
The facts involved a bank present in New York and its subsidiary in Canada, which
maintained a bank account in favor of tax deadbeats. Northern Mariana Islands v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, 990 N.E.2d 114, 115-16 (N.Y. 2013). If the bank present in New
York had a branch in Canada, the single branch rule would have prevented the turnover
order. Obviously, where the foreign branch is separately incorporated, the turnover order is
even less justified. The Mariana Islands court, however, based its decision on the fact that
CPLR section 5225(b) requires a garnishee to have "actual" possession of the debt it owes to
the judgment debtor. Id. at 119. Actual possession seems to mean that the garnishee owes a
vested or contingent debt. Id. "[C]onstructive possession" seems to mean that the garnishee
controls an entity that owes the debt. See People v. Muhammad, 945 N.E.2d 1010, 1011-12
(N.Y. 2011).
74a See JW Oilfield Equip., LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 764 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595-96
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
744 See Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, No. 105262/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2268,
at *7-8 (Sup. Ct. New York County May 12, 2011); Parbulk II AS v. Heritage Mar., SA, 935
N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2011).
745 S & S Mach. Corp. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 638 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1996).
14s Tire Engineering & Distributing LLC v. Bank of China. Ltd., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
9256 (2d Cir. February 24, 2014).
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the judgment debtor to a bankruptcy estate. 747 As such, a debtor
violates the restraining notice when he files for bankruptcy. But
this may be swept aside, as federal preemption doctrine surely
privileges the bankruptcy petition over the restraining notice. 748
What if a garnishee has been served with a prepetition
restraining notice? Does the restraining notice continue in effect
after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition?
A bankruptcy petition typically invokes the automatic stay, which
prevents creditors from taking any action to collect a debt (save
through the procedures. afforded by the Bankruptcy Code). 749
Accordingly, after the bankruptcy petition, a creditor may not serve
a new restraining notice, as Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(l)
prohibits "issuance or employment of process." 750
Does the automatic stay cancel a restraining notice lawfully
issued before the bankruptcy petition? Before answering, it should
be noted that there is a school of thought that any garnishee who
owes a debt or holds property of the bankruptcy estate must follow
instructions from the bankruptcy trustee and voluntarily hand over
property of the estate to the bankruptcy trustee. 751 Independently,
it has been suggested that Bankruptcy Code section 542(b) imposes
this duty. 752 This duty, if it exists, means that a bankruptcy trustee
may require the garnishee or the debtor to violate the restraining
notice. Therefore, it is certainly convenient to think that the
automatic stay preempts any preexisting restraining notice, as they
are in conflict (at least on the above-stated interpretation of the
automatic stay).

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 544(a) (2012).
See generally Hines v, Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) ("Our primary function is to
determine whether ... [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.").
749 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). But see id. § 362(c)(4) (identifying an exception which denies
the automatic stay to debtors who file multiple bankruptcy petitions in a year).
750 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l). Additionally § 362(a)(3) appears to prohibit the issuance of a new
restraining notice by applying the stay to "any act to ... exercise control over property of the
estate." Id.
751 David Gray Carlson, Turnover of Collateral in Bankruptcy: Must a Secured Party-inPossession Volunteer?, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 483, 496 (1997).
752 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2012) ("Except as provided in subsection (c) and (d) of this section,
an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate and that is matured, payable on
demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to
the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 ... against a claim against the
debtor."); Calvin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Calvin), 329 B.R. 589, 596 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2005).
747
748
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This was the result reached in In re Ado mah, 753 on federal
preemption grounds. Because the debtor's bank had received a
prepetition restraining notice, the bank refused to honor the
debtor's checks for the three weeks following the chapter 7
bankruptcy petition. 754 The failure of the bank to honor checks
(under color of the restraining notice) was held to be a violation of
the automaticstay.755
There are some curious aspects to In re Adomah. Chapter 7
implies that the checking account belongs to the bankruptcy
trustee, not to the debtor. 756 So any checks the debtor wrote in the
first three weeks should not have been honored in any case. 757 The
debtor did claim that the funds were exempt under New York's
bankruptcy-only exemption under New York Debtor & Creditor Law
section 283. 758 But an exempt bank account is initially property of
the bankruptcy estate. 759 The debtor must fetch exempt property
out of the bankruptcy estate by filing Schedule C. 760 Once the
debtor does so, the trustee and creditors have thirty days after the
conclusion of the creditors' meeting to file objections to any
exemption. 761 If no one objects, the claimed exemption is expelled
from the bankruptcy estate. 762 Until then, any claimed exemption is
estate property. 763 Accordingly, the debtor had no right to insist
that the bank honor checks until at least 30 days after the first
creditors' meeting (at least when money in the account is
prepetition money). 764
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Bank of Maryland
In re Adomah, 340 B.R. 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 455.
755 Id. at 460.
756 In re Calvin, 329 B.R. at 595-96.
757 Id. at 601-02 ("The Debtors suffered no injury because at the time the Bank froze the
funds, they did not belong to the Debtors despite their claiming the funds as exempt in
Schedule C.").
758 In re Adomah, 340 B.R. at 457.
759 In re Pimental, 142 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1992).
760 11 U.S.C. § 522([) (2012); see David Gray Carlson, The Role of Valuation in Federal
Bankruptcy Exemption Process: The Supreme Court Reads Schedule C, 18 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 461, 463 (2010).
761 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(l).
762 11 u.s.c. § 522([).
763 See id. § 522(b)(l).
764 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2012); In re Adomah, 340 B.R. 453, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(noting that post-petition earnings are the property of the debtor, whereas pre-petition
earnings are property of the estate); Calvin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 329 B.R. 589, 597 &
n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that any post-petition paychecks deposited in the account
are not property of the estate).
753
754
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v. Strumpf, 765 has held that a bank's refusal to honor checks never
violates the automatic stay because the bank's dishonor of checks
constitutes a breach of contract, and Bankruptcy Code section
362(a) does not prohibit breaches of contract. 766 The Adomah court
held that Strumpf only condoned a temporary freeze of the checking
account. 767 If true, it may be observed that the bank in Ado mah did
rather temporarily freeze the account because it was unsure of the
effect of the restraining notice. But temporariness has to do with
whether the freeze was the manifestation of a setoff, which is
prohibited under section 362(a)(7). 768 Temporariness has nothing to
do whether breaches of contract with the debtor violate the
automatic stay. The alternative holding in Strumpf that breach of
contract does not constitute "control over property of the estate" is
categorical, not temporal. 769 Therefore, it would seem the bank
acted properly because its actions were temporary and in any case
its breach of contract is no violation of the automatic stay. 770 On top
of that, recall that a garnishee can choose to be bound by a
restraining notice that is not ultimately effective. 771 Under this
principle, it is hard to see how the bank should have been liable for
restraining funds. Be that as it may, Adomah suggests, plausibly,
that the automatic stay cancels the restraining notice.
Some old cases suggest that the restraining notice survives the
automatic stay. In Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 772 the
bankruptcy court suggested that a debtor who wished access to a
fund that was exempt would have to receive a bankruptcy court
order to negate the restraining notice. 773 The restraining notice was
not per se void as violating the stay, as the Adomah court
claimed. 774
765
766
767
16s
769
770
771
772

Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
See id. at 21.
See In re Adomah, 340 B.R. 453, 458-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2012).
See Calvin, 329 B.R. 589 at 603.
Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 21.
See supra Part I.M.
Tompkins Cnty. Trust Co. v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan), 31 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.

1983).
773 Id. at 126-27 & n.1; McMahon v. Norse (In re McMahon), 70 B.R. 290, 293 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1987).
774 See Sullivan, 31 B.R. at 127; see also Medi-Physics, Inc. v. Cmty. Hosp., 432 N.Y.S.2d
594, 596 (Rockland County Ct. 1980) (holding that the stay provisions of section 362 have no
effect upon a retraining notice which merely acts as an injunction). In Broome v. Citibank, an
undischarged creditor served a restraining notice on a bank holding post-petition funds, after
the debtor had received a general discharge from all other claims. Broome v. Citibank, 632
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While we are on the subject of bankruptcy, it may be pointed out
that judicial liens created within ninety days of bankruptcy are
voidable preferences, whenever the debtor is insolvent at the time of
lien creation. 775 Therefore, if a garnishee violates a restraining
notice within ninety days of bankruptcy, damages are zero, because
any judicial lien that the creditor could obtain would have been
invalid in the ensuing bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the garnishee's
actions can be punished by contempt because the restraining notice
was in fact violated. In ·Vinos Argentinos Imports USA, Inc. v. Los
Andes Imports, Inc., a judgment creditor served a restraining notice
on the judgment debtor. 776 Thereafter, the president of the
corporate debtor caused the debtor to make preferential payments
to other creditors. 777 The debtor could have, but did not, file for
bankruptcy. 778 The court refused to order these funds transferred to
the judgment creditor, because, hypothetically, the debtor could
have deprived the judgment creditor of these funds by filing for
bankruptcy. 779 But, separately, the corporate debtor was penalized
$25,000 and the president was penalized $10,000 for these
payments. 780
IL BANKS AND THE EXEMPT INCOME PROTECTION ACT

A. In General
In 2008, the New York legislature amended section 5222 to
address a particular abuse of the elderly. 781 Today, New York, along

N.Y.S.2d 410, 410-11 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1995). In fact, the automatic stay did not
apply to either the debtor or to the post-petition property. Id. at 413-14. The bank, however,
released the funds. Id. at 411. The court held the bank liable to the judgment creditor on the
strength of Medi-Physics, which held that the restraining notice is consistent with the
automatic stay. Id. at 413. In truth, the automatic stay was simply over. 11 U.S.C. §
362(c)(2) (2012). The restraining notice was effective on any theory of the automatic stay,
and the bank should not have released the funds.
775 11 u.s.c. § 547(b)(3) (2012).
776 Vinos Argentinos Imps. USA, v. Los Andes Imps., No. 91 Civ. 2587 (JSM), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15826, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1993).
777 Id. at *4.
118 Id.
119 Id.
180 Id.
781 Exempt Income Protection Act, ch. 575, sec. 3-4, C.P.L.R. 5222-5222-a, 2008 N.Y. Laws
4085, 4088-93; Memorandum of Assemblymember Helene Weinstein in Support of A.8527-A
to Governor David Patterson, July 29, 2008, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2008 A.B. 8527-A, 231st Leg.
Reg. Sess. (2008), ch. 575, at 6-7. This act is modeled upon a similar Connecticut statute.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-367b (West 2013); Memorandum of Assemblymember Helene
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with Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and California, are considered the
jurisdictions most protective of the exemption rights of senior
citizens, insofar as their bank accounts are concerned. 782
Social security income is exempt property, 783 and the government
typically wires these payments directly into the checking accounts
of the recipients of this federal largesse. 784 Once the federal wire
hits the recipient's checking account, the proceeds of the recipient's
social security entitlement remain exempt. 785 According to 42
U.S.C. § 407(a), "none of the moneys paid ... shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." 786
Prior to 2008, if social security recipients had suffered a money
judgment against them, plaintiffs would serve restraining notices
on banks, followed by a sheriffs levy pursuant to an execution. 787
Banks often took no action to protect their customers. If the bank
honored the restraining notice (even though the bank account was
entirely exempt), it was "the responsibility of the judgment debtor
to arrange to release a restrained account." 788 If the bank paid the
sheriff pursuant to the levy, the bank was protected from liability
by CPLR section 5209, which provides:
A person who, pursuant to an execution or order, pays or
delivers, to the judgment creditor or a sheriff or receiver,
money or other personal property in which a judgment
debtor has or will have an interest, or so pays a debt he owes
the judgment debtor, is discharged from his obligation to the
judgment debtor to the extent of the payment or delivery. 789
Weinstein in Support of A.8527-A to Governor David Patterson, July 29, 2008, N.Y. Bill
Jacket, 2008 A.B. 8527-A, 231st Leg. Reg. Sess. (2008), ch. 575, at 6-7.
782 Allen C. Myers, Note, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from
Freezes, Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 371, 386-87 (2009).
783 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006). Section 407 also applies to Supplemental Security Income
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(l) (2006). Social Security benefits are not exempt from alimony
or child support claims. 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (2006).
784 In 2012, the percentage of social security recipients receiving wire transfers exceeded
94 percent.
Trend in Direct Deposit Participation, Soc. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/deposit/trendenv.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
785 See, e.g., Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
786 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
787 See Johnson v. Chem. Bank, No. 96 Civ. 4262 (SS), 1996 US. Dist. LEXIS 18027, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1996); see also Memorandum on Behalf of the New York Public Interest
Research Group to Terryl Brown Clemons, Acting Counselt to the Governor, dated Sept. 23,
2008, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2008 A.B. 8527-A, 231st Leg. Reg. Sess. (2008) L. 2008, ch. 575, at 42
(discussing the negative impacts restraining notices can have when placed on accounts owned
by the poor and elderly).
788 Johnson, 1996 US. Dist. LEXIS 18027, at *11.
7s9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209 (McKinney 2014).
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B. A New Exemption
New CPLR section 5222(h) now provides that, under certain
circumstances, the restraining notice does not affect $2,500 in the
checking account. 790 These same limitations now also apply to
executions. 791
According to new section 5205(l), an exemption arises if a
restraining notice is served on a "banking institution" or if the
banking institution is levied pursuant to an execution. 792 If either
of these events has occurred, the bank must determine: "[i]f direct
deposit or electronic payments reasonably identifiable as statutorily
exempt payments were made to the judgment debtor's account ...
during the forty-five day period preceding the date a restraining
notice was served on the banking institution."793
If all these conditions accrue, then the debtor's bank account is
automatically exempt for $2,500. This is so whether or· not the
money in the account can be traced to an exempt income stream. 794

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(h) (McKinney 2014).
According to CPLR section 5230(a) (third sentence):
Except in cases when the state of New York, or any of its agencies or municipal
corporations is the judgment creditor; or if the debt enforced is for child support, spousal
support, maintenance or alimony, provided that in those instances the execution
contains a legend at the top thereof, above the caption, in sixteen point bold type with
the following language: "The judgment creditor is the state of New York, or any of its
agencies or municipal corporations, AND/OR the debt enforced is for child support,
spousal support, maintenance or alimony.", an execution notice shall state that,
pursuant to subdivision ([) of section fifty-two hundred five of this article, two thousand
five hundred dollars of an account containing direct deposit or electronic payments
reasonably identifiable as statutorily exempt payments, as defined in paragraph two of
subdivision ([) of section fifty-two hundred five of this article, is exempt from execution
and that the garnishee cannot levy upon or restrain two thousand five hundred dollars
in such an account.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a) (McKinney 2014).
792 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205([)(1). New CPLR section 5205(n) defines ''banking institution" as
"all banks, trust companies, savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions,
foreign banking corporations incorporated, chartered, organized or licensed under the laws of
this state, foreign banking corporations maintaining a branch in this state, and nationally
chartered banks." C.P.L.R. 5205(n).
793 C.P.L.R. 5205([)(1).
794 See Martinez v. Capital One, N.A., 863 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Section
5222 also prohibits restraint of the first $1,740, regardless of the source of the funds."),
certifying questions to New York Court of Appeals sub nom., Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 711 F.3d
261 (2d. Cir. 2013), and certified questions accepted, 988 N.E.2d 884; Acevado v. Citibank,
N.A., No. 10 Civ. 8030 (PGG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40242, at *14-15 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2012). In fact, funds already exempt under some other provision are not addressed by this
amendment. This language creates an exemption in the bank account provided some direct
deposits were made into the account. In short, the language creates a new exemption (at
least from the restraining notice and sheriffs levy). See Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 855 F. Supp.
79o

791

f
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To be noted is that the exemption is tied to the choice of a debtor
to receive exempt electronic funds transfers. Debtors who receive
checks in the mail the old-fashioned way lose out on this new
exemption.
New CPLR section 5205(l) gives a non-exclusive definition of what
"statutorily exempt payments" may mean:
any personal property exempt from application to the
satisfaction of a money judgment under any provision of
state or federal law. Such term shall include, but not be
limited to, payments from any of the following sources: social
security, including retirement, survivors' and disability
benefits, supplemental security income or child support
payments; veterans administration benefits; public
assistance;
workers'
compensation;
unemployment
insurance; public or private pensions; railroad retirement;
and black lung benefits. 795
Not listed are ordinary wages. In terms of wages, CPLR section
5205(d) makes
ninety percent of the earnings of the judgment debtor for his
personal services rendered within sixty days before, and at
any time after, an income execution is delivered to the sheriff
or a motion is made to secure the application of the judgment
debtor's earnings to the satisfaction of the judgment .... 796
What if no income execution or requisite motion has ever been
served? If the CPLR is read literally, the new exemption does not
apply if wages are wired into a checking account, provided that no
income execution has already been served.
Since the exemption presupposes an income execution or motion
to secure earnings, a restraining notice absent such preconditions is
apparently fully effective, as none of the wages are exempt. 797
Nevertheless, courts often overlook the absence of an income
execution and just assume that wages are exempt. 798 On the text of

2d 157, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), certifying questions to New York Court of Appeals, 711 F.3d 261
(2d Cir. 2013), and certified questions accepted, 988 N.E.2d 884.
195 C.P.L.R. 5205(1)(2).
796 C.P.L.R. 5205(d)(2) (emphasis added).
797 McLoughlin v. Altman, No. 92 Civ. 8106 (KMW)(MHD), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11413,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1997) ("[T]he statutory exemption is keyed to the delivery of an income
execution to the sheriff or the filing in court of a motion to apply the debtor's income to the
judgment .... ").
798 In re Wrobel, 268 B.R. 342, 344 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Coolbaugh, 250 B.R. 162,
166-67 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000) (tracing rule presumed all withdrawals within sixty days of
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the CPLR, this is not justified. In any case, this judicial innovation
as to the wage exemption at least means that New York is in
compliance with federal legislation, which commands that state
legislation permit the garnishment of no more than 25 percent of
income. 799 If this instinct is followed, a wage earner who receives
wire transfers from his employer is entitled to the $2,500. A wage
earner who deposits ordinary checks is not so entitled. It is hard to
make sense of this distinction based on wire transfers, except that
the legislature was thinking of social security recipients, who
almost always receive wire transfers.
Returning then to the new limitation on restraining notices, the
bank is expressly ordered not to restrain $2,500. 800 If the account
has less than $2,500 in it, the restraining notice is "deemed void." 801
It is not clear what happens if the debtor maintains more than one
account with the bank. Should the bank aggregate all the accounts
together, or does the debtor get $2,500 from each of her several
accounts? At least one court requires all the accounts to be
aggregated together. 802
The new rules lead to peculiarities. Suppose a judgment debtor
wins the lottery and his account had $2,501 in it at the time the
bank received the restraining notice. The lottery winnings are
successfully restrained. Suppose, however, the account had only
$2,499. The account is not restrained, and the debtor may draw
upon the lottery winnings at will. Furthermore, had the garnishee
been a nonbank, the judgment creditor would need a court order to
permit a second restraining notice to be served on the garnishee. 803
Where the garnishee is a bank, the court may not order that a new
restraining notice be served. According to CPLR section 5222(c),
"[a] judgment creditor shall not serve more than two restraining
notices per year upon a natural person's banking institution
account." 804
There is, however, an oddly contradictory third
sentence in section 5222(h): "Nothing in this subdivision shall be
bankruptcy are withdrawals of exempt wages; the leftovers are presumed to be non-exempt
cash).
799 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(l) (2012). This act permits garnishment to rise to 65 percent if
family support obligations are due and owing. Id. § 1673(b)(2)(B).
800 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(h) (McKinney 2014).
801 Id.
802 Calton v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 2117 (LMM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119284, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011).
803 C.P.L.R. 5222(c) ("Leave of court is required to serve more than one restraining notice
upon the same person with respect to the same judgment or order.").
804 Id.
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construed to limit a banking institution's ... obligation to restrain .
. . such funds from the judgment debtor's account if required ... by
a court order." 805 It therefore appears to be the case that a second
restraining notice against a bank might be issued, but perhaps not
within the span of a single year. 806 At moments like these, it is also
wise to remember that, according to CPLR section 5240, "[t]he court
may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any
interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an
order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or
modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." 807 Undoubtedly,
it is in the discretion of a court to ignore any relevant provision in
Article 52 of the CPLR. 808
Whether or not exempt income streams are wired into a bank
account, a restraining notice issued to a bank is ineffective for
amounts below $1,740 as of July 24, 2009. 809 This amount is
declared to be 240 times the hourly minimum wage. 810 After that
time, the minimal exemption must be calculated afresh according to
the current minimum wage. 811 As of May 2013, the minimum wage
was $7.25. 812 So the $1,740 minimum still holds. 813

C.P.L.R. 5222(h).
See C.P.L.R. 5222(c). The limit of two restraining notices per year on a bank was added
to placate the opposition of the New York Bankers Association to the EIFTA. Infranca, supra
note 42, at 1158.
801 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2014).
808 For example, in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, a restraining
notice was served on the debtor, which prevented the debtor from paying attorneys fees. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 08 Civ. 3324(RWS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151298, at *1-2, *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013). The court acknowledged that CPLR section
5222 provides no exception for debtor payments to attorneys, but, thought the court, this was
unfair. Id. at 11, 17. It therefore used CPLR section 5240 to legislate that debtors can pay
their attorneys in spite of the restraining notice. Id. at 17-18.
809 C.P.L.R. 5222(i).
If a debtor has four banking accounts, each under $1,740, the
restraining notice nevertheless applies to an amount above $1740 (after the accounts are
aggregated). Calton v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 2117 (LMM), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 119284, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011); see also Chase Bank U.S., N.A. v. Greene,
No. 170519/2008, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2077, at *1-3 (Civ. Ct. Queens County July 21,
2009) (reporting the exemption to be $1,716, for a restraining notice served before July 21,
2009, and denying a turnover order for a lesser amount in an uncontested hearing).
810 C.P.L.R. 5222(i).
811 Id.
8 12 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
813 See C.P.L.R. 5222(i). A 2009 amendment to section 5230(a) (fourth sentence) requires
that an execution served on a bank set forth the rule that it
shall not apply to an amount equal to or less than ninety percent of the greater of two
hundred forty times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 or two hundred forty times the state minimum hourly wage
prescribed in section six hundred fifty-two of the labor law as in effect at the time the
806
806
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The minimum can be lowered by court order by the amount "a
court determines to be unnecessary for the reasonable requirements
of the judgment debtor and his or her dependents." 814 Presumably a
judgment creditor may obtain this relief in advance of serving the
restraining notice on the bank, and presumably the debtor is
entitled to notice with regard to the motion. By the time the
hearing occurs, the debtor will have had plenty of time to empty out
the exempt part of the bank account. So this opportunity is unlikely
to provide much solaceto creditors. 815
The bank may charge a fee for receiving a restraining notice. 816 If
the restraining notice has no bite (as where the checking account
have less than $1,740 in it), the bank may not charge a fee. 817 This
is a change from former law, where banks could charge fees even
though a bank account was entirely exempt. 818
None of these limitations on bank restraints applies when the
creditor is the state or a municipality of New York, or if the debt is
for child support, spousal support, maintenance or alimony,
provided that the restraining notice contains a legend at the
top thereof, above the caption, in sixteen point bold type with
the following language: "The judgment creditor is the state of
earnings are payable, except such part as a court determines to be unnecessary for the
reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his or her dependents.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(a) (McKinney 2014). Whereas the restraining notice has a limit at $1,740,
the execution's limit is lower-90 percent of $1,740, or $1,566. Id. This limit does not apply
in cases when the state of New York, or any of its agencies or municipal corporations is
the judgment creditor, or if the debt enforced is for child support, spousal support,
maintenance or alimony, provided that in those instances the execution contains a
legend at the top thereof, above the caption, in sixteen point bold type with the following
language: "The judgment creditor is the state of New York, or any of its agencies or
municipal corporations, AND/OR the debt enforced is for child support, spousal support,
maintenance or alimony." ....
Id. For good measure, these restrictions are repeated with respect to levies on banking
institutions. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(e) (McKinney 2014). No such limitation appears as to
prejudgment attachment, however. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2014).
014 C.P.L.R. 5222(i).
816 In Portfolio Recovery Associates v. Calderia, 881 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
2009), although the court noted that the exemption applies to levies and restraining notice,
but not to turnover proceedings, the court nevertheless gave a debtor in a turnover proceeding
an opportunity to show that the exempt amount was necessary for the reasonable
requirements of the judgment debtor. Id. at 873. If the debtor defaulted, the court indicated
its willingness to order the turnover over the entire account. Id. at 874.
816 See McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270, 273-74 (E.D.N.Y.
2011).
011 C.P.L.R. 5222(j).
010 See generally McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that
judgment debtor was charged a $10 fee by her bank when it received a restraining notice for
her account and sent her a letter informing her of the same).
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New York, or any of its agencies or municipal corporations,
AND/OR the debt enforced is for child support, spousal
support, maintenance or alimony.". 819
It may be noted that CPLR section 5222(h) and (i) are not
restricted to individuals with bank accounts. But these subsections
do require that a bank receive direct deposits of exempt income
streams. So corporate entities, indirectly, are not entitled to the
minimal exemptions described therein.

C. Notice to the Debtor in the Case of Bank Accounts
New section 5222-a piles extra burdens on the shoulders of
creditors who would restrain bank garnishees. 820 These restrictions
equally apply to sheriffs levying under executions. 821 The judgment
creditor serving the restraining notice must provide the bank an
exemption notice that the bank can mail its customer, plus two
copies of exemption claim forms for the bank to send to the
customer. 822 The content of these forms is precisely set forth in the
statute. 823 Failure of a creditor to tender the proper forms renders
the restraining notice invalid. 824 The bank is commanded not to
restrain the account if the proper forms are not received. 825 Earlier,
we saw that a garnishee can choose to be bound by a restraining
notice that is not technically valid. 826 But after 2008, this is no
longer true in consumer cases, where a bank is the garnishee into
which exempt funds are wired.
As of 2008, the sheriff is similarly burdened when levying a bank
under an execution. 827 If the sheriff fails to provide these forms, the
entire execution is void. 828 Suppose a sheriff levies on a Monday but

C.P.L.R. 5222(k).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(a) (McKinney 2014). See generally Infranca, supra note 42, at
1154-58 (discussing laws that California, Connecticut, New York, and Oregon instituted to
protect exempt benefits held in bank accounts).
821 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(a). The failure of the sheriff to bear the procedural burdens of the
EIPA negates the levy. And if the levy is no good, the commencement of a turnover
proceeding obviously does not extend it. LR Credit 21, LLC v. Burnett, No. CV-013186-13,
2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2635, at *4-6 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County June 24, 2013).
822 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(l).
82 3 See C.P.L.R.5222-a(b)(4).
824 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(l).
825 Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 15145/2011, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2465, at *15-16
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 2013).
826 See supra text accompanying notes 651-74.
821 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(2).
828 Id.
81s

820
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forgets the required forms. The sheriff corrects the mistake on
Tuesday. Too late. The levy was void as of Monday.

D. Bank Duties in the Case of Restraining Notices and Executions
The EIPA imposes new obligations of banks served with
restraining notices and executions. Unlike section 5222(d), which
was added in 1985 to address constitutional issues, CPLR section
5222-a may not correct constitutional errors, but is based on subconstitutional notions of fairness. 829
Under CPLR section 5222-a, the bank, within two business days,
must serve the judgment debtor with a copy of the restraining
notice, the exemption notice, and the two exemption claim forms. 830
Service must be at the last known address of the judgment
debtor. 831
Although section 5222-a generally applies only to ''banking
institutions," 832 there is a sentence that applies to "depository
institutions." 833 According to this sentence, "[t]he inadvertent
failure by a depository institution to provide the notice required by
this subdivision shall not give rise to liability on the part of the
depository institution." 834 "Depository institution" is not a defined
term, 835 and it may well be that the legislative pen slipped here. I
will therefore assume that the legislature intended banking
institutions to have this immunity.
If inadvertent failure to perform these duties engenders no

829 McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 547-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding pre-2009
regime constitutional, though the bank froze an account containing only exempt funds);
Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837 (CPS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20279, at
*26-27, *34-53 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (refusing to dismiss a complaint alleging
unconstitutionality of the restraining notice procedure, in light of the changed circumstance
of wire transfers into bank accounts allowing banks to ascertain whether funds are exempt);
Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01 CV 3016 (JG); 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13664, at *9-12 (E.D.N.Y.
July 11, 2002) (following the holding in McCahey); see also Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607
(SJF)(ARL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30076, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (refusing to
dismiss due process claim where bank paid pursuant to a levy); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due
Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1360-63 (2012) (discussing the Mayers and Huggins
decisions); Myers, supra note 780, at 397-99 (discussing the Mayers and Granger decisions).
830 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(3).
831

Id.

832

C.P.L.R. 5222-a(a).
C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(3).

833

Id.
But see N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 599-b (McKinney 2014) ("'Depository institution' has the
same meaning as in section three of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and includes any
credit union.").
834

836
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liability, it certainly would seem fair to conclude that purposeful
failures do give rise to liability. One New York justice has so
held. 836 But the New York Court of Appeals has recently disagreed.
Cruz v. TD Bank, N. Am. (Cruz III), 837 involved certified questions
from two class actions commenced in federal court claiming that
banks were deliberately ignoring their EIPA duties. 838 In one of
these cases, plaintiffs alleged that a bank received a restraining
notice without the required exemption notices for the bank to
forward to their customers. 839 Properly, the restraining notices
were invalid. 840 The bank nevertheless improperly restrained the
bank accounts and also charged a fee against their customers,
which was improper, given the invalidity of the restraining
notice. 841
In the other case, a different bank allegedly failed to forward the
required notifications and forms to their customers. 842 Both these
class actions were dismissed, and the plaintiffs appealed.
In the certification proceeding, the New York Court of Appeals, in
an unconvincing opinion, came down squarely on the side of the
banks and against senior retirees. As a result, banks are informed
that, if they deliberately ignore the EIPA, they will not owe
damages in a plenary action and probably not under any
circumstances. To understand the weakness of the court's opinion,
836 Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 15145/2011, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2465, at *54
(Sup. Ct. Kings County May 21, 2013) ("Moreover, the EIPA provides a protection to .banks
who 'inadvertently' fail to provide its customers with the restraining notice, exemption notice
and exemption claim forms. Why would the legislature make only this specific exclusion of
liability for banks if no other causes of action or theories of liability exist?" (emphasis
omitted)).
837 Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A. (Cruz Ill), 2 N.E.3d 221, 230 (N.Y. 2013).
838 Cruz v. TD Bank, N. Am., 855 F. Supp. 2d 157, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), certifying question
to 711 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2013), certified question answered by 979 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. 2013),
aff'd, No. 12-1200-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25076 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2013); Martinez v.
Capital One, N. Am., 863 F. Supp. 2d 256, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), certifying question to sub.
nom., Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 711 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2013), certified question answered by 2
N.E.3d 221 (N.Y. 2013).
839 Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 261; N.Y. C.P.L.R 5222-a(b)(l) (McKinney 2014).
840 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(l) (McKinney 2014).
841 Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 261; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(j) (McKinney 2014) ("In the event that a
banking institution served with a restraining notice cannot lawfully restrain a judgment
debtor's banking institution account, or a restraint is placed on the judgment debtor's account
in violation of any section of this chapter, the banking institution shall charge no fee to the
judgment debtor regardless of any terms of agreement, or schedule of fees, or other contract
between the judgment debtor and the banking institution.").
842 Martinez, 863 F. Supp .. 2d at 260-61. The bank disputed the accuracy of the allegation,
but given the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the appellate courts were
obliged to treat the allegations as true. See id. at 260 n.4.
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however, it is best to consider the state of New York law in 2008,
when the EIPA was enacted.
1. Debtor Remedies When the CPLR Is Violated

As we have seen, courts routinely award damages to judgment
creditors when a garnishee violates a restraining notice. 843 Indeed,
the court of appeals, in Aspen Industries, Inc. v. Marine Midland
Bank, 844 stated in dictum, "violation of the restraining notice by the
party served . . . subjects the garnishee to personal liability in a
separate plenary action or a special proceeding .under CPLR article
52 brought by the aggrieved judgment creditor." 845 A plenary action
is one commenceable by formal pleadings sounding in tort 846 or
contract847 (as opposed to summary proceedings connected with
enforcement of judgments, which are much lessformal). 848
Plenary actions for damages when a re~training notice is violated
suggested to the Cruz court that there is a link between violation of
a court order authorized by the CPLR and the right to damages in a
plenary action. 849 Where, however, there is no court order, yet the
garnishee violates the law, the violation will not constitute a tort
generating a plenary action.
Yet counter-examples exist. According to CPLR 6219, a garnishee
is obligated to
serve upon the sheriff a statement specifying all debts of the
garnishee to the defendant, when the debts are due, all
property in the possession or custody of the garnishee in
which the defendant has an interest, and the. amounts and

843 Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chemical Bank N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y.S. 2d 354, 358
(Sup.Ct. New York County. 1965), aff'd mem., 24 A.D.2d 499, 267 (App. Div. 1st Dep't. 1966).
844 Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 421 N.E.2d 808 (N:Y. 1981).
845 Id. at 881 (emphasis added). The court tracks the same language found in Security
Trust Co. v. Magar Homes, 461 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (App. Div. 4th Dep't. 1983). In Magar,
damages were not awarded because an agent of the third party did not forward the
restraining notice to the third party, who therefore had no actual knowledge of it. Id. Where
the underlying money judgment is paid, the cause of action for violating the restraining notice
evaporates. Tri-Mar Contractors, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk Cnty., 440 N.Y.S.2d 556, 556-57
(App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981); Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151(MDS), 2012
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47, at 44 (Sup.Ct. New York County. 2012). Attorneys' fees may not be
recovered as damages for violating the restraining notice. Id. at 44-45.
846 Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 457, 458 (N.Y. 2001).
847 White House Manor, Ltd. v. Benjamin, 899 N.E.2d 941, 946 (N.Y. 2008).
848 Cent. Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721,731-32 (8th Cir. 1932).
849 Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A. (Cruz III), 2 N.E.3d 221, 232 (N.Y. 2013).
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value of the debts and property specified. 850
In Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, 851 a plaintiff had obtained
an ex parte order of attachment, which must be reaffirmed by a
court within five or perhaps ten days of a levy. 852 The levy of an
order of attachment restrains the garnishee from paying a debt to
the defendant or conveying defendant property and to pay a debt or ,
deliver property to the sheriff. 853 The levy is, however, not a court
order. The order of attachment is an order, but it is an order to the
sheriff, not the garnishee. 854 The garnishee knowingly filed a false
report, claiming no debt was owing. As a result of the false report,
the court dissolved an order of attachment. The garnishee, then,
never did violate a court order. The garnishee's falsehood sustained
a plenary action for damages, even though the garnishee never
violated a court order.
Here we have at least one example of a case that de-links
contempt of court and the right to damages. Of course, Capitol
Records is an "Erie guess" on the content of New York law. In due
course, we will consider, then, whether Cruz III overrules Capitol
Records, inviting garnishees to file false reports free of tort liability.
Another example of damages awarded for technical violations of
the CPLR in the absence of a court order is Adinolfi v. Solimine. 855
In this case, a city marshal had the duty to "forthwith serve a copy
of the execution . . . upon the person from whose possession or
custody the property was taken."856 The marshal did not do this,
which justified a new action against the marshal in small claims
court. 857 In this respect, the marshal can be compared to a
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6219 (McKinney 2014).
Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 896 (2d Cir. 1985).
852 See id. If the order of attachment is based on the defendant being a nondomiciliary, the
plaintiff must move withi,n ten days of the levy for an ordering confirming the order of
attachment. N.Y. C.P.L.R 62ll(b) (McKinney 2014). If the order of attachment is based on
some other ground, the plaintiffs motion must be made within five days of the levy. Id.
853 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(b) (McKinney 2014).
8 54 C.P.L.R. 62ll(a). An order of attachment
shall be directed to the sheriff of any county or of the city of New York where any
property in which the defendant has an interest is located or where a garnishee may be
served. The order shall direct the sheriff to levy within his jurisdiction, at any time
before final judgment, upon such property in which the defendant has an interest and
upon such debts owing to the defendant as will satisfy the amount specified in the order
of attachment.
850
851

Id.
Adinolfi v. Solimine, 682 N.Y.S.2d 341, 341 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1998).
Id. (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b) (McKinney 2014)).
See Adinolfi, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Cf Cais v. Pichler, 473 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (Civ. Ct.
New York County 1984) (holding that, as per CPLR 5232, the sheriff did not have to serve the
866

856
857
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garnishee with duties not stemming from a direct court order. Both
cooperate in the levying process and are assigned duties by the
CPLR.
For our present purpose, it can be observed that, as of 2008, when
the legislature enacted the EIPA, plenary actions were authorized
for violation of court orders and for violation of CPLR duties
imposed on garnishees or sheriffs, where no court injunction is
involved.
Separately, CPLR 5239 provides for a "special proceeding" against
garnishees. A special proceeding, governed by Article 4 of the
CPLR, greatly accelerates the pace of the litigation. 858 According to
CPLR Section 5239:
Prior to the application of property or debt by a sheriff or
receiver to the satisfaction of a judgment, any interested
person may commence a special proceeding against the
judgment creditor or other person with whom a dispute exists
to determine rights in the property or debt. . . . The court
may ... direct that damages be awarded .... If the court
determines that any claim asserted was fraudulent, it may
require the claimant to pay to any party adversely affected
thereby the reasonable expenses incurred by such party in
the proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and any
other damages suffered by reason of the claim. The court
may permit any interested person to intervene in the
proceeding. 859
By its terms, CPLR section 5239 actions must be commenced
before "application of property ... by a sheriff." 860 Thus, a bank
that has somehow misbehaved cannot be reached under CPLR
section 5239 if the bank has paid over the bank account to the
sheriff and the sheriff has forwarded that money to the judgment
creditor. Nevertheless, if this deadline is a problem, a judgment
debtor can seek relief under CPLR section 5240, which invites the
court "at any time ... [on] the motion of any interested person ...
[to] make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,

judgment debtor with a notice of execution in Connecticut). A sheriff was sued in a plenary
action on the same basis for seizure of a vehicle, but the sheriff won summary judgment on
the merits. Id. at 722.
8 58 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 403(b) (l\'1cKinney 2014).
859 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239 (l\'1cKinney 2014).
860 Id.; see Lincoln Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Miceli, No. 2342/0l(AME), 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
6811, at *6-8 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County Oct. 9, 2007).
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extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure." 861 It
is to be noted that CPLR section 5239 refers directly to the award of
damages, whereas CPLR section 5240 does not. Rather, CPLR
section 5240 invites the court to extend or limit an enforcement
procedure. It is difficult to characterize the award of tort damage as
the modification ofa procedure authorized by CPLR Article 52.
To summarize, without question debtors prior to EIPA had rights
under CPLR sections 5239 and 5240. But they also had the right to
bring plenary actions for violations of duties imposed by the CPLR.
This was so even if a court order did not generate contempt
penalties for violating the order. The point is important in that,
according to CPLR section 5222-a(h): "Nothing in this section shall
in any way restrict the rights and remedies otherwise available to a
judgment debtor, including but not limited to, rights to property
exemptions under federal and state Jaw." 862 If debtors could bring
plenary .actions prior to 2008, clearly the EIPA did not intend to
take that right away.
2. The Immunity For Banks
Against this background of tort liability for violating CPLR
duties, the legislature, in enacting the EIPA, provided a limited safe
harbor in the EIPA for banks: "The inadvertent failure by a
depository institution to provide the notice required by this
subdivision shall not give rise to liability on the part of the
depository institution." 863
The background liability regime
(assuming Capitol Records was correctly decided) is that deliberate
violations of CPLR duties continue to be tortious under New York
law. Indeed, the false report in Capitol Records was intentional,
and it gave rise to tort damages. 864
The Cruz court, however, decided that intentional wrongdoing by
garnishee banks is hot tortious, in the sense of giving rise to a cause
of action for damages. In so ruling, the Cruz court ignored the Erie
guess in Capitol Records and assumed that tort damages in plenary
actions are available only when linked to contempt of court.
Plaintiffs seize on the dictum [in Aspen] referencing "a

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(h) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
863 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(3).
864 See Leber-Krebs, Inc., v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1985).
The
report was "a damaging lie constituting a fraud on plaintiff and on the court." Id. at 896.
861
862
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separate plenary action" to argue that a judgment debtor
should be able to bring a plenary action for money damages
against a bank for a violation of the EIPA. However,
assuming the reference to be good law, any right to bring a
plenary action in the Aspen context arises from the fact that
the Legislature has declared this type of noncompliance with
a restraining notice to constitute contempt; the dictum is
consistent with the general proposition that a party injured
as a consequence of a contempt of court can sue to secure
money damages. The fact that a judgment creditor may be
able to bring a plenary action to punish a bank's
contemptuous failure to honor a restraining notice does not
establish that noncompliance with other technical aspects of
CPLR Article 52 can give rise to a plenary action for money
damages when errors of that type have not been declared by
the Legislature to constitute contempt-which is, of course,
the case with the EIPA.865
Given this narrow and probably erroneous view of the background
enforcement regime, the Cruz court was able to characterize the
plaintiffs' position as a false application of "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-the interpretive maxim that the inclusion of a
particular thing in a statute implies an intent to exclude other
things not included." 866 Thus, the plaintiffs theory of liability was a
"new'' theory, not one previously supplied by the preexisting tort
law of New York:
If the Legislature intended to create new liability for banks,
it is odd that it would choose to do so by expressly stating
that banks are not liable in particular circumstances while,
at the same time, remaining silent as to any instances when
banks are liable under the new statute. The banks point out
that, when interpreting a statute, courts typically do not rely
on legislative silence to infer significant alterations of
existing law on the rationale that legislative bodies generally
do not "hide elephants in mouseholes" ... Put another way,
if the Legislature had intended to impose new liability on
banks when they act as garnishees of the funds of judgment
865 Cruz v. TD Bank (Cruz III), N.A., 2 N.E.3d 221, 231-32 (N.Y. 2013) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Capitol Records involved a violation of a technical duty
under Article 62, pertaining to prejudgment attachment, rather than post-judgment
execution. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d at 896.
866 Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 227.
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debtors, it would have said so in the statute. 867
Insisting that the plaintiffs' were claiming a "new" tort theory
created only with the enactment of the EIPA (as opposed to an "old"
theory that the CPLR gives rise to tort duties), the court was able to
tap into the line of cases governing the implicit creation of "new"
private causes of action. 868 These cases tend to show that when a
statutory regime provides for some limited remedy, the legislature
must have intended no private right of action for the victims of
wrongdoing. 869 For example, the creation of a power of the
Department of Social Services to appoint receivers to operate adult
care facilities does not give a private right of action for the patients
to seek a receiver, because the Department was intended to have
"discretion" in such cases. 870 A statute promoting the monitoring of
foster homes for children, coupled with a penalty imposed on local
social services districts, did not create a new tort on behalf of
children abused by foster parents. 871
None of these cases are relevant ifit is agreed that, in the absence
of a court order, the CPLR imposes tort duties on garnishees. 872 If
867 Id. at 228 (citation omitted) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S.
457, 468 (2001)).
8 68 Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 226-27 (citing Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp., 991 N.E.2d 190, 193
(N.Y. 2013); Metz v. New York, 982 N.E.2d 76, 80 (N.Y. 2012); Stray from the Heart, Inc. v.
Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene of N.Y.C., 982 N.E.2d 594, 595 (N.Y. 2012); McLean v.
New York, 905 N.E.2d 1167, 1171 (N.Y. 2009); New York v. Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 911
N.E.2d 834, 842-43 (N.Y. 2009); Hammer v. American Kennel Club, 803 N.E.2d 766, 768
(N.Y. 2003); Mark G. v. Sabol, 717 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (N.Y. 1999); Uhr v. East Greenbush
Cent. Sch. Dist., 720 N.E.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. 1999); Carrier v. Salvation Army, 667 N.E.2d 328,
329 (N.Y. 1996); Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 20, 22 (N.Y. 1989)).
869 E.g., _Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 226-27.
870 Carrier, 667 N.E.2d at 330.
871 Sabol, 717 N.E.2d at 1071.
872 Equally irrelevant is the court's observation that the EIPA was inspired by Connecticut
legislation. "Connecticut, however, explicitly imposes liability on banks in its statute." Cruz
III, 2 N.E.3d at 228. Because New York did not likewise express a rule of liability, the
legislature supposedly intended there to be no liability in a plenary action. Id. at 231. But if
the legislature assumed generally that violation of CPLR duties is tortious, there was no need
for the legislature to express what was already the law of New York. In any case, the court is
comparing New York apples to Connecticut oranges. The Connecticut law holds that if a
financial institution unlawfully "pays exempt moneys from the account of the judgment
debtor . . . such financial institution shall be liable in an action therefor to the judgment
debtor for any exempt moneys so paid and ... shall refund or waive any charges of fees ...."
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-367b(n) (2013). The Cruz court thought that the "conscious variance
with the Connecticut statute suggests that the Legislature did not wish to create the same
remedy against banks that Connecticut did." Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 855 F. Supp. 2d 157,
173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), reserved, 711 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Sabol, 717 N.E.2d at
1071), question certified to 2 N.E.3d 221 (N.Y. 2013), affd, 12-1200-cv, 12-1342-cv, 2013 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25076 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2013). In fact, the wrong alleged in Cruz did not pertain
to the payout of exempt funds. See Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 225. The wrong involved failure to

f
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so, then the legislature enacted the EIPA with this background in
mind. The proposition of the Court of Appeals-that any banks
intentionally violating the rights of senior citizens are not liable for
doing so-must be viewed as wrong, or at least highly regrettable.
3. The Adequacy of Other Remedies

The "implied right of action" cases typically emphasize that
remedies legislatively supplied negate the implication of private
rights of action. Thus, enforcement in government officials implies
no· right of action for ordinary citizens harmed by a statutory
violation. 873 These cases inspired the Cruz III court to find that the
legislature already supplied adequate remedies for judgment
debtors wronged by bank indifference. 874 These remedies are the
above-quoted CPLR section 5239 and section 5240. CPLR section
5239 and section 5240 were in place long before the EIPA was
enacted. 875 Therefore Cruz III implies a legislative intent to limit
senior citizens unlawfully treated by banks to just these
remedies. 876 If, however, these remedies are defective and unable to
guard the rights of senior citizens, then the persuasiveness of the
court's remarks is certainly undercut.
We have mentioned that section 5239 mentions the award of
damages, but, as the Cruz court does not acknowledge, actions
under section 5239 are temporally limited. 877 The action must be
commenced before the sheriff receives and disposes of the funds
obtained in a levy.s7s
Suppose a creditor properly supplies the garnishee bank with
send the exemption notice or the restraining notice. Id. Therefore, the observation about
Connecticut law is useless.
873 Schlessinger, 991 N.E.2d at 192; Metz, 982 N.E.2d at 79-80 (citing McLean, 905 N.E.2d
at 1172).
874 See Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 231.
875 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239 (McKinney 2014) (effective in 1994), and N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5240 (McKinney 2014) (effective in 1963), with Exempt Income Protection Act of 2008, ch.
575, 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 4085, 4085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.Y.
C.P.L.R.) (ratified in 2008); see also Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 225 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5221(a)
(McKinney 2014)) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240) ("The EIPA did not alter
the pre-existing provisions in CPLR Article 52 permitting the commencement of special
proceedings whereby creditors, debtors and 'any interested person' can adjudicate disputes
over the ownership of income or property, nor did it restrict the power of the court to 'make an
order denying, limiting, condition, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any
enforcement procedure."').
876 See Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 225.
877 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239.
878

Id.
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forms, but the bank does not forward these to the judgment debtor.
Instead, the bank simply restrains the account. The debtor, who
has not received the proper notice and advice, will have to know
that any claim to damages must be filed before the levy. This
burden is somewhat mitigated by the fact that, when the creditor
serves an execution on the sheriff, the sheriff has an independent
duty to supply the bank garnishee with the exemption claim
forms. 879 But suppose our bank garnishee does not forward these
forms either. The bank is enjoined against paying the sheriff for 27
days, giving time for the debtor to make the exemption claim that
should have been sent to the debtor (but was not). After 30 days, if
no exemption claim is made, the bank can pay the sheriff the entire
amount above the $1716 amount that is in all cases reserved for the
debtor. Once this payment is made and once the sheriff forwards
the funds to the creditor, the opportunity for a section 5239 action
terminates. 880
If it is too late to bring such an action, section 5240 has no time
limits, 881 but section 5240 refers only to the modification of
879 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(g) (McKinney 2014) ("Where a levy by execution pursuant to this
section is made against a natural person's account at a banking institution, the sheriff or
support collection unit shall serve the banking institution with the exemption notice and two
exemption claim forms prescribed in subdivision (b) of section fifty-two hundred twenty-two-a
of this article.").
880 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5239.
88, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240; see also Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 230 ("Comparable relief would be
available under CPLR 5240, even after the assets have been transferred to the judgment
creditor ...."). The Cruz court's comment should put to rest the questionable Erie guess in
Mikulec v. United States, 705 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983), JC had docketed against JD. JD's
mother (X) bought JCs lien just before a scheduled execution sale. The judgment in question
was for $121,008.44. Then X bid in $50 of her judgment and won the auction. Among the
foreclosed parties was a junior federal tax lien.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has, by federal law, a redemption right after an
execution sale. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2410(d):
In any case in which the United States redeems real property ... the amount to be paid
for such property shall be the sum of (1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale (which, in the case of a
purchaser who is the holder of the lien being foreclosed, shall include the amount of
the obligation secured by such lien to the extent satisfied by reason of such sale) ....
The IRS claimed the redemption price was 58$ plus interest. X claimed that the redemption
price was $121,008.44, because, under Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973), her judgment was reduced by the fair market value of the property (which
apparently exceeded the amount of the judgment). The Mikulec court ruled for the IRS, on
the ground that Wandschneider had been limited by Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 392 N.E.2d
1240 (1979). Accoring to the Mikulec court, "[U]nder Guardian Loan [section] 5240 cannot be
used to invalidate sales or to adjust rights following a transfer of title regardless of the
identity of the purchaser." Mikulec, 705 F.2d at 602. This was a poor reading of Guardian
Loan. See Carlson, Critique I, supra note 1, at 1339-41. The remarks by the Cruz court
about the lack of time restraints under section 5240 corrects the impaired Erie intuition in
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"enforcement procedures." Awarding of damages does not seem to be
authorized directly. Therefore, Cruz III hints that damages against
the bank for deliberate violations of the EIPA depend on senior
citizens starting a section 5239 action before the bank (who should
have ignored the levy) actually paid the sheriff and before the
sheriff forwards the funds to the judgment creditor. At best a senior
citizen may have a restraint removed or an order that the judgment
creditor reimburse the senior citizen for exempt funds wrongfully
paid out.
The court goes on to say that "[c]omparable relief would be
available under CPLR 5240, even after the assets have been
transferred to the judgment creditor."882 But the examples the
courts give come at the expense of the judgment creditor, not from
the bank. Unless somehow it is possible to say that a damage
award can be characterized as "denying, limiting, condition,
regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement
procedure," 883 it appears that the court has imposed a burdensome
time limit on senior citizens. They must obtain fee reimbursements
or other damages before the sheriff forwards funds to the creditors.
Otherwise not at all.
The Cruz court specifically mentions that section 5239 would
sustain an action against the bank for "reimbursement of any bank
fees improperly charged." 884 This remark is well justified by the
reference in section 5239 to damage awards. An unlawful fee would
appear to be in the nature of a damage award. But does the court
mean that bank customers no longer have a cause of action for
wrongfully set off fees (when the fee involves a restraining notice)?
It would appear that is exactly what the court implies.
Yet the bank's safe harbor immunizes it from "inadvertent"
failure to forward exemption claims. Charging an illegal fee would
appear to be well beyond this safe harbor. Therefore, it cannot be
the case that the safe harbor implies no plenary action for
reimbursement of fees. Wrongful fees have nothing whatever to do
with inadvertent failure to forward the exemption claim.
The court's reasoning also give rise to a paradox. Wrongful
charges for fees is surely a breach of contract giving rise to a
plenary cause of action, if the contract is read to be consistent with
Mikulec. No time limit is implicit in section 5240.
882 Id.
883 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240.
s84 Cruz Ill, 2 N.E.3d at 230.
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New York law. One would think that breach of contract is the
archetypical plenary action. Yet Cruz III seems to bar such actions.
One gains the impression that the New York Court of Appeals
was dead set against class actions against banks, even to the point
of inviting deliberate intentional wrongs against senior citizens. If
that was the intent of the Court of Appeals it was in for a surprise.
In Cruz v. T.D. Bank (Cruz \I), 885 the class action plaintiffs
attempted to amend their complaints 886 to change their "plenary''
action to a class action under CPLR 5239 and 5240-actions they
thought they could bring in federal court, even though the
underlying money judgment giving rise to bank misconduct were
rendered in state court. The Cruz V court denied permission to
amend the complaint but it also suggested that a different set of
amendments that might successfully plead a cause of action. 887
The court noted that "[a] 'special,' proceeding, denominated as
such, cannot be commenced in a federal court." 888 According to Rule
2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "There is one form of
action-the civil action." 889 But under CPLR 103(b), "All civil judicial
proceedings shall be prosecuted in the form of an action, except
where prosecution in the form of a special proceeding is
authorized."890 Nevertheless, the Cruz III opinion indicated that
CPLR 5239 and 5240 gave rise to substantive causes of action-that
could be brought in federal court as plenary actions! 891 "While
sections 5239 and 5240 may continue to provide a procedural
mechanism for relief under state law, the opinion in Cruz III makes
plain that there is a substantive component to the two sections.
Thus ... the New York Court of Appeals has defined the cause of
action u.nder sections 5239 and 5240 and, under Erie principles, this
court must apply the authoritative pronouncements of New York
law in a diversity action." 892 The private right of action (which
could not be drawn from EIPA) could nevertheless be drawn from
5239 and 5240 themselves. These causes of action were not limited

885 Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A. (Cruz V), 10 Civ. 8026 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2014).
sss Id. at *2.
887 Id. at *2-3.
888 Id. at *9.
ss9 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 2).
89° Cruz V, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916, at *9 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 103(b) (McKinney
2014)).
s91 Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A. (Cruz Ill), 2 N.E.3d 221, 230 (N.Y. 2013).
s92 Cruz V, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916, at *13-14.
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to the narrow time constraints to be found in CPLR 5239. Rather,
they were subject to the general six-year statute of limitations to be
found in CPLR 213(1).s93
This victory for the plaintiff, however, was tempered. Cruz V
quotes Cruz III as stating, "The sum.m.ary proceedings have the
advantage of being swift and without procedural complexity-there
is no basis to suppose that the legislature expected that injured
judgment debtors would commence complicated and lengthy plenary
proceedings to vindicate their rights, such as the federal court
actions plaintiffs brought here." 894 Therefore, the plaintiffs could
not have dam.ages (even though CPLR 5239 mentions dam.ages).
That would be too complicated for a sum.m.ary proceeding (even
though Cruz V involved a plenary proceeding, not a sum.m.ary
proceeding). The Cruz V court noted an absence of examples under
CPLR 5239 of claim.ants being awarded dam.ages. 895 Of course,
Capital Records is an example of dam.ages, but in a plenary action,
not a special proceeding. 896 Be that as it m.ay, the· Cruz V court
thought that the only thing the plaintiffs could achieve is
undoing the effects of an improper account garnishment and
restoring a judgment debtor to the position in which he or
she would have been had the wrongful garnishment never
taken place . . . . Plaintiffs claims for punitive dam.ages,
exemplary dam.ages, and an injunction ... are precisely the
"opportunity for litigation on the back end after an improper
restraint was imposed" which the New York Court of
Appeals foreclosed as against a garnishee-bank. 897
Therefore the plaintiffs were limited to release of funds wrongfully
retained by the garnishee bank, an injunction against turning funds
over to the sheriff and a refund of improper fees (including fees on
any wrongfully bounced checks). 898 Furthermore, the Cruz V court
expected plaintiffs prove that total dam.age to the class of plaintiffs
exceed $5 million, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. 899

893
894
895
896
897
898
899

Id. at *15.
Id. at *21 (quoting Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 231).
Cruz V, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916, at *24.
Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1985).
Cruz V, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916, at *23.
Id. at *26 (citing Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 230).
Cruz V, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53916 at *29-30.
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4. The Implications for Pre-Judgment Attachment

The Cruz court has linked plenary actions for damages to
contempt of a court order, as where a bank ignores the restraining
notice and distributes funds to the order of a debtor. This puts into
question the decision in Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, where
no court order was violated, yet damages were awarded for a false
garnishee's report required to be filed by CPLR section 6219. 900
Shall we now consider Capitol Records as overruled by the Cruz
decision? If so, the Cruz court has visited considerable collateral
damage on New York law.
In linking plenary actions to contempt, the Cruz court remarks:
The fact that a judgment creditor may be able to bring a
plenary action to punish a bank's contemptuous· failure to
honor a restraining notice does not establish that
noncompliance with other technical aspects of CPLR Article
52 can give rise to a plenary action for money damages when
errors of that type have not been declared by the Legislature
to constitute contempt-which is, of course, the case with the
EIPA.001
In proffering this remark, the court assumes that a cause of
action for "noncompliance with other technical aspects of CPLR
Article 52" is new, when Capitol Records establishes such a cause of
action for technical aspects of Article 62. 902 So one possibility is that
any implication of the EIPA for plenary causes of action apply only
to postjudgment matters under Article 52 and never to prejudgment
matters under Article 62. If so, violations of Article 62 still give rise
to tort causes of action, but violations of Article 52 do not.
Still, this point undermines the court's reasoning. In Article 52, a
garnishee's duties are described in CPLR section 5232(a). 903 Prior to
the EIPA, those duties were to pay or deliver to the sheriff and to no
one else. 904 These are duties imposed by the CPLR, as opposed to in
a court order. 905 If violated, the expectation is that the judgment
creditor will commence a turnover proceeding against ·the

900 Leber-Krebs, Inc., v. Capital Records, 779 F.2d 895 897-98, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1985).
(citing Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1891)).
901 Cruz III, 2 N.E.3d at 232.
902 See Capital Records, 779 F.2d at 900-01.
9 03 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(a) (McKinney 2014).
904 See id.
905 See id.
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garnishee. 906 Such a proceeding does culminate in a court order
against the garnishee and therefore generates the right to damages
in a plenary action. It is far from clear that, in the absence of a
turnover order, a garnishee's violation of the injunctions in CPLR
section 5232(a) (governing levies of property not capable of delivery)
is actionable in damages. For example, if a garnishee were to
convey away debtor property before the turnover proceeding is
concluded, the garnishee would owe no damages because its action,
though wrongful, was not in violation of a court order.
Article 62, however, has always imposed the duty on a garnishee
to file a report. And the filing of a false report has been found, in
Capitol Records, to give rise to tort damages. Surely this is a
desirable rule. The Cruz opinion may have made an unwise point
about tort duties arising under Article 52. It would be unfortunate
if the Cruz reasoning were to be exported into Article 62.
5. The Judgment Creditor's Liability for Bank Failures
Under the EIPA, the judgment creditor must forward exemption
claim forms to the bank, and the bank must forward these forms to
the debtor. Where the bank fails in its duty to do so, the debtor has
received no notice of his rights to claim property as exempt.
Where nonbanks are garnishees, the judgment creditor has the
duty, imposed by CPLR section 5222(d), to send notices directly to
the debtor. 907 But these duties are suspended "where the provisions
of section fifty-two hundred twenty-two-a of this article are
applicable." 908 Now section 5222(d) was enacted to correct the
constitutional defects of the CPLR as announced in Deary v.
Guardian Loan Co. 909 Therefore, as the court in Distressed
Holdings, LLC v. Ehrler, 910 recognized, the bank's failure to do its
duty means that the constitutional rights of the judgment debtor
have been violated. 911
In Distressed Holdings, the debtor sought to dissolve the
creditor's restraining notice for this constitutional violation. 912
Whereas the court affirmed that a constitutional violation had

907

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) (McKinney 2014); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5227 (McKinney 2014).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(d) (McKinney 2014).

9os

Id.

909

Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Distressed Holdings, LLC v. Ehrler, 976 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 2013).
Id. at 519.

906

910

911
912

Id.
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occurred, 913 it declined to dissolve the restraining notice since the
creditor was blameless. 914 Instead the creditor was ordered to send
the exemption forms directly to the debtor, thereby bypassing the
bank. 915 Therefore, so far, the consequences to creditors, when
banks fail their duties to their customers, are not onerous.
6. Bank Liability Under Federal Civil Rights Legislation
According to section 1983 of Title 42:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 916
The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that there can be no
tort damages against a bank that deliberately violates the CPLR to
the detriment of its customers, but this can have no bearing on
whether a federal cause of action might accrue under section 1983.
One attempt to bring a civil rights action against banks has
failed, but in such a way that suggests an action based on a
deliberate violation of CPLR section 5222-a(b)(3) might indeed
succeed. In Sykes v. Bank of America, 917 state agencies served a
restraining notice on a bank garnishee for child support past due. 918
The state agencies reasoned that Supplemental Social Security
payments were not exempt from child support claim. 919 The court
ruled that the exemption was valid, even against a child support
claim, meaning that the restraining notice was wrongful as against
the debtor. 920 The debtor then sought to bring a section 1983 action
against the bank for the wrongful restraint. 921 The court dismissed
the complaint, but for reasons that would not apply to a debtor

913
914
915
916
917
918

919
920
921

Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (2006).
Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 402.
Id. at 401-02.
See id. at 405.
Id. at 406.

2013/2014]

Critique of Money Judgment Part Three

1623

subjected to deliberate bank violations of section 5222-a(b)(3). 922
The Sykes court cited the fact that the debtor before it was not
challenging the constitutionality of New York State's post-judgment
procedures generally. 923 But in Sykes a constitutional procedure
was in fact followed. Where the bank, however, deliberately refuses
to forward the exemption notices and claim forms, the system
indeed becomes unconstitutional, as was recognized in Distressed
Holdings, LLC v. Ehrler. 924
Second, in Sykes, the debtor did not allege that the bank
garnishee
was any different from that of the traditional garnishee
acting pursuant to New York State's post-judgment
garnishment procedures. Bank of America, for all it appears,
thus did no more than comply with the restraining notice
issued by [the judgment creditor] in the same way it would
with a notice from a private attorney on behalf of a private
creditor. 925
But where a bank deliberately violates the CPLR by refusing to
forward the required forms, the bank is behaving very differently,
presumably, from the way it should behave when it receives a
restraining notice from a private attorney.
Third, in Sykes, the bank's role was purely ministerial. It
exercised no discretion in following New York law. 926 But a bank
that deliberately violates its CPLR duties is using discretion to
violate the law, thus depriving the debtor of the constitutional right
to due process. In Sykes, state agencies, not the bank, took the
decisive action that harmed the debtor. But the bank that refuses
to forward the forms in violation of CPLR 5222-a(b)(3) is the one
taking the decisive action that causes the harm.
Therefore, even though wronged debtors have no right to bring a
plenary action under New York state law, it appears as if the same
facts justify a plenary action under section 1983. On that basis, the
class action against banks that deliberately ignore the CPLR can
proceed.

922
923
924
92 6
9 26

Id.
Id.
Distressed Holdings, 976 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 406-07.
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E. Claims of Exemption
Having received claim forms from the bank, a judgment debtor is
invited to claim that the bank account is exempt. 927 This is done by
the debtor's signing the two forms that the bank has sent to him. 928
These forms must be served929 within twenty days of the postmark
on the envelope by which the debtor was "served" by the bank. 930
One copy of the form must be served on the bank, the other on the
attorney for the judgment creditor or judgment creditor directly
(where there is no attorney). 931
This twenty day period for claiming exemptions has led one court
to invent a new procedural limitation on turnover orders. In In re
North Shore University Hospital at Plainview v. Citibank Legal
Service Intake Unit, 932 a judgment creditor brought a turnover
action, but did not plead in its papers that it had complied with
CPLR section 5222-a. 933 Since a turnover can conceivably be
obtained eight days after notice of the creditor's petition, 934 "a
motivated and diligent judgment creditor could commence a
turnover proceeding and have it returnable before the court before
the time for a judgment debtor to serve an exemption claim form
had expired." 935 The court therefore legislated that, where a
judgment creditor serves a restraining notice on a bank, the
judgment creditor "must plead and prove compliance with CPLR
[section] 5222-a as part of its prima facie case in a turnover
proceeding." 936
Earlier courts had imposed less sweeping conditions on turnover
proceedings.
Such proceedings do not require service of a

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222:a(c) (McKinney 2014).
C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(l).
929 Service may be by first class mail or in person. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(l).
930 Id. Failure of the debtor to prove the date of the postmark justifies a court denying a
debtor's motion to remove the restraint. Recovery of Judgment, LLC v. Warren, 937 N.Y.S.2d
85, 86 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012).
931 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(l). Given that a restraining notice has been served, the absence of
an attorney suggests that the attorney who served has resigned or that a judgment creditor
without an attorney has obtained a restraining notice signed by a clerk of the court or by a
judge.
932 In re N. Shore Univ. Hosp. at Plainview v. Citibank Legal Serv. Intake Unit, 883
N.Y.S.2d 898 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 2009).
933 Id. at 900.
934 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 403(b) (McKinney 2014).
936 N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
936 Id.. at 903; accord LR Credit 21, LLC v. Burnett, No. CV-013186-13, 2013 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2635, at *5 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County June 24, 2013).
921
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restraining notice. But where a judgment creditor has chosen to
serve a restraining notice on a garnishee and where the judgment
creditor has not sent the debtor the notice warning that the debtor
has the right to exemptions, some courts have prohibited the
creditor's attempt to commence a turnover proceeding until the
creditor serves the required notice. 937
When the debtor serves the exemption claim on the bank, the
bank must then release "all funds" (presumably all exempt funds) 938
eight days after the postmark on the debtor's claim (or eight days
after personal delivery of the claim). 939 The bank must notify the
judgment creditor of the release date. 940 Release is canceled if the
judgment creditor interposes an objection before the release date. 941
Thus, where the creditor, the bank, and the debtor timely perform
their part in the drama, the bank account should be entirely
unfrozen in twenty-eight days. 942 The debtor can shorten this time
frame by promptly making the claim of exemption before the
twenty-day deadline. In the meantime, $2,500 of the account is
937 E.g., Weinstein v. Gitters, 462 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1983); Chem.
Bank v. Flaherty, 468 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1983).
938 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(4) (McKinney 2014) gives instructions to the creditor when the
funds are in part exempt and in part non-exempt. This certainly supports the view that "all
funds" should be inte:rpreted as meaning "all exempt funds."
939 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(3). Presumably the bank's obligation cannot be waived by contract.
In McCarthy v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), the debtors
sought damages from a bank for honoring a New York restraining notice with respect to a
Florida account. Id. at 269. The court held that the contract between bank and customer
authorized the bank to honor restraining notices. Id. at 274. Therefore, there could be no
action against the bank for wrongful restraint of the bank account. Id. But McCarthy did not
involve restraint of exempt funds. Id. at 270-71. Presumably, waiver of the bank's duties
with regard to exempt funds would not be honored, as waivers of exemptions are not honored
generally. State v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 406 N.E.2d 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1980) ("[C]ontractual
waivers of a debtor's statutory exemptions are usually held to be void.").
940 Prior to this time, the restraint is effective, and release of non-exempt funds by the
bank justifies the award of damages to the judgment creditor. Jackson v. TD Bank, No.
995/10, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3797, at *4 (Civ. Ct. Kings County Aug. 9, 2010).
041 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(3).
942 This remark is justified by the following table:
Action
Time of Performance
Statutory Authority

Creditor serves bank with
notice

Day0

C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)

Bank sends forms to debtor

Day2

C.P.L.R. 5222a-(b)(3)

Debtor claims exemptions

Day20

G.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(l)

Bank releases funds

Day28

C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(3)
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automatically exempt and unfrozen (if exempt wire transfers are in
evidence), allowing the debtor to sustain life over that time. 943
Although the debtor is required to make the claim for exemptions
within twenty days of being served, the bank is subject to a twentyfive-day rule. 944 According to this rule, where the bank receives no
claim twenty-five days after the bank mails the forms to the debtor,
"the funds remain subject to the restraining notice or execution." 945
This balances out if the post office takes exactly five days to deliver
the mail. But suppose, by a miracle, the postman delivers to the
debtor on the same day as the bank mailed. Then there is this
mysterious five-day gap. During this gap, it is too late for the
debtor to file her claim. Yet at the end of the gap, the funds are
restrained even if they are in fact exempt. 946 In that case, the
debtor will have to make a motion to the court to have the restraint
dissolved. "Failure of the judgment debtor to deliver the executed
exemption claim form does not constitute a waiver of any right to an
exemption." 947
If the debtor "demonstrat[es] that all funds in the account are
exempt," the creditor, within seven days of the postmark on the
debtor's return of the form, must instruct the banking institution to
release the account, whereupon the restraining notice is void. 948
If the debtor's claim shows that only some of the funds in the
account are exempt, the creditor is required to "apply the lowest
intermediate balance principle of accounting" to determine whether
the funds left in the account are exempt or not. 949 The lowest
intermediate balance (LIB) test is one of four tests typically applied
to separate commingled bank accounts. The LIB is developed from
trust law, where the trustee has wrongfully commingled trust funds
with personal funds. 950 The accounting problem arises whenever
the trustee has ambiguously withdrawn funds without evidence of
whether the trustee intended to draw personal or trust funds. 951
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(h) (McKinney 2014).
C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(l), (5).
946 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(5).
946 See id.
947 Id.
948 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(4).
Here there is no assumption that the debtor might serve the
attorney for the judgment creditor in person. Also CPLR section 5222-a(c)(4) negates the rule
in CPLR section 2103(b)(2) that permits a party served by mail to add five days to the
deadline for responding. Id.
949 Id.
950 Infranca, supra note 42, at 1182-84.
95l See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 202 cmt. j (1959).
94 a
944
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The idea of the LIB is that the trustee subject to the rule is
presumed, perhaps against his will, to be honest. Therefore, earlier
withdrawals are viewed as being the withdrawal of personal funds,
not fiduciary funds. 952 Only if it is logically necessary to recognize
that the trustee has embezzled trust funds do we lower our estimate
of the trust funds in the account. This dipping into the trust portion
of the account is the "lower intermediate balance" to which the
name refers. 953 Later, the trustee may make a deposit of personal
funds. 954 This deposit is not deemed to reimburse the trust (unless
the trustee historically intended it to do so). 955 Therefore the LIB
continues to constitute the maximum trust. 956
The CPLR is strangely silent about how the test is to work.
According to section 5222a-(c)(4) (second sentence):
Where the account contains some funds from exempt
sources, and other funds from unknown sources, the
judgment creditor shall apply the lowest intermediate
balance principle of accounting and, within seven days of the
postmark on the envelope containing the exemption claim
form and accompanying information, shall instruct the
banking institution to release the exempt money in the
account. 957
A key piece of information is left out of this formulation. Shall we
See, e.g., id. § 202 illus. 20.
Id.
954 Id.
955 See, e.g., id.
956 According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS:
Where the trustee deposits in a single account in a bank trust funds and his individual
funds, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so withdrawn,
and subsequently makes additional deposits of his individual funds in the account, the
beneficiary cannot ordinarily enforce an equitable lien upon the deposit for a sum
greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. If the amount on deposit at
all times after the deposit of the trust funds equalled or exceeded the amount of trust
funds deposited, the beneficiary is entitled to a lien upon the deposit for the full amount
of the trust funds deposited in the account. If after the deposit of trust funds in the
account the deposit was wholly exhausted by withdrawals before subsequent deposits of
the trustee's individual funds were made, the beneficiary's lien upon the deposit is
extinguished, and if he is unable to trace the money withdrawn, he is relegated to a mere
personal claim against the trustee, and is entitled to no priority over other creditors of
the trustee.
Id. § 202 cmt. j. The LIB test has been criticized as unduly complex, compared to the FIFO
system. Infranca, supra note 42, at 1182-84. A pre-EIPA court suggested that New York
would follow FIFO with regard to accounts containing exempt and nonexempt funds. Lincoln
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Miceli, No. 2342/01, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6811, at *11 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County Oct. 9, 2007).
95 7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(4) (McKinney 2014).
952
953
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analogize the debtor to a trustee, or shall we analogize the creditor
as the trustee? Very different results occur depending on this
assumption.
Suppose we say that the debtor is entitled to treat exempt funds
as her own, but is a fiduciary for any non-exempt property. These
funds properly ought to be paid to the creditor. On this assumption,
every withdrawal by the debtor is a withdrawal against exempt
funds, leaving (if possible) a positive balance for the creditor.
Such an assumption is supported by the observation that the
debtor is expected to live off the exempt funds but to reserve
everything else for the creditors. So any withdrawal by the debtor
is a withdrawal of the exempt funds, which the debtor then uses to
sustain life-the very purpose of the exemption.
The assumption, however, is contradicted by the fact that the
debtor is, in fact, not a fiduciary for the creditor. A debtor who
spends unencumbered non-exempt funds for purposes other than
paying does no wrong to the creditor. Furthermore, according to
Gresham's law, any self-interested debtor would obviously spend a
non-exempt dollar before spending an exempt one, and since the
debtor is no evildoer whose intent should be overridden in the name
of equity, we should allow the debtor her honest intent to maximize
her own welfare over that of the creditors. 958
Which assumption is the more appropriate? Analogies are
decided by aesthetic (i.e., subjective) criteria, so my opinion is no
better than yours. But it can be observed that the legislatureenacted EIPA was designed to protect debtors, and so the pro-debtor
interpretation of LIB seems entirely appropriate. 959
How may the creditor accomplish the formidable task of
administering LIB? 96 CPLR section 5222-a(c)(4) (fourth sentence)
does indicate that evidence of exemptedness includes "originals or
copies of benefit award letters, checks, check stubs or any other

°

958 That is, bad money gets circulated before good money.
ROGER LEROY MILLER &
ROBERT W. PULSINELLI, MODERN MONEY AND BANKING 27 (2d ed. 1989).

See Infranca, supra note 42, at 1183.
In Midland Funding LLC v. .Singleton, 943 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
2012), the court volunteers some advice:
Where the judgment debtor claims the funds on deposit in a bank account exempt from
execution because the funds are earned income earned within the last 60 days, the
judgment creditor could issue subpoenas and/or subpoenas duces tecum to the bank in
which the funds are deposited and the defendant/judgment debtor's employer requiring
them to appear on the date of the evidentiary hearing with bank statements, deposit
records, payroll records and to testify regarding these matters.
Id. at 377. The court also suggests that the creditor could call the debtor as a witness. Id.
959

960
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document that discloses the source of the judgment debtor's income,
and bank records showing the last two months of account
activity." 961 The form that the bank submits to the judgment debtor
urges (but does not require): 962 "If you have any documents, such as
an award letter, an annual statement from your pension, pay stubs,
copies of checks or bank records showing the last two months of
account activity, include copies of the documents with this form.
Your account may be released more quickly." 963
So far, the procedure for restraining notices served on banks does
not involve court appearances. 964 The matter changes if the creditor
objects to the debtor's claim of exemption. In such a case, the
creditor must move for an order sustaining the restraining notice
pursuant to CPLR section 5240. 965 This motion must be served on
the bank and the debtor within eight days of the postmark on the
debtor's claim. 966 The creditor is warned that the creditor's
objection must "demonstrate a reasonable belief that such judgment
debtor's account contains funds that are not exempt from execution
and the amount of such nonexempt funds." 967 No "conclusory''
remarks are allowed. 968 A penalty is threatened if the creditor
disputes the exemption claim in bad faith. 969 In the court hearing,
the debtor's exemption claim (which the creditor must submit to the

C.P.L.R. 5222-a(c)(4).
Singleton, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
963 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(4)(b).
964 Infranca, supra note 42, at 1157 ("The New York law seeks, when possible, to have the
matter resolved by the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, and the bank without
requiring a court hearing.").
,
965 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d). According to section 5240, "[t]he court may at any time, on its own
initiative or the motion of any interested person, and upon such notice as it may require,
make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extendipg or modifying the use of
any enforcement procedure." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5240 (McKinney 2014).
966 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d). Once again, the CPLR prohibits the creditor from extending this
time because service was by mail. Id. Ordinarily, a party served by mail can add five days to
the deadline for a response. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2103(b)(2) (McKinney 2014). Service by mail on
the debtor means a mailing to the address that the debtor listed on his exemption form, not
the address on the original summons, which may be out of date. Midland Funding LLC v.
Digonis, 889 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 2009).
967 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d).
96s Id.
969 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(g).
The penalty consists of "costs, reasonable attorney fees, actual
damages and an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars." Id. In general, "[i]f the
judgment creditor fails to act in accordance with this [rule], the judgment creditor shail be
deemed to have acted in bad faith and the judgment debtor may seek a court award of the
damages, costs, fees and penalties provided for in subdivision (g) of this section." C.P.L.R.
5222-a(c)(4).
961
962
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court), 970 "shall be prima facie evidence at such hearing that the
funds in the account are exempt funds. The burden of proof shall be
upon the judgment creditor to establish the amount of funds that
are not exempt." 971 Prior to 2009, this burden would have been on
the debtor. 972
The hearing on the debtor's exemption claim must be noticed for
seven days after the creditor serves the debtor and the bank with
papers. 973 The court must rule within five days of the hearing. 974
Pending the court's ruling, the bank must retain the exempt
funds for twenty-two days. 975 After that the funds must be released
unless the court orders the bank otherwise. 976 The creditor or her
attorney is expected to serve the court order on the bank within two
days of the order being issued. 977
As usual, none of these rules "apply when the state of New York
or any of its agencies" is the plaintiff. 978 So, for example, if the
judgment creditor is New York's Department of Taxation and
Finance, a bank is justified in restraining the account of a senior
citizen and charging fees that otherwise could not be charged. 979 It
is an ill cook that cannot lick his own fingers.
The exemption form urges but does not require the debtor to

•

C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d).
Id.
972 See Frasca v. Gen. Motors Corp., 643 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1020 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996)
(citing Zadar Constr. & Woodworking, Inc. v. Charter Woodworking Corp., 551 N.Y.S.2d 834,
834, (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990); Lesiak v. Benefit Commercial Corp., 475 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1984)).
973 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d).
"[D]ue process requires that a judgment debtor be afforded an
opportunity for a hearing on an exemption claim within a matter of days." McCahey v. L.P.
Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 552 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 59 (3d Cir.
1980) (en bane); Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1353 (1st Cir. 1985)). Prior to 2008, there
was no specific rule on when the hearing must take place. See Exempt Income Protection Act,
ch. 575, sec. 4, C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d), 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4092. The McCahey court left open
the possibility that the restraining notice procedure (as it still exists for nonbanks) is
unconstitutional for its failure to set a time limit for the hearing, but it declined to rule in a
case where the debtor, advised by lawyers, did in fact receive a prompt hearing. McCahey,
774 F.2d at 552-53. Though the 2008 legislation now provides for a prompt resolution in the
case of bank garnishees, it still does not do so for nonbanks. See C.P.L.R. 5222-a(a).
974 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d). In contrast, a section 5239 proceeding is not subject to any such
deadline. See C.P.L.R. 5239. Whether section 5239 adequately assured a judgment debtor a
prompt hearing on the exemption issue was left open, pending "a concrete example of its
application by New York Court[s] to a judgment debtor." McCahey, 774 F.2d at 553-54.
975 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(e).
976 Id.
977 C.P.L.R. 5222-a(d).
97s C.P.L.R. 5222-a(i).
979 Stephens v. Capitol One Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-00193 (SJF)(ARL), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89417, at *13-14 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2012).
970

9n
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provide documentary evidence of the exemption. 980 But what if the
debtor does not do so and then doesn't show up at the hearing?
Meanwhile, the exemption form is prima facie evidence in favor of
the debtor and the creditor has no proof at all, as the documents are
all in the possession of garnishees or the debtor.
The court in Midland Funding LLC v. Singleton felt entitled to
rule against the no-show debtor, even though the creditor had no
evidence to rebut the presumption. 981 The court complained that:
Nothing in CPLR 5222-a provides the court with guidance on
how to determine the validity of a claim of exemption when
the proof submitted by the judgment debtor to the judgment
creditor with the Exemption Claim Form is inconclusive or
insufficient to establish the exemption, when the judgment
creditor objects to the claimed exemption and the judgment
debtor ... fails to appear for the evidentiary hearing set by
the court to determine the validity of the claimed
exemption. 982
The court opined:
The legislature, when [it] enacted EIPA, could not possibly
have intended to permit a person to obtain an exemption
simply by checking a box on the Exemption Claim Form,
signing that form and timely mailing back to the judgment
creditor's attorney. Such a determination would permit
judgment debtors to obtain an exemption without having any
basis for claiming an exemption or presenting any proof
supporting the claimed exemption. 983 _
Thus, the presumption of exemptedness disappears, according to
the Singleton court, where the debtor does not show up to defend
her claim of exemption.

III.

INFORMATION SUBPOENAS

Besides the restraining notice, the other unilateral tool made
available to judgment creditors without the need of obtaining a
court order is the information subpoena. Unlike the restraining
notice, which must be issued by an attorney of the judgment

980

981

See C.P.L.R. 5222-a(b)(4)(b).
Midland Funding LLC v. Singleton, 943 N.Y.S.2d 373, 378 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County

2012).
982
983

Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
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creditor as officer of the court, 984 a judgment creditor may issue a
subpoena by herself, even though she is not an officer of the court. 985
An ancient appellate opinion says otherwise: a subpoena issued by a
judgment creditor must be quashed because creditors are not listed
as authorized to issue subpoenas under CPLR section 2302(a). 986
This seems questionable in light of the comparison of CPLR section
5222(a), requiring an attorney to issue a restraining notice, and
section 5223, directly authorizing the judgment creditor to issue a
subpoena. 987
A subpoena may be used to force a garnishee to retrieve
information from one of its corporate subsidiaries. In comparison,
the Court of Appeals in Northern Mariana Islands v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce 988 ruled that CPLR section 5225(b)
turnover orders require a garnishee to have "actual" possession of
the debt it owes to the judgment debtor. 989 Actual possession seems
to mean that the garnishee owes a vested or contingent debt or
directly possesses debtor property. "Constructive possession" seems
to mean that the garnishee controls an entity that owes the debt. 990
That actual possession is required was traced to the absence of the
words "or control." This decision may well cause mischief to the law
of New York, in that possession by any agent would seem to be
"constructive possession," thereby eliminating the possibility of
turnover orders against garnishees who relegate possession to
agents. Be that as it may, the word "control" appears in CPLR
section 5224(4)(a-l), 991 so garnishees served with subpoenas must

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(a) (McKinney 2014).
N,Y_- C.P.L.R. 5223 (McKinney 2014) ("[T]he judgment creditor may compel disclosure .
. . ."). Prior to judgment discovery may be had upon motion of a plaintiff. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6220
(McKinney 2014).
986 Chopak v. Marcus, 255 N.Y.S.2d 277, 277-78 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1964).
987 C.P.L.R. 5222(a), 5223.
Prejudgment subpoenas are made available under section
5229, but these require a court order and the occurrence of "a verdict or decision." N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5229 (McKinney 2014). Separately, if a prejudgment order of attachment has been
issued, a "court may order disclosure by any person of information regarding any property in
which the defendant has an interest, or any debts owing to the defendant." C.P.L.R. 6220. A
person served with the order of attachment has an automatic obligation, within ten days after
service, to provide "the sheriff [with] a statement specifying all debts of the garnishee to the
defendant, when the debts are due, all property in the possession or custody of the garnishee
in which the defendant has an interest, and the amounts and value of the debts and property
specified." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6219 (McKinney 2014).
988 N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 990 N.E.2d 114 (N.Y.
2013).
989 Id. at 115.
990 People v. Muhammad, 945 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (N.Y. 2011).
99 1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224(4)(a-1) (McKinney 2014).
984
98 5
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use their control over their agents to compel disclosure of
information. 992
A subpoena is not a court order, like a restraining notice is.
Nevertheless, it is contempt of court for a recipient not to obey it. 993
A subpoena may require personal attendance at a deposition, 994
the production of documents, 995 and written interrogatories. 996 If
the subpoena requires attendance or documents, the subpoena must
''be served in the same manner as a summons" 997 and must be
accompanied by the required fees. 998 An information subpoena may
be served by registered or certified mail. 999 The creditor must,
however, supply a return envelope with postage. 1000 The person
served or, in the case of a business association, "an officer, director,
agent or employee having the information," 1001 must respond.
Written answers must be under oath and are due within seven days
of receipt. 1002 Information subpoenas by email or fax require the
consent of the person served. 1003

992 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 02 Civ. 666 (JSR), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165209, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013).
993 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5251 (McKinney 2014); Torah v. Kesher Int'l Trading Corp., 667 N.Y.S.2d
759, 760-61 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998). It appears to be unconstitutional to send recipients of
a subpoena directly to jail without a hearing, at least where they are not represented by
attorneys. See Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1977); Vail v.
Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom., Judice v. Vail,
426 U.S. 946, and rev'd, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
99 4 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(l) (McKinney 2014).
996 C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(2).
996 C.P.L.R 5224(a)(3), (4).
997 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2303(a) (McKinney 2014); accord Aquavella v. Equivision, Inc., 694
N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1999). Court rules govern the form of the
subpoena. E.g., N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 208.39(f) (McKinney 2014) (requiring that a
subpoena put requirement of personal appearance in bold type). Failure to follow such rules
makes the subpoena invalid. See Neu-Era Lumber & Trim Co. v. Rieves, 465 N.Y.S.2d 119,
120 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1983).
998 Judgment debtors are entitled to no expenses or fees. C.P.L.R. 5224(b). Nondebtors
are entitled to payment in advance of "authorized traveling expenses and one day's witness
fee." Id. In federal cases, the witness fee is set by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. GMA Accessories v.
Elec. Wonderland, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72897, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012). In the case of a subpoena duces tecum, a debtor is not entitled to
expenses, but any nondebtor required to produce documents is entitled to payment in advance
under CPLR section 5224(b). D'Avenza S.P.A. v. Garrick & Co., No. 96 Civ. 0166
(DLC)(KNF), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1998). Failure to tender
the fees at the time the subpoena is served (or a reasonable time thereafter) renders the
subpoena invalid. Id. at *6--7.
999 C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3).
1000 Id.
1001 Id.
1002 Id.
1003 C.P.L.R 5224(a)(4). "Electronic means" are defined as "any method of transmission of
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As of January 1, 2007, 1004 an information subpoena (in a case
where the creditor is not the state of or a municipality in New York)
must include the following statement (apparently in capital letters):
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS INFORMATION
SUBPOENA COMPLIES WITH RULE 5224 OF THE CIVIL
PRACTICE LAW AND RULES AND SECTION 601 OF THE
GENERAL BUSINESS LAW1005 THAT I HAVE A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE PARTY RECEIVING
THIS SUBPOENA HAS IN THEIR POSSESSION
INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEBTOR THAT WILL
ASSIST THE CREDITOR IN COLLECTING THE
JUDGMENT. 1006
A subpoena that fails to set forth this capitalized certification 1s
automatically void. 1001
Where the certification is set forth, it is a reason to quash the
subpoena if the creditor, in fact, has no reason to believe the entity
served with a subpoena is relevantly connected to the debtor. 1008
But a common address or telephone number of the third party and

information between computers or other machines designed for the purpose of sending and
receiving such transmissions, and which allows the recipient to reproduce the information
transmitted in a tangible medium of expression." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2103(£)(2) (McKinney 2014).
1004 See Act of Aug. 16, 2006, ch. 452, sec. 2, C.P.L.R. 5224(a), 2006 N.Y. Laws 3333, 3334.
1005 The reference to section 601 of the General Business Law was added in 2011. Act of
Aug. 3, 2011, ch. 342, sec. 1, C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3)(i), 2011 N.Y. Laws 1129, 1129-30. Section
601 is a regulation of those who collect claims against consumers. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW§§
600(3), 601 (McKinney 2014). The provision prohibits a list of practices considered harassing
in nature. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 601. In 2011, the New York legislature added a provision that
governs creditors that send more than fifty information subpoenas per month in consumer
cases. C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3)(i), 2011 N.Y. Laws at 1129. The new provision requires the
creditor to keep records and to maintain them for five years. Id. The records must show
what reasonable belief attends each information subpoena. Id. at 1129-30. Oddly, section
602(3) of the General Business Law gives an "entity served with more than fifty information
subpoenas per month" a cause of action against the "principal creditor"-that is, a creditor
who seeks to enforce a consumer claim. GEN. Bus. LAW § 602(3); see also GEN. Bus. LAW §
600(3) (defining principal creditor). Surely, this is a scrivener's error. Undoubtedly the
legislature meant to give a cause of action to any entity who receives a single improper
information subpoena from a creditor who serves more than fifty information subpoenas per
month.
100s C.P.L.R. 5224(a)(3)(i).
1007 Cohan v. Movtady, No. 2845/11, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3096, at *6-7 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County June 17, 2001).
1008 Buffalo Laborers Welfare Fund v. Signal Constr. Co., No. 06-CV-400A, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 122583, at *8-9 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011); Tech. Multi Sources, S.A. v. Stack Global
Holdings, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007). This was also the rule prior
to the 2011 amendment. See Murray v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 627 N.Y.S.2d 969, 969
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
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the judgment debtor is enough to sustain the subpoena. 1009 So is
reason to believe that fraudulent conveyances were received. 1010
Accordingly, a restructuring consultant to corporate affiliates had to
answer with regard to its debtor client. 1011
Pursuant to CPLR section 5240, courts have wide discretion to
govern the scope of subpoenas. 1012 "'[T]he judgment creditor must
be given the freedom to make a broad inquiry to discover hidden or
concealed assets of the judgment debtor."' 1013 "An application to
quash a subpoena should be granted '[o]nly where the futility of the
process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious' or
where the information sought is 'utterly irrelevant to any proper
inquiry."' 1014 It is not required that the subpoena provide the exact
name and address of the debtor. 1015
A debtor's attorney might resist a subpoena on the basis of the
lawyer-client privilege, 1016 but only if the information sought was
given to the attorney "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." 1017

1009 Buffalo Laborers, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122583, at *9-10; Tech. Multi Sources, 845
N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.
1010 See Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd. v. Star Mark Mgmt., No. CV-042293 (SMG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99771, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010); Ateni Mar. Corp.
v. Great Marine Ltd., 631 N.Y.S.2d 116, 116 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996); ICD Grp., Inc. v. Israel
Foreign Trade Co., 638 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1996); Gottesman Co v.
Keystone Enters., Inc., No. 603352/03, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2131, at *5 (Sup. Ct. New York
County Apr. 21, 2011).
1011 Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. GBR Info. Servs., Inc., 815 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 2006) (citing ICD, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 430).
1012 See Tech. Multi Sources, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 358 ("[A court has] broad discretionary power
to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under article 52 to prevent
'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice.' ... 'An
application to quash a subpoena should be granted [o]nly where the futility of the process to
uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious' ... or where the information sought is
utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry."' (second alteration in original) (quoting Paz v. Long
Island R.R., 661 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1997) and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 537 (N.Y. 1988)); Liberty Co. v. Rogene Indus., 707 N.Y.S.2d 911,
911-12 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2000).
101s Costamar Shipping Co. v. Kim-Sail, Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 3349 (KTD), 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18430, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1995) (quoting Caisson Corp. v. County W. Bldg. Corp.,
62 F.R.D. 331, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
1014 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 537 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting In re Edge
Ho Holding Corp., 176 N.E. 537, 539 (N.Y. 1931) and La Belle Creole lnt'l, S.A. v. Att'y Gen.
of N.Y., 176 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1961)).
10 15 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Young, 523 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1987).
1016 See Boller v. Barulich, 557 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1990).
1017 Sarfati v. Bertino, No. 2008-1430 S C., 2009 Misc. LEXIS 1644, at *3 (App. Term 2d
Dep't June 29, 2009) (quoting In re Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986 (N.Y. 1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Legal bills sent by the attorney are not privileged, for
example. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Nat'l Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 600350/08, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
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For instance, the question whether the attorney is holding funds for
the debtor is not barred by the privilege, even if it involves the
attorney's retainer. 1018 Requesting documents that the debtor has
executed (as opposed to drafts of documents not executed) does not
invade the privilege. 1019 Questionably, a judgment debtor's address
has been held within the privilege, thereby permitting debtors to
hide. 1020 Meanwhile, the marital privilege does not seem to apply to
hidden assets. 1021 Of course, the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination applies, but a court may grant immunity from
prosecution to a witness in order to compel testimony. 1022
Requests must be relevant to the task at hand-discovering
assets that a creditor might reach in satisfaction of a judgment. 1028
Discovery "should be 'limited to a search for the [judgment debtor's]
hidden assets."' 1024 No fishing expeditions are permitted: "[A]
judgment creditor should tailor its requests appropriately, in order
to foster compliance and to achieve its ultimate goal, to wit, having
its judgment satisfied." 1025 Document requests that go too deeply
into the past are apt to be limited. 1026 "[U]nreasonable annoyance,
disadvantage, and prejudice" require that a subpoena be entirely
quashed (rather than pruned). 1027 A subpoena may not aim at
evidence to be used in a matter not yet reduced to judgment. 102s
"[D]isclosure concerning the assets of a non-party is generally not
4186, at *4 (Sup. Ct. New York County Aug. 3, 2009).
1018 Art Bd., Inc. v. Worldwide Bus. Exch. Corp., 510 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974-75 (Civ. Ct. New
York County 1986).
1019 Id. at 975.
1020 Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. Karmgard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 (Civ. Ct. New York
County 1979).
1021 G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1974).
1022 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5211 (McKinney 2014). The court must comply with New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 50.20, basically requiring that the court must order the witness to
provide evidence and must communicate the promise of immunity to the witness. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 50.20(2)(b) (McKinney 2014). A court wishing to grant immunity must give
twenty four hours written notice of this fact to the relevant district attorney. C.P.L.R. 5211.
1023 Rossini v. Republic of Arg., 453 F. App'x 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2011).
1024 GMA Accessories v. Electric Wonderland, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72897, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Costamar
Shipping Co. v. Kim-Sail, Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 3349 (KTD), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18430, at *8
(S.D.N.Y Dec. 12, 1995)).
1025 D'Avenza S.P.A. v. Garrick & Co., No. 96 Civ. 0166 (DLC)(KNF), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 243, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1998).
1026 Robbins v. Nat'l Dev. Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 351, 351-52 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1984); Gorea
v. Pinsky, 374 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880-81 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975).
1027 Riverside Capital Advisors, Inc. v. First Secured Capital Corp., 814 N.Y.S.2d 646, 649
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 2006).
1028 See YSL v. SHAL, 809 N.Y.S.2d 387, 391 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2005).

2013/2014]

Critique of Money Judgment Part Three

1637

contemplated," but it will be permitted "where the relationship
between the judgment debtor and the non-party is sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt about the bona fides of the transfer of assets
between them." 1029
Disclosure of tax returns is generally disfavored. "The party
seeking disclosure must make a strong showing of necessity and
demonstrate that the information contained in the returns is
unavailable from other sources." 1oao
Even if the information sought is relevant, "the obligation of a
third party served with a CPLR 5223 information subpoena is to
provide information which can with reasonable effort be ascertained
by means of its presently existing information retrieval system." 1oa1
There is no need to develop a new computer system just to respond
to a subpoena. 1082
Subpoenas may be issued to third parties without any notice
to the judgment debtor. 1088 A debtor has no standingto challenge a
subpoena to a third party unless she can show "a sufficient privacy
interest in the confidentiality of records pertaining to their personal
financial affairs so as to give them standing to challenge [a]
subpoena." 1084
Nevertheless, in EM Ltd. V. Republic of
Argentina, 1085 this fine point of standing was ignored. In Republic of
Argentina, a plaintiff with a money judgment against Argentina had
served subpoenas on third party banks. Argentina moved to quash
on the ground that the subpoenas violated the Federal Soverign
Immunities Act (FSIA). 1086 One of the banks joined in this motion
but later dropped out after the plaintiff agreed to reduce the scope
Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Gordon v. Grossman, 584 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1992) (citing Lukowsky
v. Shalit, 559 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1990); Matthews .Indus. Piping Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985); Briton v. Knott Hotels Corp.,
489 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1985)). But see Siemens & Halske v. Gres, 354
N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1973) (broadly permitting extensive discovery
of joint tax returns).
1031 Carrick Realty Corp. v. Flores, 598 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1993) (emphasis added).
1032 Id.
1033 Encalada v. CPSl Realty LP, No. 104782/2007 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2572, at *6
(Sup. Ct. New York County June 5, 2014).
1034 GMA Accessories v. Elec. Wonderland, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 72897, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting In re Flag
Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3400 (WCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69140, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006)).
1035 EM Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom Rep. of Arg. v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
1036 Id. at 205 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (2013)).
1029
1030
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of the subpoena. 1037 Argentina was permitted to claim on the merits
that the FSIA barred the subpoena. 1038 But the District Court
decided the FSIA did not bar the subpoena. 1039 The appellate courts
agreed-on the merits. 1040 It is possible, however, that the status of
Argentina as a sovereign state is relevant to standing, which would
otherwise appear to be disallowed as a matter of New York law. For
example, in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1041 a creditor in a
default judgment moved for some sort. of declaration under
California law that an account receivable in France due to Iran be
transferred to the creditors. 1042 The District Court sua sponte
denied the order under the authority of the FSIA, though Iran had
made no appearance in the case. 1043 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal rejected the notion that sovereign immunity was a
mere defense that had to be pleaded. 1044 Rather, the FSIA was
conceived to limit the jurisdiction of the court to issue the requested
declaration. 1045 If indeed the FSIA is "jurisdictional," then the
District Court in the Argentina case could and surely should
consider sua sponte the merits of Argentina's claim,· even though
technically Argentina had no standing to quash the subpoena under
New York law.
Subpoenas might be vacated or modified if they are abusive or
harassing. 1046 A court might issue an order that threatens contempt
sanctions if the subpoena is not complied with. 1047 It might hold the
recipient of the subpoena in contempt with the proviso that the
contempt would be deemed purged if the recipient complied by a
stated deadline.104s
After some controversy in the courts about whether out-of-state

EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 205.
Id.
1039 Id.
1040 Id. at 210.
1o41 Peterson v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2010).
1o 42 Id. at 1121.
1043 Id. at 1121, 1123-24.
1044 Id. at 1124.
1045 Id. at 1125.
1°46 Carrick Realty Corp., 598 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05.
1047 Ferrara v. Metro D Excavation & Found., Inc., No. 10 CV 4215 (SLT)(LB), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22443, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb 22, 2012). The venue rules of section 5221(a) apply
to enforcement of subpoenas by contempt orders, though, as always, venue objections are
waived if not made, as where the respondent simply defaults. Cornell Fed. Credit Union v.
Thorpe, 606 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90-91 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1993).
1048 Coldwell Banker Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Gitlin, No. 002015-09, 2011 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 4315, at *7 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County Aug. 29, 2011).
·
1031

103s
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entities present in New York had to respond to subpoenas duces
tecum, 1049 the legislature in 2006 added CPLR section 5224(a-1)
requiring, among others, "a corporation, partnership, limited
liability company or sole proprietorship doing business, licensed,
qualified, or otherwise entitled to do business in the state" to
respond to a subpoena duces tecum, "whether the materials sought
are in the possession, custody or control of the subpoenaed person,
business or other entity within or without the state." 1050 This
provision overrules the branch rule for banks insofar as subpoenas
are concerned. Thus, the branch rule with regard to restraining
notices was upheld in Global Technology, Inc. v. Royal Bank of
Canada, but the court also made clear that any such rule could not
apply to subpoenas. 105 1
It may be possible for corporations to escape new CPLR section
5224(a-1) even though jurisdictionally present in New York. In In
re Navigator Gas Transport PLC, 1052 a creditor's committee had a
contempt judgment against a former shareholder of the debtor .1053
Under the plan, the old shareholders were wiped out, and new
shares were to be issued to creditors. 1054 A foreign corporation
bought up some debt and filed a proof of claim, thereby submitting
to jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court in New York City. 1055 The
creditor's committee wished to restrain the bankruptcy distribution
to the foreign corporation on the ground that it was an alter ego of
the contemnor. 1056 The court held that the committee had presented
no evidence to justify the alter ego theory.: 057 It also ruled that the

1049 Compare Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(explaining that when a corporation doing business or licensed to do business in New York is
served, the subpoena duces tecum reaches "all responsive materials within the corporation's
control'' regardless of where those materials are located), with Walsh v. Bustos, 46 N.Y.S.2d
240, 241 (City Ct. New York County 1943) (quashing subpoena under the Civil Practice Act
where account was at a foreign branch, even though foreign bank maintained a branch in
New York).
1050 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1) (McKinney 2014).
105 1 Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., No. 150151/2011, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 47,
at *37 & n.12 (Sup. Ct. New York County Jan. 11, 2012); see Intercontinental Credit Corp. v.
Roth, 578 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1990) (Israeli bank was ordered to
respond to subpoena duces tecum).
1052 In re Navigator Gas Transp. PLC, 358 B.R. 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
105a Id. at 83.
1054 Id. at 84.
1 055 Id. at 87.
1066 Id. at 84.
1057 The sole shareholder of the foreign creditor was the "friend ... and/or ... father" of the
contemnor, but this was held to be insufficient evidence to raise the suspicion of an alter ego
theory. Id. at 88--89.
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corporation did not have to respond to an information subpoena,
because, though the corporation was jurisdictionally present in New
York, the creditors' committee had not shown that the corporation's
bankruptcy dividend was owned by the contemnor. 1058
It seems odd that the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation and control over the dividend that is
alleged to be secretly the property of the contemnor. Yet the court
felt it could not sustain a subpoena against the foreign
corporation. 1059 Arguably the case could be read to establish a high
burden on creditors to establish reason to believe in the alter ego
theory. In any case, Navigator Gas seems to be a case in which a
foreign corporation was subject to jurisdiction in New York yet not
doing business in New York and therefore immune from subpoenas.
In federal cases, the FRCPs incorporate by reference all the
above-described discovery rules of the CPLR. 106 Federal subpoenas
must also comply with FRCP Rule 45. 1061 In particular, Rule 45(c)
has a 100-rn:ile travel rule and also Rule 45(b)(l) requires that the
requisite fee and expenses be tendered at the time the subpoena is
served. 1062 Failure to follow such rules makes the subpoena
invalid. 1063

°

IV. CONCLUSION

The restraining notice is a powerful tool but with curious
weaknesses. It renders third parties liable for damages if the
restraint is violated. But the restraining notice supposedly creates
no lien, causing difficulties in the case of advance payment for
services not yet rendered.
Advance payments are typically
payments of contingent debts. Contingent debts are typically
leviable as "property," as the court of appeals ruled in the famous
case of ABKCO Industries v. Apple Films, Inc. 1064 Verizon New

Id. 89--90.
Id. at 90.
FED. R. Crv. P. 69(a)(2) ("In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or
a successor in interest whose interest appears of record may obtain discovery from any
person-including the judgment debtor-as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the
state where the court is located.").
1061 GMA Accessories v. Elec. Wonderland, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3219 (PKC) (DF), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72897, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012).
1062 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(l), (c)(3)(A)(ii).
1063 Xstrata Can. Corp. v. Advanced Recycling Tech., Inc., No. 08-CV-1366 (LEK/DRH),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118110, at* 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2010).
1064 ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1976); see Alliance Bond
1058

1059
106
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England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Services, Inc. is a case in
which the relation between a judgment debtor and a garnishee was
"too contingent"-the contingent debt therefore did not qualify as
property. 1065 Nevertheless, the case illustrates the problem created
by New York's expansive setoff rule. Even after a levy arises, the
garnishee is invited to set off post-levy debts at the expense of the
sheriff. Where a contingent debt is leviable as property, a levy is
useless to prevent prepayment. Given that the restraining notice is
even less potent than the levy, this result will also be seen in
restraining notice cases.

Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 190 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1999) ("ABKCO
virtually erases the distinction in [section] 5201 between 'debt' and 'property' by recharacterizing-as 'property against which a money judgment may be enforced'-debts that
otherwise are placed out of reach by [section] 5201(a)'s requirement that the debt being
pursued be either past due or certain to become due upon demand.").
1065 Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 124-25
(N.Y.2013).

